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This thesis examines three ways in which education is deliberately and directly 
attacked during situations of armed conflict: firstly, situations where students, 
educational personnel, and educational institutions are physically attacked; secondly, 
where education institutions are used for military purposes; and thirdly, where 
children are recruited for military purposes, including recruitment from within schools 
and along school routes. Deliberate and direct attacks against education during 
situations of non-international armed conflict are a long-standing problem. Given the 
importance of education for the individual and society as a whole, this is an issue in 
need of addressing. There is, at the time of writing, however, no analysis as to the 
adequacy of IHRL in providing for the right to education, and of IHL in protecting 
education, in the context of deliberate and direct attacks during non-international 
armed conflicts, in both theory and practice. I examine the phenomenon of deliberate 
and direct attacks in Colombia and the DRC. The methodology is therefore socio-legal 
in nature. The findings of this thesis are that gaps and ambiguities exist in the manner 
in which international human rights law provides for the right to education, and in 
which international humanitarian law protects education. While there is some scope 
for international human rights law to fill the gaps in international humanitarian law, 
and vice versa, when the regimes are applied simultaneously in practice to the issue of 
deliberate and direct attacks, gaps and ambiguities nonetheless remain. There is scope 
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Central research question 
       This thesis examines the phenomenon of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education during non-international armed conflicts.1 Specifically, it focuses on three 
situations in which deliberate and direct attacks against education occur: firstly, 
physical attacks against educational institutions, students, and educational personnel; 
secondly, the military use of educational institutions; thirdly, the military recruitment 
and use of children.2 The central research question of this thesis is whether, in respect 
of these types of deliberate and direct attacks, international human rights law 
adequately provides for the right to education, 3  and whether international 
humanitarian law adequately protects education.4 In order to shed light on the efficacy 
of the law in practice, I examine deliberate and direct attacks against education in the 
context of NIAC in Colombia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.5  
This thesis is written for two purposes. Firstly, this thesis is written to provide 
guidance to those responsible for implementing the law ‘on the ground’ as to how 																																																								
1 Hereinafter NIAC. 
2 ‘Attack’, for the purposes of international humanitarian law, is defined as ‘an act of 
violence…whether in offence or in defence’: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 
Jun. 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 7 Dec 1978, Art 49(1-2), hereinafter Additional Protocol 
I. The examination of physical attacks against educational institutions, staff and students conforms to 
the notion of being ‘attacked’ in international humanitarian law, however, the military use of 
educational institutions or the military recruitment and use of children will not amount to an ‘attack’ 
within the meaning of Additional Protocol I: Peter Rowe, ‘Chapter 10: The Application of International 
Humanitarian Law to Attacks on Education in Armed Conflict’ in UNESCO, Protecting Education 
from Attack: A State-of-the-Art Review (UNESCO 2010), 180. However, one of the three key texts in 
this field refers to an attack on education as ‘an act against education, students and education staff, and 
educational institutions…education-related violations are those acts which attack and undermine the 
conditions necessary for education’: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Protecting 
Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict: An International Law Handbook (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 2012), 5-6, hereinafter BIICL Handbook. While the military use of 
educational institutions and the military recruitment and use of children does not fall within the legal 
definition of an ‘attack’ within international humanitarian law, this thesis adopts the wider 
interpretation of attack as contained within the BIICL Handbook, as such deliberate and direct acts 
result in individuals being deprived of their right to education and are therefore attacks against 
education within the meaning of international human rights law. 
3 Hereinafter IHRL 
4 Hereinafter IHL 
5 Hereinafter DRC; I explain the choice of case studies in the methodology section of Chapter 4. 
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IHRL and IHL, as they currently stand, should be applied in practice simultaneously. 
Secondly, this thesis is written to provide guidance to policy makers at the 
international, regional, and national levels as to how IHRL and IHL can be improved 
in order to better facilitate the realisation of the right to education in situations of 
NIAC. 
NIAC can, of course, significantly impact the realisation of the right to education 
in many ways. However, due to the focus on deliberate and direct attacks against 
education in NIAC, this thesis does not examine issues such as indiscriminate attacks 
against education, or disproportionate incidental loss of life and injury to students and 
educational personnel, or disproportionate damage to schools. Also, this thesis does 
not look at issues such as access to education in NIAC more broadly, so for example, 
it does not look at access in refugee camps. Additionally, while regional instruments 
are of importance to the protection of education, this thesis only examines the 
adequacy of the law that is of universal application. Finally, this thesis concentrates on 
the adequacy of the norms of IHRL and IHL, and does not examine the adequacy of 
the accountability mechanisms in international law, though it is recognised that 
adequate accountability mechanisms are important for the effective realisation of the 
right to education in practice.6 
Rationale 
NIAC not only negatively impacts the realisation of the right to education but also 
many other rights, so why then is education deserving of increased protection? This 
question is addressed, firstly, from a legal perspective, as everyone has a right to 
																																																								
6 For a discussion of the adequacy of the accountability mechanisms in international law, see the BIICL 
Handbook (n2); see also Shaheed Fatima QC, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict (Hart Publishing 
2018), hereinafter Protecting Children. 
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education within IHRL that remains applicable in a NIAC. 7  This question is 
addressed, secondly, from the perspective of the particular benefits to the individual 
and society.  
The Continued Application of the Right to Education for All during Situations of 
Non-International Armed Conflict 
Education is deserving of increased protection in a NIAC in the face of deliberate 
and direct attacks, as all States have committed to realising the right to education for 
everyone, and such attacks impact the realisation of this right. The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which provides for the right to education for all, has been almost 
universally ratified, with the exception of the United States of America.8 The United 
States of America is, however, a party to the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which also recognises the right of 
all to education.9 As such, each State has committed to ensuring the right to education 
by ratifying at least one of the major IHRL instruments.  
Significantly, the right of every person to education remains applicable even if a 
situation of armed conflict exists, whether an international armed conflict or NIAC.10 
The ‘traditional approach’ to the question of the applicability of IHRL in armed 
conflicts is that IHRL applies only in peacetime, while IHL applies only in wartime.11 
																																																								
7 For a discussion of the right of all to education as contained within the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see Chapter 1.  
8 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; For the ratification status of this instrument, see 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en> (Last accessed 30/09/2019) 
9 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, Arts 5 and 
7; For the ratification status of this instrument, see 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&clang=_en> (Last accessed 30/09/2019) 
10 Hereinafter IAC 
11 Gill refers to the view that IHRL does not apply during an armed conflict as the ‘traditional 
approach’, while Heintze refers to this as both the ‘traditional approach’ and the ‘separation theory’, 
and Hathaway and others describe this as ‘the displacement model’: Oona A Hathaway and others, 
‘Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship between International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review 1883, 1894-1895; Terry D Gill, 
‘Chapter 9: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and 
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Now, however, it is well accepted that IHRL applies in armed conflicts,12 and while it 
is also traditionally argued that the two regimes developed separately, this proposition 
is also increasingly challenged.13 
 While the focus of the question as to the applicability of IHRL in armed conflicts 
has previously been on civil and political rights,14 with economic, social and cultural 
rights being largely absent from the debate,15 many scholars also argue that both CPR 
and ESCR are applicable in armed conflicts alongside IHL.16 This is important as the 
																																																																																																																																																															
International Human Rights Law – A Plea For Mutual Respect and a Common-sense Approach’ (2013) 
12 The Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 251, 255; Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theories on the 
Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in Robert Kolb and 
Gloria Gaggioli, Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2013), 54-62. 
12 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2002), 193; 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd Ed, Oxford University Press 2008), 74; Cordula 
Droege, ‘Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90 International Review of 
the Red Cross 501, 501-502; Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict’ (2011) 22(1) The European Journal of International Law 219, 234; Katharine Fortin, 
‘Complementarity between the ICRC and the United Nations and International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law, 1948 to 1968’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 1433, 
1434; Vera Gowlland-Debbas and Gloria Gaggioli, ‘The Relationship between International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law: An Overview’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli, Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013), 79; Jean d’Aspremont and 
Elodie Tranchez, ‘The Quest for a Non-Conflictual Existence of International Human Rights Law and 
Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the Lex Specialis Principle?’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli, 
Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013), 223; 
Amrei Müller, The Relationship between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law: An Analysis of Health-Related Issues in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013), 20; William Boothby, Conflict Law: The Influence of New 
Weapons Technology, Human Rights and Emerging Actors (T.M.C. Asser Press 2014), 326, 376; 
Jordan J Paust, ‘Human Rights on the Battlefield’ (2015) 47 The George Washington International Law 
Review 509, 511; Daragh Murray and others (eds), Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in 
Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2016), paras 1.02, 1.05; Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-
Ortega, and Johanna Herman, War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice (3rd ed, Routledge 
2018), 54 
13 Fortin, (n12), 1433,1434; Boyd van Dijk, ‘Human Rights in War: On the Entangled Foundations of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ (2018) 112 The American Journal of International Law 553, 553 
14 Hereinafter CPR 
15 Noam Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’ (2005) 87 
International Review of the Red Cross 737, 751; Cordula Droege, ‘The Interplay between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40(2) 
Israel Law Review 310, 342; Elizabeth Mottershaw, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed 
Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 12(3) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 449, 449, 451-452; Ian Scobbie, ‘Principle or Pragmatics? The 
Relationship between Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflicts’ (2010) 14(3) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 449, 454; Giacca, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press 2014), 82-84; Hereinafter ESRC 
16 Lubell, (n15), 751; Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge 
University Press 2006), 120; Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law 
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right to education is considered an ESCR, due to it being provided for within the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.17 It is clear that 
within the scholarly debate there has been a move towards the continued applicability 
of CPR and ESCR in situations of both IAC and NIAC, and this is also affirmed in 
numerous authoritative international sources. This was first affirmed in 1968, when 
the United Nations adopted General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), entitled 
‘Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict’. 18  Following the adoption of 
Resolution XXIII, the continued applicability of ESCR, including the right to 
education specifically, was affirmed in sources of IHL, 19  IHRL, 20  and by the 
International Court of Justice.21 
																																																																																																																																																															
of Armed Conflicts (Hart Publishing 2008), 270; BIICL Handbook (n2), 35, 47; Mary E O’Connell, 
‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2013), 13; Gerd Oberleitner, ‘Humanitarian Law as 
a Source of Human Rights Law’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2013), 291; hereinafter CPR and ESCR respectively. 
17 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976, hereinafter ICESCR 
18 United Nations General Assembly, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 19 December 
1968, A/RES/2444; Notably, ‘human rights’ are referred to as opposed to CPR, and ‘armed conflict’ is 
referred to as opposed to IAC, indicating that it was recognised that both CPR and ESCR applied in 
both IAC and NIAC. 
19 See Additional Protocol I, Art 72; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977, entered into force 7 Dec 1978, Preamble, hereinafter Additional Protocol II; ICRC, 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(ICRC 1987), para 4371; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edn, ICRC 
2016), para 39 and ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(2nd edn, ICRC 2017); which refer to the applicability of IHRL alongside IHL in IAC and NIAC 
without distinguishing between CPR and ESCR. 
20 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, 
Art 38, hereinafter CRC; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, entered into force 12 
February 2002, hereinafter OPCRC, which are IHRL instruments that regulate the protection of 
children in IAC and NIAC alongside IHL; See also the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
hereinafter HRC, and its Universal Periodic Review, the function of which is to review the fulfilment 
by each State of its human rights obligations. The HRC stated that ‘given the complementary and 
mutually interrelated nature of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the 
review shall take into account applicable international humanitarian law’, again without distinguishing 
between CPR and ESCR or IAC and NIAC, United Nations Human Rights Council, Institution-
Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 2007, A/HRC/RES/5/1. On this see 
also, Lijiang Zhu, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human 
Rights Council an Empirical Survey’ (2014) Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 186, 
186-187, 211-212; See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of 
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Specifically in respect of the right to education, Vernor Munoz, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, states that ‘emergency situations should 
not…entail suspension of domestic and international obligations to guarantee the 
human rights of those affected’.22 The following UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Education, Kishore Singh, provides that ‘emergencies do not relieve states from 
their obligation to take all appropriate measures to ensure the realization of the right to 
																																																																																																																																																															
Emergency (Article 4), 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, paras 3 and 16; United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para 11; United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: on Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, 30 October 2018, CCPR/C/GC/36, paras 2, 
23, 29, 64, 67, 6, and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 7: The 
Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11.1 of the Covenant: Forced Evictions), 20 May. 1997, E/1998/22, at 
[5] (General Comment 7); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12), 11 Aug. 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, at 
[10, 34] (General Comment 14); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 Jan. 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, 
at [21] (General Comment 15); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 19: The Right to Social Security (art. 9), 4 Feb. 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, at [27, 50] (General Comment 
19); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel 31 August 2001, E/C.12/1/Add.69, at [12]; Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, 26 June 2003, E/C.12/1/Add.90, at [31]; Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Democratic Republic of the Congo, December 2009, E/C.12/COD/CO/416, at [6]; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Colombia, 7 June 2010, E/C.12/COL/CO/5, at [7]; United 
Nations General Assembly, Report of Four Special Rapporteurs on their Mission to Lebanon and 
Israel, 2 October 2006, A/HRC/2/7, at [15], which clearly affirm the applicability of both CPR and 
ESCR in IAC and NIAC. 
21 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, International Court of 
Justice, 8 July 1996, at [25] (Nuclear Weapons Opinion), which, on the issue of the right to life, a CPR, 
provides that the ICCPR applied in armed conflict; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004, at 
[106, 134] (Wall Opinion), which goes further by stating that the construction of the wall impeded ‘the 
exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate 
standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (emphasis added); Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 
2005 (Dec. 19), at [216-217] (DRC v Uganda), which held that the CRC and the OPCRC, instruments 
which protect children and education from deliberate and direct attack in IAC and NIAC, had been 
violated; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) I.C.J. Rep. 2008 (Oct. 15), at [112], which held that 
that the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, an instrument which protects the right 
to education, applied ‘even if certain of these alleged acts might also be covered by other rules of 
international law, including humanitarian law’, hereinafter ICJ 
22 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 
Vernor Munoz: Right to Education in Emergency Situations, 20 May 2008, A/HRC/8/10, at [10] 
(Education in Emergency Situations) 
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education for all persons in their territories’.23 These are the clearest authoritative 
statements as to the right to education applying in both IAC and NIAC.  
Restrictions on the applicability of IHRL during Armed Conflicts 
While it is now clearly accepted that ESCR, including the right to education, 
remains applicable during a NIAC, there are, however, situations in which the 
application of both CPR and ESCR may be restricted in armed conflict situations. An 
IHRL treaty that has been ratified and is in force may apply only partially where a 
valid reservation, derogation, or limitation has been made to the treaty, where a State 
is acting extraterritorially, and where the perpetrator is a non-State actor, such as a 
non-State armed group.24  
Reservations 
Reservations can be made to CPR and ESCR, and can also be made to IHL 
treaties, and reservations to IHRL instruments can apply in peacetime as well as 
during a conflict. Therefore, this is not a restriction specific to ESCR. Article 2(1)(d) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a reservation is a:  
 
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State.25  
 
																																																								
23 United Nations General Assembly, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education, Kishore Singh: The Right to Education, 5 August 2011, A/66/269, at [67] (Report of 
Kishore Singh) 
24 Hereinafter NSAG 
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May. 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (1969), entered into 
force 27 Jan. 1980, Art 2(1)(d), hereinafter VCLT 
	 	
	 20	
Article 19 of the VCLT provides that a State may only make a reservation to a treaty, 
firstly, where the treaty permits this, and secondly, where it is compatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty.26 Therefore, a State should not be permitted to make 
a reservation in respect of minimum core obligations, simply put, the essential 
elements of a right. 27 If the State were permitted to make a reservation in respect of 
the minimum core of the right to education, during peacetime or NIAC, this would 
undoubtedly cause the right to lose its raison d’être. In the case studies of this thesis, 
there are no relevant reservations made by Colombia and the DRC to the treaties that 
regulate the issue of deliberate and direct attacks in a NIAC. While the question of 
reservations is important to this issue beyond the context of the two States examined, 
it is not necessary to discuss this in further detail for the purposes of this thesis. 
Derogations and Limitations 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a clause 
allowing the State to derogate from certain rights.28 Conversely, the ICESCR does not 
contain a derogation clause; instead it permits limitations to its rights.29 In respect of 
derogations, Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that: 
 
‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under 
																																																								
26 Ibid, Art 19 
27 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of minimum core obligations. 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 4, hereinafter ICCPR 
29 Mottershaw (n15), 451-452; Amrei Müller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social 
and Economic Rights’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights Law Review 557, 558; Louise Doswald-Beck, 
Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford University Press 2011), 467 
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international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.30  
 
Article 4 of the ICESCR sets out the meaning of ‘limitations’, providing that States 
may subject ESCR 'only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as 
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’.31 It has also been correctly 
argued that limitations must not affect the minimum core of ESCR, since this would 
go against the nature of the right.32 As such, in a NIAC, while a State may be 
permitted to make a limitation to the right to education, this is not permissible in 
respect of elements of the right that form part of the minimum core. 
In respect of the derogability of ESCR, on the one hand, it is argued that as there is 
no derogation clause in the ICESCR, parties will continue to be bound by it in 
situations of armed conflict.33 Conversely, the CESCR, in the limited guidance they 
have provided, has stated that minimum core obligations also cannot be subject to 
derogation.34 It is therefore arguable that non-core rights within the ICESCR can be 
derogated from,35 and there ‘seems to be some agreement on the derogability of ESCR 
such as the right to strike, rights related to trade unions and the right to work in 
exceptional situations’.36 Alston and Quinn argue also that in a sufficiently grave 
																																																								
30 ICCPR, Art 4; Note that Article 4(2) of the ICCPR prohibits derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 
(paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18.  
31 ICESCR, Art 4 
32 Giacca (n15), 82; Müller, ‘Limitations’ (n29), 575; For a detailed discussion of the concept of 
‘minimum core’, see Chapter 1. 
33 Murray, Guide, (n12), at [1.1.40]; See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 9 July 2004, paras. 102–12 
34 General Comment 14, at [47]; General Comment 15, at [40]; For a detailed discussion of the 
minimum core obligations see Chapter One 
35 Müller, ‘Limitations’ (n29), 557; BIICL Handbook (n2), 22 
36 Giacca (n15), 84 
	 	
	 22	
situation, the absence of a derogation clause should not be interpreted as foreclosing 
the possibility of derogation.37  
There is, therefore, a lack of clarity as to the derogability of ESCR and the right to 
education. Though even if it is possible to derogate from ESCR, it is clear that the 
minimum core of ESCR remains non-derogable, so the restriction on the applicability 
of ESCR is only partial. However, no relevant derogations or limitations have been 
made by Colombia and the DRC. While derogations and limitations are important 
issues in respect of the protection of education more widely, the precise nature and 
scope of these principles will not be examined further as this is not necessary for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
Extra-territorial obligations 
The extraterritorial application of IHRL has now been clearly established.38 The 
case law of the ICJ supports the position that IHRL obligations extend 
extraterritorially to situations in which the State exercises ‘effective control’ over a 
territory.39 The question of extraterritorial applicability is relevant during IAC and in 
cases of occupation, where a State is likely to be operating outside of its own 
borders.40 As such, a State will not be bound by IHRL where it does not exercise 
effective control over territory, though a State that has effective control will be bound 
to protect IHRL, including the right to education. The case studies of this thesis 
concern NIAC, as such the issue of extraterritorial obligations is not relevant. As such, 
the complex issue of extraterritorial IHRL obligations will not be discussed further, 
																																																								
37 Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 
156 
38 John Cerone, ‘Jurisdiction and Power: the Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 396, 418 
39 Noam Lubell, ‘Parallel Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law: An Examination of the debate’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 648, 652 
40 Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying’ (n15), 739 
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though it is important to note that the issue is important for the wider protection of 
education in armed conflict situations. 
Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups 
It is often argued that IHL binds all parties to a conflict, including NSAG.41 
However, the question as to whether IHRL binds non-State actors is far more 
controversial,42 as there is disagreement as to whether NSAG may be bound by 
IHRL.43 NSAG may have a significant impact on the enjoyment of human rights, 
including the right to education, which implies that they should have obligations, but 
this is countered with the argument that it is the States responsibility to regulate the 
conduct of these actors.44 The significant threat that NSAG pose to CPR and ESCR ‘is 
particularly so where a State has lost control over part of its territory’.45 Yet, there is a 
growing consensus to suggest that NSAG can hold IHRL obligations,46 particularly 
where they have control over territory.47 In situations where the State has no power to 
enforce its IHRL obligations as a result of a NSAG’s control over territory, if NSAG 
have no IHRL obligations this results in a legal vacuum where individuals are left 
																																																								
41 Moir (n12), 194; Laura M Olson, ‘Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity 
Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – Demonstrated by the Procedural 
Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2009) 40(3) Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 437; Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging’ (n12), 248; Daragh Murray, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: Studies in International Law (Hart Publishing 2016), 
10-12, 59, 82; Protecting Children (n6), at [2.14.1] 
42 Droege, ‘The Interplay’ (n15), 336; Droege, ‘Elective Affinities?’ (n12), 521 
43 Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging’ (n12), 242-243; Katharine Fortin, The Accountability of Armed 
Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 15 
44 Sigrun I. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International 
Cooperation (Intersentia: Oxford, 2006), 63-64 
45 Tatyana Eatwell, State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Committed in the State’s 
Territory by Armed Non-State Actors (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights 2018), 7; As to the ability of NSAG to have a significant impact of the enjoyment of 
rights, see also, Tilman Rodenhäuser, Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups under 
International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press 2018), 1-4 
46 Emily Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010), 127 
47 Nigel S Rodley, ‘Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?’ in Kathleen E. Mahoney 
and Paul Mahoney (eds), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (Springer 1993), 297–313; 
Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2002), 52; Fortin, The Accountability (n43), 385-386 
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without effective legal protection.48 By allowing a vacuum to exist, international law’s 
effectiveness is undermined, as it fails to respond to the realities of international life.49 
Murray argues that ‘it does not seem reasonable that affected individuals should be 
denied the protections of international human rights law solely because the entity to 
whose authority they are subject is not a state’.50  
Not only does it remain unclear whether NSAG have IHRL obligations, especially 
when such groups do not have territorial control, another significant concern is 
whether NSAG have the capacity to comply with the rules of IHRL, as some have 
significant capabilities and some do not.51 It is often argued that non-State actors are 
unlikely to have the capacity to uphold certain rights.52 The question as to whether and 
to what extent NSAG must apply IHRL is, therefore, left unresolved.53 In the case 
studies of this thesis, due to the difficulties in determining whether the NSAG in 
question have territorial control and the capacity to realise the right to education, the 
focus is on the obligations of the States of Colombia and the DRC, as the primary 
IHRL obligations holders. As I only analyse the obligations of States within the case 
studies of this thesis, it is not necessary, and beyond the scope of this thesis, to 
examine in any more detail the obligations of NSAG. 
The Benefits of Ensuring the Realisation of the Right to Education for All during 
Situations of Non-International Armed Conflict 
As well as education being a legal right for all that States are required to realise 
during situations of NIAC, there are other significant and persuasive reasons for 
ensuring increased protection of education in NIAC. Arguably, one of the most 																																																								
48 Murray (n41), 9-10; Fortin, The Accountability (n43), 375 
49 Ibid, (n41), 10 
50 Ibid, 157, 159; See also, Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 534; Chris Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New 
Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 60, 61 
51 Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging’ (n12), 253, 256 
52 Moir (n12), 194 
53 Murray, Guide, (n12), 3 
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compelling reasons to protect education during NIAC is that education can be both the 
cause of conflict or the solution to conflict.54 On the one hand, education itself can 
play a contributory role in the outbreak of armed conflict, for example, tension and 
violence between groups may increase where curricula, language policies or teaching 
methods are biased against, or insensitive towards, minority groups.55 An unequal and 
inadequate system of education can motivate a rebel group to fight against the State. 
Alternatively individuals may have few opportunities or the means to support 
themselves because of a lack of education, so resort to participating in a conflict to 
support themselves instead.56  
This could result in a vicious cycle whereby a lack of, or unequal distribution of, 
educational opportunities contributes to the outbreak of conflict, while the conflict 
further restricts educational opportunities, which in turn intensifies the conflict. The 
conflicts in Sudan and Sierra Leone have been directly linked to issues such as a lack 
of, or unequal access to, education, to exclusionary content of the curriculum, and to 
the failure of education resulting in employment after graduation.57 It is important to 
realise equitable and quality education in peacetime in order to minimise the risk of 
NIAC, but to also ensure such education during a NIAC to avoid enflaming the 
conflict. Education is intimately intertwined with, and plays a vital role in, the 
																																																								
54 UNICEF, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for 
Children (UNICEF 2000), vii; Shelley Deane, ‘Syria’s Lost Generation: Refugee Education Provision 
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55 Global Education Cluster, Booklet 6: Education for Building Peace, Protecting Education in 
Countries Affected by Conflict Series (Global Education Cluster 2012), 4 
56 Kendra E Dupuy, ‘Education in Peace Agreements, 1989–2005’ (2008) 26 Conflict Resolution 
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building of peace in conflict-affected societies,58 as does human rights education and 
an understanding of IHL.59  Education is essential for peace and tolerance, 60 to 
sustainable development and stability within and among countries.61 Education can 
contribute to peace where the equal right of all groups to education is respected, and 
where the education promotes values such as mutual respect, understanding, and 
conflict resolution.62 As such, it is equally important to realise education during NIAC 
to bring an end to the conflict. 
Human rights are indivisible in that each right is inherent to the dignity of every 
person and each right has equal status and no hierarchy among other rights, similarly 
human rights are interdependent and interrelated as the realisation of one right often 
depends, wholly or in part, on the realisation of others.63 However, education, in 
particular, is an enabling right, in that it empowers access to other human rights,64 as 
many CPR and ESCR can only be ‘exercised in a meaningful way after a minimum 
level of education has been achieved’.65 The ICESCR itself provides that education 
should ‘strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'. 66 
Education has, therefore, been described as a ‘key to unlock other human rights’, such 
as the rights to health, or freedom of expression and of association,67 or the right to 
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60 Incheon Declaration, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000245656, at [5] 
61 The Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments, at 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000121147, at [6] 
62 Global Education Cluster, (n55), 3, 4, 5 
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67 Katarina Tomasevski, Education Denied: Costs and Remedies (Zed Books 2003), 32 
	 	
	 27	
work and the right to an adequate standard of living.68 Education can also contribute 
to increasing people’s income and combatting poverty.69 The failure to realise the 
right to education is, therefore a great impediment for the future of any child,70 or 
adult and society. Education also facilitates human rights education, and such 
knowledge ‘is a prerequisite for individuals and groups so that they can reasonably 
expect and demand respect for their rights and freedoms’.71 Therefore, in a NIAC, the 
continuity of education is especially important, as all rights are at risk of violation, 
and individuals educated on their rights will be better equipped to expect and demand 
respect for all of their rights, including the right to education itself. As such, States 
should endeavour to protect each right, while taking into account that protecting the 
right to education is particularly vital for the realisation of other rights. 
Education is also considered crucial for democratic societies in general’,72 and is 
also considered enabling in the sense that it empowers meaningful participation in 
society,73 promotes ‘the rule of law and a culture of lawfulness’, and ‘provides an 
important protective function by strengthening learners’ abilities to face and overcome 
difficult life situations’.74 In fact, children and their families living on the ground in 
conflict situations have recognised education as a key concern and as a humanitarian 																																																								
68 BIICL Handbook (n2), 132 
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need.75 Protecting education is seen as important for those living in such situations 
because it can also provide a sense of normality in an otherwise hostile and 
frightening environment.76 Yet, in order to fulfil these functions, it is important that 
children not only have access to schools during armed conflict, but also a high quality 
of learning, as ‘being in school isn’t the same thing as learning’.77 
Significantly, particularly in protracted conflict situations, conflict can deprive an 
entire generation of children of a good-quality education,78 resulting in ‘generations of 
uneducated adults who are destined for a life of poverty in countries with little chance 
of economic growth, political stability or security’. 79  For example, Rohingya 
children,80 and Syrian children have been referred to as a ‘lost generation’ as a result 
of missed educational opportunities due to armed conflict and the impact this will 
have on their future.81 Similarly, the conflict in Yemen has disrupted the education of 
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millions of children, putting their development and future at risk,82 and Yemeni 
children have also been referred to as a ‘lost generation’.83  
 Few matters are ‘more compelling than the desire to protect children from armed 
conflict’.84 Children have always been affected by armed conflict, yet there has been a 
drastic increase in the impact of armed conflict on entire communities, with children 
being caught up in, and targeted by, violence.85 This thesis looks at the killing and 
injuring of child students, attacks on primary and secondary schools, and the military 
recruitment of children. However, educational initiatives typically focus almost 
exclusively on the provision of primary and secondary education in conflict contexts, 
while higher education is rarely considered.86 The failure to protect higher education 
will also result in ‘losing a future generation of scientists, engineers, physicians, 
teachers and leaders’.87 Higher education should also be protected because it helps 
build human capital and growth, and helps mitigate the risk and effects of conflict.88 
Where generations of children and adults miss out on their right to education, the 
peacebuilding function of education is lost, as are the above-mentioned additional 
benefits to the individual and society, as such, it is essential to ensure the education of 
both children and adults during NIAC. As such, this thesis also examines the 
protection of education for adults during NIAC. 
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Contribution to knowledge  
There are three key texts that examine the protection of education in situations of 
armed conflict. One of these texts is a study by the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, ‘Protecting Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict: An 
International Law Handbook’.89 The BIICL Handbook develops an analysis of the 
protection of education during situations of insecurity and armed conflict within 
IHRL, IHL and international criminal law, and provides guidance as to how these 
regimes intersect.90 However, there are three main differences between this thesis and 
the BIICL Handbook, emphasising the originality of, and the need for, this research.  
Firstly, and most significantly, the BIICL Handbook constitutes an excellent 
starting point from which to work, but it is aimed at presenting clarity rather than 
identifying problems. The BIICL Handbook was written with the intent to inform 
legal and non-legal practitioners as to how international law currently applies,91 so it 
is logical that areas of uncertainty and controversy, or areas where gaps in protection 
exist, are not examined with depth. The purpose of this thesis, on the other hand, is to 
assess what the law currently is so as to better understand its shortcomings and gaps 
when applied in practice, in order to determine how the law can be developed to better 
ensure the realisation of the right to education during armed conflicts. In contrast to 
the BIICL Handbook, this thesis actively highlights and focuses on areas of debate.  
Secondly, the methodology used in the BIICL Handbook is black letter law, as it 
focuses on analysing treaties and other international and regional instruments, 
customary international law, case law and academic literature.92 The BIICL Handbook 
does not apply the law in practice. Conversely, this thesis is socio-legal in nature, 
																																																								
89 BIICL Handbook (n2) 
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92 Ibid, 2 
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examining the effectiveness of IHRL and IHL in practice within the context of 
comparative case studies.   
Thirdly, this thesis is more focused than that of the BIICL Handbook. This thesis 
does not look at a broad spectrum of education-related violations during armed 
conflict and insecurity, rather it examines the particular issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks against education during NIAC. It is worth noting that the BIICL Handbook is 
also broader as it covers the protection of education within international criminal law. 
Instead, this thesis focuses on an in-depth analysis of IHRL and IHL, permitting a 
more detailed and thorough analysis. 
The second key text is the recently published ‘Protecting Children in Armed 
Conflict’, which examines whether the norms of IHRL, IHL, and ICL, and the regimes 
respective accountability mechanisms adequately and efficiently protect children 
during situations of armed conflict in respect of the ‘six grave violations’ identified by 
the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict.93 Protecting Children, 
therefore, does what the BIICL Handbook does not, namely it focuses on examining 
the adequacy of international law. It argues that numerous existing substantive 
protections relevant to the protection of children in conflict are vague and ambiguous 
and could be clarified,94 and that some substantive protections are under-developed 
and could be strengthened, or are lacking altogether and could be created.95 However, 
this thesis differs significantly from, and supplements the knowledge in, Protecting 
Children. It does this ultimately by highlighting the relevant ambiguities and gaps 
identified in Protection Children, and providing additional commentary on them; at 
times this thesis agrees with the recommendations made, and at other times it makes 
alternative recommendations. Significantly, this thesis also provides additional 																																																								
93 Protecting Children (n6),  at [1.11]  
94 Ibid, at [1.7, 1.12.1, 2.69 9.8, 9.49] 
95 Ibid, at [1.7, 1.12.2, 2.69, 9.8, 9.49] 
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commentary on the adequacy of IHRL and IHL in their protection of education in 
NIAC, above and beyond that contained in Protecting Children.  
Like the BIICL Handbook, Protecting Children in AC adopts a blackletter 
methodology and does not examine the law in practice. Most importantly, this thesis 
applies the law simultaneously in practice in order to test the ambiguities and gaps 
identified in Protecting Children, as well as in Chapter 1, 2 and 3 of this thesis. This 
thesis also supplements the knowledge in Protecting Children, as it examines the 
relationship between IHRL and IHL in far greater depth. In Protecting Children, it was 
stated that it would not be helpful to embark on an analysis as to whether lex specialis 
or some other mechanism best protects children in respect of the regulation of the 
relationship between the two regimes. This is because the text uses the lack of clarity 
as to the relationship to support its key recommendation that the IHRL and IHL rules 
relating to the protection of children be consolidated into one body of law.96 
Conversely, Chapter 3 of this thesis is dedicated to the examination of the various 
approaches to the relationship between IHRL and IHL, with the purpose of 
determining which approach best protects education while balancing the purposes of 
IHRL and IHL. While a unified body of law might be an approach that is developed 
going forward, it is important to determine how to best regulate the relationship until 
such an approach is possible. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between the two 
bodies further, as it examines whether the ambiguities and gaps in IHRL can be filled 
by the simultaneous application of IHL, and vice versa. 
While there is naturally some overlap between Protecting Children and this thesis, 
the focus of this thesis fundamentally differs. The six grave violations examined in 
Protecting Children are: the killing and ill treatment of children; the military 
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recruitment and use of children; sexual violence against children; child abduction; the 
denial of humanitarian assistance; and attacks against schools and hospitals.97 This 
thesis examines the adequacy of IHRL and IHL only in respect of the killing and ill 
treatment of children, the military recruitment and use of children, and attacks against 
schools and hospitals. Also, this thesis does not look at a broad spectrum of child-
related violations, rather it looks specifically at the issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks against education in a NIAC for both adults and children.  
As to the killing and ill-treatment of children examined generally in Protecting 
Children, this thesis analyses this issue only in respect of the systematic targeting of 
children when they are going to or from school, and while they are at school, but also 
in respect of such attacks against education personnel in all levels of education, and 
attacks against adult students. As such, while Protecting Children focuses on a range 
of rights and protections provided for within the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, this thesis focuses on the protection of the right to education as contained in the 
ICESCR, which provides for the right to education for adults as well as children, as 
such, much of the analysis on IHRL within Protecting Children, was not relevant for 
this thesis. Additionally, unlike Protecting Children, I do not examine the manner in 
which attacks against education affect other rights, such as the right to life, as this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Similarly, in respect of the grave violation regarding the military recruitment and 
use of children, again the focus in this thesis is on the realisation of the right to 
education. In respect of attacks against schools and hospitals, attacks against hospitals 
are examined only to the extent that it is necessary to underline the different level of 
protection between educational institutions and hospitals in IHL. As such, the focus is 
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once more on the right to education. This thesis is also narrower as it does not look at 
the regime of ICL and accountability mechanisms, or the law applicable in IAC. Such 
issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, and it allows for a more detailed analysis of 
IHRL and IHL in respect of the issue of deliberate and direct attacks in a NIAC.  
The BIICL Handbook states that ‘there has been very little examination of the 
different areas of international law and their intersection on issues concerning 
education-related violations during insecurity and armed conflict’.98 This thesis is 
essential due to the need for further research examining how IHRL and IHL intersect 
specifically on the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education during 
armed conflict situations. Moreover, the problem is global, as attacks against 
education occur in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.99 Attacks 
are also longstanding and on-going issues. The third of the three key texts is the 
‘Education under Attack’ series. UNESCO first examined incidences of attacks 
against education in their report ‘Education under Attack’, which highlights the 
occurrence of such attacks globally between 1999 to 2007.100 UNESCO repeated this 
study for the period of 2007 to 2010.101  The Global Coalition to Protect Education 
from Attack replicated ‘Education under Attack’ for the period 2010 to 2013,102 and 
most recently for the period 2013 and 2017.103 These reports offer a ‘global overview 
providing a more detailed picture of the scale, nature, motives and impact of attacks 
on education and the variety of responses that are being, or could be, made’.104 These 
reports discuss attacks against education in order to highlight the occurrence of attacks 																																																								
98 BIICL Handbook (n2), 2 
99 Human Rights Watch, ‘Protecting Schools from Military Use: Law, Policy, and Military Doctrine’ 
(Human Rights Watch May 2019), 1 
100 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Education under Attack: 2007 
(UNESCO 2007) 
101 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Education under Attack: 2010 
(UNESCO 2010) 
102 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, Education under Attack: 2014 (GCPEA 2014) 
103 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, Education under Attack: 2018 (GCPEA 2018) 
104 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102), 5 
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against education around the globe, without an analysis of, or the application of, the 
applicable legal framework.  
There are also numerous texts relevant to the relationship between IHRL and 
IHL,105 though none examine the relationship specifically in the context of deliberate 
and direct attacks against education in a NIAC in practice. Of particular importance 
for the purposes of this thesis is ‘Practitioners Guide to Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict’,106 as I identify the approach developed within this text as the most suitable 
approach to regulating the relationship between IHRL and IHL. However, this thesis 
supplements this text as it expands upon the proposed approach in the context of 
deliberate and direct attacks against education, and tests the approach in the case 
studies. 
Therefore, my thesis is original because at the time of writing, no other text 
examines the effectiveness of IHRL in providing for the right to education, and of IHL 
in protecting education, when applied simultaneously, in both theory and practice in 
relation to the issue of deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC. This research is 
essential not only as is it original, but also because it demonstrates how education can 
be better protected during situations of NIAC, and as highlighted above, education is 
worthy of increased protection. 
Methodology 
This thesis adopts a mixed-methods methodology. Macro research relates to large-
scale systems of social relations, whereas micro research is concerned with analysing 
more local forms of social organisation.107 Chapters 1 to 3 of this thesis are macro in 
the sense that they are a large-scale examination of IHRL and IHL. Chapter 4 is micro 
																																																								
105 See Chapter 3 on the relationship between IHRL and IHL. 
106 Murray, Guide,(n12) 




as it examines more locally, in the form of two case studies, the effectiveness of IHRL 
and IHL in practice. The overall thesis is socio-legal in the sense that it examines law 
in practice. The macro part of the thesis is, however, largely black letter in its close 
analysis of IHRL and IHL. The case studies, in the micro part of thesis, are both 
socio-legal and comparative.108  
Black Letter Law Approach 
A black letter law approach can be defined as research aimed at providing a 
detailed commentary of the content of the law.109 A black letter approach will criticise 
the law and call for reform, but this is ‘limited in nature and scope to the exposure of 
ambiguities and gaps within existing law’.110 Traditional forms of black letter research 
focus on using primary legal sources, particularly cases and statutes, and this is seen 
as sufficient. 111 Salter and Mason refer to a black letter approach as ‘law in books’.112 
The macro section of my thesis is largely black letter in the sense that primary and 
secondary sources are sufficient in facilitating the analysis of the content of, and the 
relationship between, IHRL and IHL, and I subject IHRL and IHL to a detailed 
analysis in order to uncover ambiguities and gaps.  
A criticism of the black letter approach is that it is often too descriptive,113 
‘without taking the context of the law sufficiently into account’.114 The black letter 
																																																								
108 See Chapter 4 for an in depth analysis of the methodology for the case studies, including a 
description of how the case studies were chosen. 
109 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Research Methods’ in Mike McConville and Wing 
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007), 18-19; Michael Salter 
and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Longman 2007), 50; Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ 
in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013), 9 
110 Salter and Mason (n109), 45, 99-100 
111 Douglas W Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and 
Society 163, 178; Fons Coomans, Fred Grunfeld and Menno T. Kamminga (eds), Methods of Human 
Rights Research (Intersentia 2009), 47 
112 Salter and Mason (n109), 89, 118 
113 Ibid, 49; Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which method(s) for what kind of discipline?’ in Mark 
van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011), 3 
114 Hoecke (n113), 3  
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law approach studies legal rules, principles and cases in a manner which views the law 
as operating in a ‘social, economic and political vacuum’.115 In adopting a black letter 
approach, one must ‘interpret disputes in a strictly legalistic manner’, which ‘requires 
students to rigorously exclude supposedly external factors, such as policy, ideological 
and moral issues’.116 The macro part of this thesis is not examined in a non-contextual 
vacuum, as social, economical, political, policy, ideological or moral issues are taken 
into account where relevant when applying the legal standards to the particular 
context of the case studies. 
Socio-legal Approach 
The definition of the socio-legal approach is contentious.117 Salter and Mason 
argue that it is difficult to provide a ‘single and fixed definition of the essence of 
socio-legal studies’.118 The concept is hard to define because of the wide range of 
scholarship carried out under the name socio-legal, and more frequently, the term 
‘socio-legal’ has been used broadly.119 This is reflected in the definition provided by 
the Socio-Legal Studies Association, which states authoritatively that ‘socio-legal 
studies embraces disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a social institution, 
with the social effects of law, legal processes, institutions and services and with the 
influence of social, political and economic factors on the law and legal institutions’.120 
It is also provided that ‘socio-legal research is diverse, covering a range of theoretical 
perspectives and a wide variety of empirical research and methodologies’.121  
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119 Cownie and Bradney (n117), 35 
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Socio-legal studies can be seen as research that investigates and assesses ‘the 
practical impact of law in action’, and as addressing the gap between ‘law in books’ 
and ‘law in action’.122 A socio-legal approach allows one to go beyond merely 
providing critique of IHRL and IHL, by testing the efficacy of the law in practice. 
Salter and Mason argue that any thesis that wishes to address its topic in a fulsome 
way must address both the ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ dimensions.123 This 
thesis examines ‘law in books’ in the macro part, and ‘law in action’ in the micro part, 
addressing more thoroughly the adequacy of IHRL and IHL.  
Unlike a black-letter approach, those ‘adopting a sociolegal approach must be 
prepared to use a far wider range of sources’, gathering data wherever appropriate to 
the problem using whatever method is most suitable. 124  Socio-legal research 
‘reinstates the centrality of social scientific approaches, using both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, to investigate the impact of law in action’.125 The 
micro part of this thesis examines a broad range of sources, such as UN reports, the 
reports of human rights monitoring bodies, and the reports of reputable NGO’s that 
document attacks against education in both a quantitative and qualitative manner. 
Testing efficacy requires the analysis of such information. 
Comparative Case Study Approach 
Gaining access to research subjects in order to conduct interviews or 
questionnaires can be difficult, and if the researcher wants to spend some time 
observing the subjects then the difficulties are likely to be greater.126 An ethnography 
study was not feasible here in light of the conflict situations within Colombia and the 
																																																								
122 Salter and Mason (n109), 125, 30 
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DRC, largely due to safety issues for both observers and participants. It was also not 
possible due to constraints on time and finances. For the same reasons, interviews 
were not an option.  
A case study investigates specific research questions in the context of human 
activity embedded in the real world, and can examine an individual case or multiple 
cases.127 I have adopted a case study methodology, examining Colombia and the 
DRC. These countries have been chosen because the issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks are longstanding in these States, and they provide a best-case scenario in 
respect of having ratified the relevant treaties, therefore it will be quite telling if these 
States are not realising the right to education in practice.128 
A benefit of a case study approach is that it investigates something that already 
exists, and is not an artificially generated situation.129 This is a particular benefit for 
this thesis, as drawing upon actual situations will enable a more realistic examination 
of the effectiveness of IHRL and IHL in practice. Given the necessarily limited 
number of case studies undertaken, I have been careful not to extrapolate too far. 
However, in Chapter 4 we shall see that it is possible to draw conclusions towards my 
working hypothesis that gaps and inconsistencies exist.  
Chapter overview 
As the right to education remains applicable in situations of NIAC, Chapter One 
proceeds to examine, firstly, the normative content of the right to education in the 
context of NIAC, with a focus on the ICESCR.130 Chapter One then discusses the 
IHRL obligations of States Parties to the ICESCR during NIAC. Chapter One 
discusses the various obligations explicitly provided for within Article 2(1) of the 																																																								
127 Bill Gillham, Case Study Research Methods (Continuum International Publishing Group 2010), 1 
128 Full detail on the methodology for the case studies is provided in Chapter 4. 
129 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: For Small Scale Research Projects (5th edn, Open 




ICESCR, and then considers the obligations not explicitly set out within the ICESCR, 
but which are provided for within General Comment No. 3: The Right Nature of State 
Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para 1, of the Covenant),131 and General Comment No. 
13, The Right to Education,132 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.133 The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there are gaps or 
ambiguities in the manner in which IHRL provides for the right to education in the 
context of deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC. I argue that education is 
inadequately provided for within IHRL, as while the normative content of the right to 
education is generally clear, the same cannot be said of the obligations of States. 
Chapter Two examines the protection of education within IHL. The chapter begins 
with a brief analysis of the various sources of IHL. Following on from this, the 
classification of conflicts and the issues surrounding the lower level of regulation of 
NIAC are discussed. Chapter Two then outlines the IHL provisions that explicitly 
protect education, with an emphasis on the fact that there are few such provisions, 
none of which are directly relevant to the issue of deliberate and direct attacks. The 
main focus of the chapter is then on the more important IHL provisions that implicitly 
protect education from deliberate and direct attacks. Namely these provisions relate to 
the principles of humanity, military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and 
precautions in attack. The purpose of this chapter is similarly to determine whether 
there are gaps or ambiguities in the protection that IHL affords to education in the 
context of deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC. I argue that the protection of 
education within IHL is inadequate, as a result of areas of uncertainty and gaps in 
protection. 																																																								
131 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para 1, of the Covenant), 14 Dec. 1990, E/1991/23 (General Comment 3) 
132 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The Right to 
Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 Dec. 1999, E/C.12/1999/10 (General Comment 13) 
133 Hereinafter CESCR 
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Chapter Three proceeds to assess the manner in which IHRL and IHL apply 
simultaneously. Various approaches to the relationship between IHRL and IHL are 
explored, namely the ‘complementarity approach’, ‘humanisation approach’, ‘lex 
specialis approach’, ‘active hostilities/security operations approach’, and the ‘unified 
approach’. These approaches are examined with a view to determining, firstly, 
whether there are multiple feasible approaches to describing the relationship between 
IHRL and IHL, and, secondly, which approach most appropriately protects education 
during armed conflict situations. I argue that there is more than one current feasible 
approach to the relationship between IHRL and IHL, namely the lex specialis and 
active hostilities/security operations approach, and that while the unified approach, 
while not presently relevant, is a potential feasible approach in the future. I further 
argue that the active hostilities/security operations approach most adequately regulates 
the relationship between IHRL and IHL.  
Chapter Four starts by outlining the methodology chosen specifically for the 
comparative case studies. Next, I first outline the context of the conflict in Colombia, I 
then identify the patterns and trends in respect of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education, and I apply IHRL and IHL simultaneously to specific incidents of each 
type of attack. Following this, I do the same for the DRC. This is done with a view to 
establishing whether IHRL has been violated and IHL breached. The main purpose of 
Chapter Four is to determine whether inconsistencies and ambiguities exist when 
IHRL and IHL are applied simultaneously, to show whether any remaining gaps and 
ambiguities exist. I argue that gaps and ambiguities remain.  
The Conclusion of this thesis begins by summarising the arguments referred to in 
the preceding chapters. It answers the main research question of this thesis, namely 
whether the right to education is effectively provided for within IHRL and whether 
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IHL effectively protects education from deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC, 
arguing that education is in fact inadequately provided for. As such, I provide 
recommendations as to how the law can be developed to better protect education in 



















Chapter One: The Realisation of the Right to Education during Non-
International Armed Conflicts: International Human Rights Law 
1.1. Introduction 
As IHRL remains applicable during armed conflicts,134 it is necessary to examine 
the nature and scope of the right to education during a NIAC, and the corresponding 
obligations of States. This is considered with a view to determining whether the right 
to education is adequately provided for within IHRL. This is important, because if 
there are gaps or ambiguities in the provision for education within IHRL, this will 
impact the realisation of the right to education during a NIAC in practice. There has, 
at the time of writing, been little discussion as to the adequacy of IHRL in providing 
for the right to education specifically during a NIAC in respect of the issue of 
deliberate and direct attacks. As such, this chapter focuses on the adequacy of the 
nature and scope of the right to education and its corresponding obligations in respect 
of attacks against educational institutions, students and educational staff, the military 
use of educational institutions and the military recruitment and use of children. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the relevant sources of IHRL, followed 
by an examination of the normative content of the right to education, focusing on 
Article 13 and 14 of the ICESCR. Following this, I analyse the obligations of States in 
respect of all ESCR, including the right to education, as provided for within Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR.135 Next, I examine the obligations that are not explicitly provided 
for within Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, but which have been developed following the 
adoption of the ICESCR, namely, minimum core obligations, and the tripartite 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil. I finally set out the manner in which IHRL 																																																								
134 See the introduction for a detailed discussion of the applicability of IHRL during armed conflicts. 
135 ICESCR, Art 2(1) 
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regulates the issue of child soldiers. While the military recruitment and use of children 
may violate the right to education, this is also explicitly prohibited, not within the 
ICESCR, but within the CRC and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict.136 I argue that IHRL insufficiently provides for education 
during situations of NIAC, as gaps and ambiguities exist within the IHRL framework, 
particularly in respect of determining the obligations of States. I test these ambiguities 
and gaps further in my case studies.  
1.2. Sources of International Human Rights Law Relevant to the Right to 
Education 
Unlike IHL,137 ‘because of the difficulty in determining the content of customary 
human rights law’ the emphasis in this chapter will be on treaty law obligations.138 
While numerous IHRL instruments expressly protect the right to education for 
specific groups of vulnerable people,139 the ICESCR protects the right for everyone. 
Also, Article 13 of the ICESCR is the most comprehensive binding provision dealing 
with the right to education,140 for this reason, it is often thought of as the most 
important provision for the right to education.141 The focus of this chapter, therefore, 
is on the right to education as provided for within Articles 13 and 14 of the 
ICESCR.142 While the discussion within this chapter is centred on the ICESCR, other 
																																																								
136 Hereinafter OPCRC 
137 For a further discussion on the customary nature of IHL, see Chapter 2. There is scope for further 
research into customary IHRL relevant to the realisation of the right to education in a NIAC, but due to 
the complexity of the topic, it is outside the scope of this thesis. 
138 Murray, Guide, (n12), at [1.1.81] 
139 For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, hereinafter CRC, provides in Article 1 that 
the Convention applies to ‘every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. The ICESCR also applies to individuals above this 
age, providing for the right to education for a broader range of individuals. A further example is 
Convention on the Elimination of Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, 
hereinafter CEDAW, which only applies to females, while the ICESCR applies to males and females.  
140 General Comment 13, at [2]; Fons Coomans, ‘Clarifying the core elements of the right to education’ 
(1995) 18 SIM Special 11-25, 13 
141 Beiter, (n72), 94 
142 ICESCR, Art 13 
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IHRL instruments are examined where they occasionally add to the understanding of 
the right to education within the ICESCR.  
The normative content of Article 13 and 14, as well as the obligations of States, 
will be analysed in light of the General Comments produced by the CESCR relevant 
to the right to education. General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary 
Education (Art. 14) addresses the obligation to produce a plan of action aimed at 
securing compulsory and free primary education in accordance with Article 14 of the 
ICESCR.143 General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Article 13 of the 
Covenant) analyses the normative content of the right to education under Article 13 of 
the ICESCR, and the corresponding obligations.144 General Comment 11 and General 
Comment 13 are complementary and should be read together.145 The obligations of 
States will also be assessed in light of General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art 2, Para 1 of the Covenant), which provides additional 
guidance on the obligations of States in respect of all ESCR, including the right to 
education in the context of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.146 The minimum core 
obligations approach was also developed following the adoption of the ICESCR by 
the CESCR,147 who incorporated the concept into its General Comment 3,148 and 
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elaborated upon it within General Comment 13 in respect of the right to education.149 
The CESCR also incorporated the tripartite typology of obligations into General 
Comment 13 in respect of education.150 
General Comments serve an important function in international law, and while 
they are not legally binding they carry considerable legal weight.151 Through their 
General Comments, the CESCR aims to define and clarify ICESCR provisions in 
order to assist States in fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant, and whenever 
necessary the CESCR is permitted to revise and update its General Comments.152 
However, the CESCR fails to update their General Comments frequently, and the 
quality of clarification provided by the CESCR is questionable.153 As such, General 
Comments 11 and 13 are used in this chapter as a starting point for determining the 
nature and scope of the right to education and the corresponding obligations in the 
context of deliberate and direct attacks during a NIAC. However, their accuracy is 
also assessed. 
Clarification on State obligations can also be found within the Limburg 
Principles,154 as well as the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.155 While the Limburg Principles deal mainly with establishing 
obligations and they briefly discuss violations, the Maastricht Guidelines mainly focus 
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Sessions, 2004, E/2004/22, at [51-52] 
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on violations.156 Also, the former instrument only provides interpretations of the 
obligations contained within Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, whereas the Maastricht 
Guidelines also discusses minimum core obligations and the tripartite obligations, 
evidencing a growing consensus towards the acceptance of these obligations within 
the international community.  
1.3. The Normative Content of the Right to Education 
1.3.1. The Prohibition of Discrimination 
Article 13(1) of the ICESCR recognises ‘the right of everyone to education’,157 
making it clear that everyone has the right not to be discriminated against in 
education. Article 13(1) must be considered alongside Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, 
which states that ‘the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.158 The term 
‘other status’ is broad and all encompassing, to ensure that education and other ESCR 
are delivered without distinction of any kind.  
All the main IHRL treaties have similar provisions for the right to education and 
the prohibition of discrimination.159 However, other instruments expressly prohibit 
discrimination on additional grounds, such as ‘economic condition’, 160  ‘ethnic 
origin’, 161  and ‘disability’. 162  Yet, this is not a true gap in IHRL, as such 
																																																								
156 Limburg Principles, Section B; Maastricht Guidelines, at [6-15] 
157 ICESCR, Art 13(1) 
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(UDHR); UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, Preamble, Art 1 (CDE); 
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160 CDE, Art 1(1) 
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discrimination is also clearly prohibited implicitly within the ICESCR as a result of 
the inclusivity of the term ‘other status’. While the ICESCR is weak in that it does not 
offer explicit protection to individuals discriminated against on these additional 
grounds, other IHRL instruments nonetheless assist in informing the understanding of 
who can be discriminated against under the term ‘other status’, mitigating this 
weakness.  
Other IHRL instruments can also inform the understanding of how individuals can 
be discriminated against in education for the purposes of the ICESCR. The most 
useful instrument in this regard is the Convention against Discrimination in 
Education, as its entire focus is, naturally, on the prevention of discrimination in 
education. The ICESCR does not provide in as much detail as the CDE what will or 
will not amount to discrimination within education.163 For example, the ICESCR 
provides, in Article 13(2)(a), that it would be discriminatory if primary education 
were not made compulsory and free to all. However, the CDE goes further to state that 
not only would it be discriminatory if primary education was not available to all, but 
also if, despite being available, the conditions relating to the quality of education 
differed.164 The CDE assists in making clear that during a NIAC, as well as during 
peacetime or an IAC, the State, to be in accordance with the ICESCR, must ensure 
that education is provided to all and is of an adequate standard.  
Article 10 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women is also useful as it expands on the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, by setting out specific steps to be taken to ensure gender equality 
within education. For example, Article 10(b) provides that females should have 
‘access the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications 																																																								
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164 CDE, Art 4(b) 
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of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality’.165 
While these specific steps are not expressly provided for within the ICESCR, the 
ICESCR does explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex, and CEDAW 
can be utilised to inform the understanding of the prohibition against discrimination 
within the ICESCR on the grounds of sex, both during peacetime and in the context of 
a NIAC. It is explicitly clear under both the ICESCR and CEDAW that it would 
amount to discrimination if the State were to fail to provide an education to females 
during a NIAC. Yet, CEDAW also assists in making clear that the State would violate 
the prohibition against discrimination if they were to, for example, teach maths and 
science to boys but not girls.  
A particular strength of the prohibition against discrimination is that the ICESCR, 
when considered alongside other IHRL instruments, sets out clearly the obligations of 
States. Another strength of the principle of non-discrimination is that it forms part of 
the minimum core of the right to education,166 and minimum core obligations cannot 
be subject to reservations, derogations or limitations.167 A NIAC could, therefore, 
never be used to justify the alteration of the States obligations in respect of non-
discrimination. Where a NIAC results in discriminatory practices in respect of 
education, the State would be violating its IHRL obligations. 
1.3.2. The aims and objectives of education 
Article 26(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
education should: fully develop the human personality, strengthen respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, promote tolerance, understanding and friendship 																																																								
165 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art 10(b), 
hereinafter CEDAW 
166 The minimum core of the right to education is discussed in more detail in the second part of this 
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167 See the Introduction for a discussion of reservations, derogations and limitations and their 
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among all nations, racial or religious groups, and further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace.168 Article 13(1) of the ICESCR reiterates these 
aims and objectives of education,169 and adds three additional aims: education should 
also be directed to the ‘human personality's sense of dignity’, it should ‘enable all 
persons to participate effectively in a free society’, and it should ‘promote 
understanding among all ethnic groups’. 170  The CESCR points out in General 
Comment 13 that these aims and objectives apply to all levels of education, ‘whether 
private or public, formal or non-formal’.171  
Beiter argues that while the above-mentioned aims of education remain topical, 
new developments in the sphere of educational aims are not reflected in Article 13 and 
the provision is therefore out-dated.172 The CESCR itself recognises that since the 
adoption of the ICESCR other international instruments ‘have further elaborated the 
objectives to which education should be directed’.173 For example, the CRC provides 
that the education of the child should not only develop the human personality, but also 
the child's ‘talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential’.174 The 
CRC also provides that education should develop ‘respect for the child's parents, his 
or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the 
country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, 
and for civilizations different from his or her own’ and ‘the development of respect 
for the natural environment’.175 While the ICESCR does not exhaustively state the 																																																								
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171 Ibid, at [4] 
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aims and objectives of education, this weakness is overcome by looking at the full 
range of applicable IHRL instruments that inform any assessment of whether 
education complies with the required aims and objectives.  
A State would not be permitted to make a reservation, derogation of limitation to 
the right to education in respect of the aims and objectives of education, due to the 
nature of this as a minimum core obligation.176 A reservation of this nature would 
certainly go against the object and purpose of the ICESCR, and it would nonetheless 
be difficult to argue that such derogation was required by the exigencies of the 
situation, or that a limitation was necessary for the general welfare in a democratic 
society. It would also be nonsensical for a State to want to restrict the right to 
education in such a way. If education is afforded in a manner that reinforces the above 
aims and objectives, the peace-building function of education is activated, while the 
failure to ensure that education conforms to these aims may conversely contribute to 
the start of a NIAC, or enflame it further.177 It is, therefore, vital to ensure that 
education is provided in accordance with the above-mentioned aims and objectives of 
education during a NIAC. 
1.3.3. The Right to Receive an Education: The Levels of Education 
Article 13(2) of the ICESCR refers to primary, secondary, higher and fundamental 
levels of education.178 It is crucial to analyse the nature and scope of each level of 
education, as each level carries with it different obligations. A preliminary issue, 
however, is what ‘school’ means. Protecting Children argues that as there are no 																																																								
176 See below for a discussion of the minimum core obligations of the right to education. 
177 See the introduction for a further discussion of the peacebuilding effect of education during a NIAC. 
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specific definitions for schools in the relevant treaties, there is a lack of clarity as to 
what is meant by ‘school’, which leads to debate as to whether certain facilities are 
protected at all.179 They acknowledge that the lack of a definition is probably because 
of the difficulties in capturing the numerous relevant permutations which may need to 
be taken into account,180 and adopt the working definition contained in the Special 
Representative for Children in Armed Conflict’s ‘Guidance Note on Security Council 
Resolution 1998: Protect Schools + Hospitals’, as it does not appear to have led to any 
dissent or disagreement.181 This guidance defines ‘schools’ as: 
 
all learning sites and education facilities, as determined by the local context, 
including both formal and informal, secular and religious, providing early 
childhood, primary and secondary education, as well as vocational training to 
children. “Schools” include all school-related spaces, structures, infrastructure and 
grounds attached to them, such as water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, which 
are recognizable and known to the community as such, but may or may not be 
marked by visible boundaries or signage.182 
 
This thesis similarly adopts this definition, though with the inclusion of all learning 
sites and education facilities related to higher and fundamental education. 
 
 																																																								
179 Protecting Children (n6), at [7.8] 
180 Ibid, at [7.8.2] 
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1.3.3.1. Primary education 
Article 13(2)(a) of the ICESCR provides that primary education must be 
compulsory and available free to all.183 States should ensure that primary education 
remains compulsory and free even during a NIAC. The provision of primary 
education for all is also a minimum core obligation, and States cannot subject the right 
to primary education to a reservation, derogation or limitation in a NIAC.184 In this 
sense, primary education benefits from additional protection than the other levels of 
education, which are weak in that the State could subject them to a reservation, 
derogation or limitation in a NIAC, where this practice is not discriminatory and 
where such a restriction is necessary, as the other levels do not form part of the 
minimum core. Nonetheless, where no such reservation, derogation or limitation has 
been made, the State remains bound to realise the right of all to all levels of education 
in a NIAC, and must provide this education for free if possible, and free on a 
progressive basis where necessary. As with primary education, free education in 
respect of all levels is especially important during a NIAC, when parents may be more 
likely to be unable to afford to send their children to school. States should refrain from 
excessive restrictions to their applicability, given the benefits of education for the 
individual and society, particularly in respect of its peacebuilding function. 
The CESCR elaborated upon the requirement to make primary education 
compulsory within General Comment 11, stating that ‘neither parents, nor guardians, 
nor the State are entitled to treat as optional the decision as to whether the child 
should have access to primary education’.185 Compulsory education is essential as it is 
an important means of protecting children from their parents and from economic 																																																								
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exploitation.186 Children are especially vulnerable to economic exploitation in a 
NIAC. For example, parents struggling financially as a result of the conflict might 
choose to send their child to work in hazardous conditions, instead of sending them to 
school, if primary education was not compulsory. Primary education also has a 
protective function in respect of the military recruitment of children, as a child who is 
not compelled to go to primary school may choose to enlist in armed groups instead. 
A NSAG may also be less likely to recruit children, voluntarily or forcibly, if a culture 
of sending all children to primary school exists as opposed to a culture where primary 
school is optional. States should therefore enact laws that make primary education 
compulsory, and ensure that enough schools are available so that all children of 
primary school age can attend primary school,187 whether or not a NIAC exists.  
Also, parents must not prevent their children from receiving an education where 
this is available and made compulsory. While this may restrict the right of parents to 
freely decide on their children's education, this is justified by the principle of the best 
interests of the child and also the best interests of society. 188  A parent may 
understandably not want to send their child to school in a NIAC if there are concerns 
for their safety where students or schools are being deliberate and directly targeted, or 
where children are being recruited from schools. While in such contexts it may be 
reasonable for the parent not to send their child to school, the State should endeavour 
to provide an education to such children in a manner that is safe, such as by 
facilitating home-schooling by the parents, or providing national education through 
the radio or television instead, and it is in this context that a parent should ensure the 
continuity of their child’s compulsory education. 
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Education can only fairly be made compulsory if it is also made free.189 Making 
parents responsible for funding education broadens the gap between those who can go 
to school and those who cannot.190 This is especially true in a NIAC, when financial 
resources are likely to be scarcer. States must, therefore, individually and collectively 
fund education.191 According to the CESCR in General Comment 11, the nature of the 
requirement for free primary education is unequivocal, and: 
 
Fees imposed by the Government, the local authorities or the school, and other 
direct costs, constitute disincentives to the enjoyment of the right and may 
jeopardize its realization…Indirect costs, such as compulsory levies on 
parents…or the obligation to wear a relatively expensive school uniform, can also 
fall into the same category. Other indirect costs may be permissible, subject to the 
Committee’s examination on a case-by-case basis.192 
 
‘Free’ has also been interpreted by the CESCR as meaning ‘free tuition, free 
admission, no fees for exams and free textbooks’.193 Indirect costs for primary 
education could include expenses for meals at school, school transport, medical 
expenses or boarding fees, which may undermine the right to free primary 
education.194 For example, providing a free meal for primary school children during a 
NIAC may be the difference between families sending their child to school or not, 																																																								
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particularly if this would be the only meal the child receives that day. States should, 
therefore, clearly interpret ‘free’ primary education broadly, as this would be more 
effective for the realisation of the right to education and human dignity,195 including 
in the context of a NIAC.  
The urgent nature of the duty to make primary education free and compulsory is 
underpinned in Article 14 of the ICESCR,196 which requires States to adopt a plan of 
action for the introduction of compulsory and free primary education if this has not 
yet been achieved. The CESCR, in General Comment 11, states that financial 
difficulties cannot relieve States of their obligation to adopt a plan of action, which 
must be aimed at the progressive implementation of the right to free and compulsory 
primary education for boys and girls.197 The available resources of a State are likely to 
be impacted by the existence of a NIAC. However, regardless of the level of resources 
available during a NIAC, States without free and compulsory primary education for 
all should adopt a plan of action for its realisation. In creating this plan, States should 
seek to ensure that resources are, firstly, prioritised towards ensuring that there are 
enough schools of a sufficient quality for all primary school aged children. Resources 
should then be prioritised towards ensuring direct costs of education are covered, 
followed by indirect costs, so that primary education can be made compulsory. IHRL, 
therefore, clearly sets out the obligation to make primary education free and 
compulsory, including in a NIAC. 
 
 																																																								
195 Mansuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 
2009), 379 
196 Beiter (n72), 99 
197 General Comment 11, at [3, 6-10]; See below for a more detailed discussion of the principle of 
progressive realisation and the issue of a States available resources in respect of the realisation of the 
right to education during a NIAC. 
	 	
	 57	
1.3.3.2. Secondary education 
Article 13(2)(b) of the ICESCR states that ‘secondary education in its different 
forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made 
generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular 
by the progressive introduction of free education’.198 In General Comment 13 it is 
stated that ‘generally available’ means ‘firstly, that secondary education is not 
dependent on a student's apparent capacity or ability and, secondly, that secondary 
education will be distributed throughout the State in such a way that it is available on 
the same basis to all’.199 As with primary education, the State is not able to decide to 
whom they will provide a secondary education, and the quality of secondary education 
should again be of an equal standard. The CESCR interpret ‘accessible to all’ as 
meaning that educational institutions must be physically and economically accessible 
to everyone, without discrimination.200 The State would not be able to subject their 
obligation to provide secondary education in this non-discriminatory manner to a 
reservation, derogation or limitation in a NIAC, because as discussed above, this 
forms part of the States minimum core obligations.  
However, while the obligations of States in respect of secondary education are 
clear, the obligations are not as far-reaching and strong as those relating to primary 
education, as there is no legal obligation to make secondary education compulsory 
within the ICESCR, despite the importance of this level of education for the 
individual and society, in peacetime and NIAC. The CESCR, in General Comment 13, 
also provides that secondary education ‘includes completion of basic education and 
consolidation of the foundations for life-long learning and human development. It 																																																								
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prepares students for vocational and higher educational opportunities’. 201  While 
primary education is essential for the individual and society and is the stepping-stone 
into secondary education, secondary education is similarly necessary as it solidifies an 
individual’s ability to become a valuable member of society, and it paves their way 
into vocational work and higher education. As such, it is in the long-term interest of 
the State for it to ensure the realisation of the right to secondary education in a NIAC.  
The CESCR further recognises that secondary education, in its different forms, 
‘demands flexible curricula and varied delivery systems to respond to the needs of 
students in different social and cultural settings’ and encourages ‘alternative 
educational programmes which parallel regular secondary school systems’.202 As with 
primary education, in responding to the needs of secondary students in a NIAC the 
State must take into account the educational needs of those affected by the conflict. 
Alternative educational programmes for secondary education are of great importance 
during a NIAC, for example, where a school is destroyed and no other building is 
available, the State could ensure the continuity of secondary education by providing 
classes via radio or television broadcast.  
1.3.3.3. Higher education 
According to Article 13(2)(c), ‘higher education shall be made equally accessible 
to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education’. 203  As with primary and secondary 
education, where not already achieved, the State should work towards making higher 
education free, especially during a NIAC when resources may be scarcer for the 
individual, prioritising primary education first, then secondary education. However, 																																																								
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the CESCR points out that ‘while article 13(2)(c) is formulated on the same lines as 
article 13(2)(b), there are three differences between the two provisions’.204 The first 
difference is that Article 13(2)(c) does not mention higher education ‘in its different 
forms’, and secondly, no specific reference to technical and vocational training is 
made.205 However, as with primary and secondary education, the CESCR also states 
that:  
 
If higher education is to respond to the needs of students in different social and 
cultural settings, it must have flexible curricula and varied delivery systems, 
such as distance learning; in practice, therefore, both secondary and higher 
education have to be available ‘‘in different forms’’ [and] technical and 
vocational education…forms an integral component of all levels of education, 
including higher education.206 
 
While the ICESCR does not explicitly state this, it is nonetheless clear that all levels 
of education must be flexible enough to adapt to various situations, such as a NIAC. 
The CESCR references distance learning as one way in which higher education can 
respond to the needs of students, however, in a NIAC, the State could realise the right 
to education through distance learning in respect of all levels of education, where it is 
not possible to physically attend educational institutions.  
Thirdly, the ‘most significant difference’ is that higher education does not need to 
be ‘available’ to all like primary and secondary education, but ‘accessible’ instead ‘on 																																																								
204 General Comment 13, at [18] 
205 Ibid, at [18] 
206 Ibid, at [18] 
	 	
	 60	
the basis of capacity’.207 As to the meaning of the term ‘accessible’, in General 
Comment 13 it is provided that reference should be made to the above guidance 
provided by the CESCR in relation to this term in respect of secondary education.208 
The CESCR also elaborates on the principle of ‘capacity’, stating that ‘the "capacity" 
of individuals should be assessed by reference to all their relevant expertise and 
experience’.209 The concept of ‘capacity’ is both qualitative and quantitative in 
character. It is qualitative in the sense that it refers to the intellectual ability of 
students, and quantitative as it permits the restriction of the number of students who 
can gain entry to specific fields of study within higher education.210  
The ‘capacity’ criterion is problematic in the context of a NIAC, as this concept 
evidences the importance of fully realising the right to primary and secondary 
education for all in a NIAC. If primary and secondary education is not realised for 
those affected by the conflict, or the quality of this level of education is inferior, it is 
likely that such individuals will lack the capacity to attend higher education later on, 
even if the conflict has since ended. While higher education is not compulsory, and 
rightfully so, it is essential that all individuals, no matter their background, have the 
opportunity to develop the capacity to access to this level of education. For those 
whose academic achievement in primary and secondary education was impacted by a 
NIAC, States should ensure that higher education facilities are mindful of the impact 
of the conflict on an individual when assessing the capacity criterion, as an individual 
may be capable but this is not reflected in their grades.  
As well as realising the right to primary and secondary education in a NIAC, 
States should also take steps to ensure that higher education is realised at the time of 																																																								
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the conflict. If States do not take steps to realise the right to higher education for all in 
a NIAC, this is of detriment to the whole of society, as those who would otherwise 
have been capable of becoming doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on, will be 
prevented from doing so. This is a particular problem in a protracted NIAC, and 
especially where higher education is frequently subjected to deliberate and direct 
attack. 
1.3.3.4. Fundamental education 
It is stated within Article 13(2)(d) of the ICESCR that ‘fundamental education 
shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not 
received or completed the whole period of their primary education’.211 According to 
the CESCR in General Comment 13, the content of fundamental education must 
resemble that of primary education, and ‘is not limited by age or gender; it extends to 
children, youth and adults, including older persons…curricula and delivery systems 
must be devised which are suitable for students of all ages’.212 The recognition of the 
right to fundamental education within the ICESCR highlights the importance of 
primary education. Fundamental education is of particular importance during a NIAC, 
when many may not have received a primary education.  
A gap in the ICESCR is that Article 13(2) of the ICESCR, unlike Article 26(1) of 
the UDHR, does not require that fundamental education be free, nor provides for the 
progressive introduction of free fundamental education.213 Beiter argues that States 
should, however, strive to achieve free fundamental education, as free fundamental 
education would be the most effective instrument in ensuring accessibility to this level 
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of education.214 Making fundamental education free would be particularly effective 
during a NIAC, as those who did not receive a primary education because of the 
conflict may be of even greater financial need.  
What is not clear is whether, in light of the importance of primary education, the 
realisation of free fundamental education should be prioritised over other levels of 
education. The fact that, unlike primary education, fundamental education is not 
compulsory and should simply be encouraged or intensified suggests that it is given 
less weight, and that secondary and higher education be prioritised accordingly. This 
appears to be the appropriate balance. Where a NIAC results in the failure to realise 
the right to primary education, I propose that the State should be considered to have 
an increased legal burden to provide fundamental education on a free basis, as the 
futures of many will be impacted as a result of circumstances most likely out of their 
control. Though whether States have such an increased burden is unclear.  
1.3.3.5.The ‘4-A framework’ 
It is stated within General Comment 13 that all levels of education ‘should exhibit 
the following interrelated and essential features’: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability.215 Coomans argues that ‘the 4-A scheme is a useful 
device to analyse the content of the right to receive an education and the obligations of 
state parties resulting from it as well as to measure the level of realization’.216 The 4-A 
framework is also ‘a useful tool to understand the various facets that this right entails 
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in practice’.217 It is particularly useful in the context of deliberate and direct attacks in 
a NIAC. 
The term ‘availability’ is defined in General Comment 13 as meaning that there 
should be a sufficient quantity of functioning educational institutions and programs 
within the jurisdiction of the State party. As a minimum, what is required is ‘buildings 
or other protection from the elements, sanitation facilities for both sexes, safe drinking 
water, trained teachers receiving domestically competitive salaries, teaching materials, 
and so on’.218 In more developed States, facilities such as a library, computer facilities 
and information technology may also be required.219 Protecting Children argues that 
the ‘concept of sufficient facilities’ in the CRC appears primarily focused on the 
construction of, and investment in, additional facilities, but it is unclear what, if any, 
scope there is for an obligation to repair and maintain schools attacked during armed 
conflict.220  
In the context of the ICESCR, however, the obligation to make education 
available, this concept being necessarily broad to apply in both peacetime and IAC 
and NIAC, makes clear that States would have to repair and maintain schools attacked 
where such attacks affected the availability of education. This interpretation further 
clarifies that deliberate and direct attacks directed at facilities such as a library would 
also infringe upon the availability of the right to education in the context of a NIAC. 
Protecting Children, does, however, correctly argue that one way of clarifying and 
developing the existing IHRL framework would be a General Comment by the 
CESCR or the CRC Committee, perhaps jointly, that specifically addresses the issue 
of attacks against educational institutions and facilities and the obligation to repair and 
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maintain those that have been attacked. 221  Explicit acknowledgement of this 
protection would, naturally, be stronger than the currently implicit protection. 
According to the CESCR, the term ‘accessibility’ has three overlapping 
dimensions: education should not only be accessible to everyone without 
discrimination, it should also be physically and economically accessible. Physical 
accessibility requires that education must be within safe physical reach, either at a 
reasonably convenient geographic location or via modern technology.222 So not only 
must there be a sufficient quantity of schools and facilities that are fit for their purpose 
during a NIAC, but these should be within reasonable and safe reach. Where they are 
not safely accessible due to the NIAC, alternative means of delivery should be 
adopted. Naturally, the physical accessibility of education is likely to be particularly 
challenging during periods of NIAC,223 especially when deliberate and direct attacks 
against, schools, students and teachers occur, so education delivered through modern 
technology will be of increased importance.  
Economic accessibility, on the other hand, refers to affordability, subject to the 
differing obligations in relation to the cost of primary, secondary, higher and 
fundamental education.224 Individuals affected by a NIAC may find themselves in 
situations of extreme poverty, so costs of education may have a large impact on 
whether they attend school.225 Primary education should, as stated above, be made 
free and compulsory, and secondary, higher, and fundamental education should be 
made free progressively, to ensure that those affected by a NIAC continue to receive 
an education and that the benefits of education to the individual and society are not 
lost. 																																																								
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The CESCR states that acceptability means that the form and substance of 
education, including curricula and teaching methods, should be relevant, culturally 
appropriate and of good quality, and subject to the educational aims and objectives 
discussed above, and such minimum educational standards as may be approved by the 
State.226 Whether an education is of good quality is an incredibly subjective issue, but 
what is clear is that States should strive to continuously improve the standard of the 
education delivered, including during a NIAC. States should ensure a high standard of 
quality in education, as failing to do so can contribute to the outbreak of a NIAC or 
increase tensions, particularly if this is discriminatory in nature. Culturally 
inappropriate education can have a similar effect, while culturally appropriate 
education that conforms to the educational aims and objectives under the ICESCR can 
prevent conflict occurring or assist in the peacebuilding process.227 For example, 
propaganda for a NIAC through educational material would never be acceptable, as 
this would not be relevant but also because this would likely intensify a conflict and 
violate the peacebuilding aims and objectives of education.228 Whether an education is 
relevant, culturally appropriate and of good quality should be reviewed on a regular 
basis, and States should strive to continuously improve their standards.229 The failure 
to review the culturally appropriateness of the education system, particularly in the 
context of an armed conflict and the issue of deliberate and direct attacks, would 
violate IHRL.  
The CESCR defines adaptability as meaning that education must ‘be flexible so it 
can adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities and respond to the 
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needs of students within their diverse social and cultural settings’.230 Where deliberate 
and direct attacks against education result in the deprivation of the right to education, 
States must ensure they respond to the educational needs of society in a NIAC by 
providing education in a manner that is flexible enough to meet the needs of all 
individuals who would not otherwise receive an education. Such measures include the 
rapid resuming of educational activities, the reintegration of children in alternative 
schools after school closures, or education about conflict resolution, disaster risk 
reduction, and civic education.231 
1.3.4. A system of schools, a fellowship system and teaching staff conditions 
Article 13(2)(e) clearly instructs States to do three things: actively pursue the 
development of a system of schools at all levels; establish an adequate fellowship 
system; and continuously improve the material conditions of teaching staff.232 The 
obligation to actively pursue the development of a system of schools at all levels is 
clearly interpreted by the CESCR as meaning ‘that a State party is obliged to have an 
overall developmental strategy for its school system. The strategy must encompass 
schooling at all levels, but the Covenant requires States parties to prioritize primary 
education’. 233  This additional reference to the requirement to prioritise primary 
education reinforces its importance to the individual and society in peacetime and 
NIAC. A developmental strategy for all levels of education, however, reinforces the 
importance of protecting all levels of education during a NIAC. Such a developmental 
strategy will also be more important in a NIAC, when the realisation of the right to 
education will be more difficult, especially in the context of deliberate and direct 
attacks that disrupt the development of education. The CESCR defines the term 																																																								
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‘actively pursue’ as meaning ‘that the overall strategy should attract a degree of 
governmental priority and, in any event, must be implemented with vigour’.234 As 
such, even in a NIAC, this should attract priority. 
General Comment 13 states that the requirement for the establishment of a 
fellowship system ‘should enhance equality of educational access for individuals from 
disadvantaged groups’.235 Where free education has not been achieved in a State, a 
fellowship system would be particularly beneficial to those groups disadvantaged 
educationally by a NIAC. A fellowship system would ensure that those who would 
not otherwise be able to afford to obtain an education, because of the impact of a 
NIAC on their financial resources, have their right to education realised. Despite the 
importance of a fellowship system to the realisation of the right to education, in both 
peacetime and during an IAC or NIAC, a potential gap in protection is that the term 
‘fellowship’ remains undefined in both Article 13(2)(e) of ICESCR and general 
Comment 13. Beiter provides that ‘fellowship’ should be defined as meaning financial 
assistance for individual students in order to help with direct and indirect costs of 
education in the case of need, which can be in the form of either bursaries or low 
interest loans.236  
The lack of explicitness as to the meaning of fellowship allows for flexibility as to 
its interpretation, so States are free to interpret it as covering direct and indirect costs. 
The risk is that States interpret this strictly as covering direct costs, meaning that 
individuals affected by deliberate and direct attacks in a NIAC are still unable to 
afford the realisation of their right to education. This flexibility is, however, 
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necessary, as the State may only be able to financially provide for direct costs, 
especially in a NIAC, when the States own resources are likely to be impacted.  
Low interest loans are unsuitable in the context of primary education where it is 
made compulsory, as it should simultaneously be made free. If secondary education is 
compulsory in a State, it should also be made free and low interest loans would 
similarly be unsuitable. Where secondary education is not compulsory and fees are 
charged, low interest loans may be acceptable, but such loans are still more suitable 
for higher education considering secondary education is necessary to ensure that 
individuals are capable of attending higher education. Low interest loans are also less 
appropriate in conflict settings where civilians would otherwise have had access to 
education at no cost, or without having accrued debt. However, if necessary, low 
interest loans should be utilised as a last resort, where it is not possible to provide free 
education to all, or where bursaries are not possible, whether in peacetime or in an 
IAC or NIAC. 
It is acknowledged in General Comment 13 that unacceptably low levels of 
material conditions and teaching staff are major obstacles to the full realization of 
students' right to education’.237 This is a greater obstacle during a NIAC when 
deliberate and direct attacks against educational institutions cause damage to 
buildings, facilities and teaching materials, and where such attacks against teachers 
cause them to flee or work in conditions not conducive to a quality education. The 
requirement to continuously improve conditions aims to protect teachers and serves 
especially to emphasise the fact that favourable material conditions will enhance the 
quality of the enjoyment of the right to education. 238  Continuously improving 
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conditions is likely to be more difficult during a NIAC where deliberate and direct 
attacks against educational institutions, teachers and students occur, where conditions 
will instead deteriorate. Nonetheless, States should clearly strive, in accordance with 
the ICESCR, to ensure the best possible conditions during a NIAC in order to fully 
realise the right to education.  
1.3.5. The Freedom to Choose and Establish Schools 
Article 13(3) of the ICESCR identifies two aspects of parental freedom; the 
‘freedom to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the 
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be 
laid down or approved by the State’ and the ‘freedom to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions’.239 In a 
NIAC, realising these parental freedoms can be instrumental in the peacebuilding 
process where the conflict is aggravated by factors such as interference with choice of 
schools, or religious or moral beliefs. 
Article 13(4) also refers to ‘the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and 
direct educational institutions’, providing that the institutions conform to the aims and 
objectives of education, and to any minimum standards as laid down by the State.240 It 
has frequently been held that there exists no requirement for States to assist, 
financially or otherwise, in the establishment and operation of such institutions, they 
must simply refrain from interfering with the liberty of individuals to establish 
educational institutions,241 and to choose to send their children to such schools. 
Interfering is, however, allowed to the extent of ensuring that the aims and objectives 
of education, and the standards proscribed by the ICESCR, are met. In the context of a 																																																								
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NIAC, it is especially important for a State to refrain from interfering with the 
establishment of private schools where such schools are able to fulfil the realisation of 
the right to a quality education when the State itself cannot realise this right for those 
students whose education is affected by the conflict. 
1.4. Obligations Provided for within Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Article 2(1) is described as the linchpin of the ICESCR, as it describes the 
obligations incumbent upon States in relation to realising all of the rights enumerated 
within the Covenant, being of critical importance to its substance and 
implementation.242 Article 2(1) is, therefore, central to the understanding of the legal 
obligations imposed upon States in respect of ESCR,243 and in respect of the right to 
education in the context of deliberate and direct attacks during a NIAC. However, 
while it is argued that Article 2(1) ‘lays down clear human rights legal obligations for 
States parties’, 244  it is conversely argued to be an ‘enormous obstacle’ to the 
implementation of ESCR,245 as its interpretations have been controversial and much 
debated.246 It is essential to determine whether Article 2(1) is in fact clear in setting 
out the obligations of States. If there are ambiguities or gaps, it will not be possible to 
conclude that the right to education is provided for in a NIAC effectively within 
IHRL. 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that States must: 																																																								
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[T]ake steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.247 
 
Each of these obligations are now examined in turn, though while the obligations are 
discussed separately, one should bear in mind that they are intertwined and should be 
viewed as an organic whole.248 These obligations should also be read in conjunction 
with Article 13 of the ICESCR, as Article 2(1) describes how States should implement 
the specific steps identified above. 
1.4.1. The Obligation to Take Steps ‘with a View to Achieving Progressively the 
Full Realisation’ of the Right to Education 
General Comment 3 states that progressive realisation:  
 
[S]hould not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful 
content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities 
of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase 
must be read in the light of the overall objective…to establish clear obligations for 
States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus 																																																								
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imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible 
towards that goal’.249 
 
In the context of the right to education, the CESCR reiterates within General 
Comment 13 that the term ‘progressive realisation’ is to be taken as meaning that 
States have a ‘specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the full realisation of article 13’.250 It is similarly 
pointed out within the Limburg Principles that States must realise ESCR as 
expeditiously as possible, and that ‘under no circumstances shall this be interpreted as 
implying for States the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realization. On 
the contrary all States parties have the obligation to begin immediately to take steps to 
fulfil their obligations under the Covenant’,251 including in respect of the right to 
education. The term is, therefore, inextricably linked to the phrases ‘full realization’ 
and ‘maximum of its available resources’.252  
As such, the term ‘progressive realisation’ is clear, and imposes well-defined, 
albeit broad, obligations. States should immediately start working towards achieving, 
as quickly as possible, the full realisation of the right to education, in line with their 
maximum available resources. While progress towards the full realisation of education 
may be impacted as a result of a NIAC, particularly where deliberate and direct 
attacks against education occur, the obligation to progressively realise the right to 
education as expeditiously as possible nonetheless continues. However, while the 
meaning of progressive realisation is clear, there are practical difficulties in 
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determining whether a State has complied with its obligation to realise an ESCR 
progressively.  
It is often argued that compliance with the principle of progressive realisation is 
difficult to measure.253 Measuring progressive realisation requires knowledge as to the 
resources and means available to a State, which, as will be shown below, are difficult 
to assess in scholarly research, as this ‘involves the gathering of data which is often 
not available, is complex to assess and is often inexact’.254 Progressive realisation also 
requires long-term measurement over a considerable period of time’.255 As such, the 
case studies in this thesis do not attempt to assess progressive realisation in light of 
available resources and means. While progressive realisation is difficult to assess in 
the context of scholarly research, such information would, however, be available to 
the State, enabling them to act in accordance with the principle of progressive 
realisation, and to courts tasked with determining whether they have in fact done so. I 
discuss the concepts of maximum available resources and means and international 
obligations for cooperation and assistance to demonstrate the difficulties surround 
assessing compliance with progressive realisation. 
1.4.2. The Obligation to Use the Maximum Available Resources 
As indicated, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR qualifies the principle of progressive 
realisation with the simultaneous obligation to take steps ‘to the maximum of 
available resources’.256 The term ‘maximum available resources’, however, has never 
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been clearly defined and remains vague’,257 and the term is often argued to be 
problematic.258 Two difficulties in measuring whether a State is in compliance with 
the obligation to use their maximum available resources are, firstly, determining 
which resources count, and secondly, determining whether these resources were used 
to the ‘maximum’.259 These two issues cause difficulty in determining whether the 
State has complied with their obligation to progressively realise ESCR, including the 
right to education in a NIAC. 
In relation to the first difficulty, there has been a focus on prioritising available 
financial resources, and ‘such a focus may have resulted in perceived or real lack of 
financial resources being used as an excuse for not doing what is possible’.260 It is, 
therefore, argued that ‘resources’ should not be interpreted as being limited to only 
financial resources.261 It is essential to look at the actual resources of the State rather 
than to budgetary expenditures. 262  Robertson argues that ‘while other types of 
resources might be identified, it appears that financial, natural, human, technological, 
and informational resources are the most important resources in achieving ICESCR 
Rights’. 263 There, therefore, appears to be consensus for a broad interpretation of 
resources, which would be beneficial to the State who will be more fairly assessed on 
compliance, and to the individual who has their ESCR better realised. This is 
especially relevant in a NIAC, when financial resources may be necessarily re-
diverted to military expenditure, as the State should look to the whole range of their 
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resources to realise ESCR, including the right to education in the face of deliberate 
and direct attacks. 
In relation to the second difficulty, the question of whether resources are used to 
the ‘maximum’ is complex. As to the meaning of the term ‘maximum’, Skogly 
suggests that a qualitative approach, in the sense of efficient utilisation, be taken in 
addition to a quantitative one, as ‘by focusing on the development of the quality of the 
resources or the means of implementation, much can be achieved without necessarily 
requiring a significant increase in funding’.264 While the availability of resources is 
one of the major obstacles to fully realising ESCR,265 resource distribution is also a 
key issue.266 Non-compliance with ESCR can often be attributed to political will 
rather than a matter of actual resource scarcity.267 Skogly argues that it is essential to 
look at both the resources that are used, and the way in which they are used.268 In 
order to ensure the realisation of the right to education in a NIAC, measuring State 
compliance with the ‘maximum’ element of this obligation, therefore, requires one to 
consider both the resources used, the total amount of resources available, and the way 
in which they are allocated.  
Robertson adds that State compliance should be measured based on resource 
utilisation, by comparing similarly developed States expenditure on ESCR and on 
other reasonable expenditures.269 While this approach could serve as a very useful 
framework for determining whether resources have been distributed adequately, it is 
necessary to take into account the different contextual situations within each State. 
The fact that the CESCR consider such information on a country-by-country basis is 																																																								
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significant in this respect.270 The CESCR stated that, where a State uses resource 
constraints as an explanation for the taking of no steps, or retrogressive steps, they 
would consider this in light of objective criteria, which includes: the country’s level of 
development; the severity of the alleged breach and whether it concerns a minimum 
core obligation; the country’s current economic situation; the existence of other 
serious claims on the State party’s limited resources such as natural disasters or 
internal armed conflict; whether the State party had sought to identify low-cost 
options; and finally whether the State party had sought cooperation and assistance or 
rejected offers of resources.271 Therefore, a NIAC is a significant consideration that 
the CESCR will take into account in determining whether ESCR, including the right 
to education, was violated. The question as to whether States have ‘appropriately’ 
allocated the maximum of their available resources to ESCR is, however, subjective 
and complex, being more difficult during a NIAC.  
Beiter argues that where a State spends a disproportionate amount on its military 
compared to insignificant amounts on ESCR, this could point to non-compliance.272 
The CESCR have in fact expressed concern about disproportionate military spending 
in Concluding Observations.273 The State would have to justify the amount of 
resources spent on its military where the right to education is unrealised or where 
retrogression occurs. Maximum available resources would need to be examined from 
the perspective of whether the diversion of spending from education to the military 
was necessary in the circumstances, and should bear in mind the importance of 																																																								
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education for peace when determining whether military spending is proportionate or 
not. In the context of deliberate and direct attacks, redirecting funding to the military 
may be necessary to protect schools and children, though it should be taken into 
account when conducting military operations that military presence in or near school 
increases the likelihood of attacks on schools or against students.274  
It is further provided in General Comment 3 that ‘any deliberately retrogressive 
measures would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully 
justified in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources’.275 Nolan, 
Lusiani, and Courtis argue that it is clear that Article 2(1) encompasses ‘an 
understanding that progressive realisation may be limited by the ‘realities’ faced by 
States, such as a diminution of resources available to them’, and appears ‘to 
contemplate that retrogressive measures may be justifiable in some circumstances’.276 
Article 2(1), therefore, is broad enough to allow the State flexibility when faced with 
the realities of a NIAC, and the likely reduction in available resources. In the context 
of education, the CESCR, in General Comment 13, reiterates that: 
 
If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden 
of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of 
all alternatives and that they are fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the State 
party's maximum available resources.277 
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However, the CESCR also provides that there exists ‘a strong presumption of 
impermissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to 
education’. 278 As such, the State cannot justify retrogressive measures simply by 
referring to resource scarcity, rather it must show, having the burden of proving this, 
why the measures ‘were necessary for the protection of the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant’.279 In the contexts of deliberate and direct attacks 
against education, retrogression would only be justifiable, therefore, if this was 
necessary, and if the State was taking all steps to mitigate such attacks in line with 
their available resources. 
Significant to the issue of retrogressive measures, Ssenyonjo argues that States 
must also address all factors that would adversely affect the availability of 
resources.280 A NIAC, as already repeatedly pointed out, would affect the availability 
of resources, financial or otherwise, which may result in retrogression. The State must 
take steps to address a NIAC that adversely affects its available resources and inability 
to realise ESCR, including the right to education. As discussed, ensuring the 
realisation of education is simultaneously an effective way of addressing a NIAC.281 
The CESCR has stated that:  
 
In its assessment of whether a State party has taken reasonable steps to the 
maximum of its available resources to achieve progressively the realization of the 
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provisions of the Covenant, the Committee places great importance on transparent 
and participative decision-making processes at the national level.282 
 
The State should, therefore, act, and be encouraged to act, as far as practicably 
possible, in a transparent manner in respect of their resources and steps taken towards 
the progressive realisation of ESCR, including the right to education. This would 
permit the discerning of whether States are unable rather than unwilling to comply 
with their obligations, including in a NIAC. 
1.4.3. The obligation to take steps by ‘all appropriate means’ 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR also obligates States to take steps ‘by all appropriate 
means’ to fully realise ESCR, ‘including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures’. 283  The ICESCR does not provide for the mandatory adoption of 
legislature,284 however, the CESCR states that the implementation of ‘legislation is 
highly desirable and in some cases may even be indispensable’.285 It is also stated 
within the Limburg Principles that ‘article 2(1) would often require legislative action 
to be taken in cases where existing legislation is in violation of the obligations 
assumed under the Covenant’. 286  States should, therefore, ensure that domestic 
legislation in enacted that protects education against deliberate and direct attacks. 
Nonetheless, legislative measures alone will not be sufficient to realise the rights 
contained in the ICESCR.287 The phrase ‘all appropriate means’ reflects this, as it is 																																																								
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purposefully broad and flexible.288 In addition to legislation, other appropriate means 
include judicial remedies, ‘administrative, financial, educational and social 
measures’.289 The inclusion of the word ‘all’ in ‘all appropriate means’ indicates that 
States must utilise an array of appropriate means available to them to ensure the 
realisation of the right to education in a NIAC. The utilisation of several methods is a 
good indicator of the political will of the State in realising education in the face of 
attacks against education. 
Similar to the obligation to use the maximum of available resources, States also 
have a margin of discretion as to which ‘appropriate means’ to pursue, but this 
discretion is not absolute.290 Craven argues that ‘it is natural that the approach of each 
state will vary according to the circumstances in which it finds itself’.291 However, 
within the Limburg Principles, it is stated that while the ‘appropriateness of the means 
to be applied…shall be determined by that State’ this ‘shall be subject to review by 
the [CESCR]’.292 The CESCR are of the same opinion, as it is provided in General 
Comment 3 that: 
 
The phrase “by all appropriate means” must be given its full and natural meaning. 
While each State party must decide for itself which means are the most 
appropriate under the circumstances with respect to each of the rights, the 
“appropriateness” of the means chosen will not always be self-evident. It is 
therefore desirable that States parties’ reports should indicate not only the 
measures that have been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to 
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be the most “appropriate” under the circumstances. However, the ultimate 
determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one 
for the Committee to make.293  
 
Therefore, the CESCR has the residual power to assess appropriateness.294 States, 
therefore, have a duty to explain to the CESCR why the means taken, in accordance 
with their discretion, to combat deliberate and direct attacks against education were 
the most appropriate. However, it can still be determined by the CESCR that they 
have failed to fulfil their obligation under Article 2(1) to use all appropriate means. As 
such, as with the determination of whether the maximum available resources were 
used, the determination of whether all appropriate means have been used is similarly 
subjective, complicated and dependant on information from the State as to what 
means were available and how they have been allocated in light of the NIAC. 
1.4.4. Obligation of International Assistance and Co-operation 
Craven argues that although there is agreement that the full realisation of ESCR is 
to some extent contingent on the provision of international assistance, ‘the nature, 
scope and obligatory nature of such assistance is still unclear’.295 Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR provides that States have an obligation to take steps not only individually, 
but also ‘through international assistance and co-operation’. 296  The Limburg 
Principles similarly state that international assistance and co-operation ‘must be 
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directed towards the establishment of a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Covenant can be fully realized’.297  
The realisation of the right to education is regarded as requiring substantial 
resources, and where the right to education cannot be realised, States are obliged to 
seek assistance and cooperation.298 The key question is not whether a State has an 
obligation to seek assistance and cooperation, but rather whether States have an 
obligation to provide assistance and co-operation,299 as this issue has not yet been 
settled.300 It is provided in General Comment 3 that international cooperation ‘for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States’, 
particularly those States which are in a position to assist other States.301 However, 
Saul, Kinley and Mowbray argue that the CESCR ‘avoids any direct attribution of 
responsibility or duty’ and therefore ‘the assertion that there are well established 
principles of international law that oblige states to so cooperate is simply incorrect’.302  
The CESCR reaffirms the notion that the States have an obligation to provide 
international co-operation and assistance in respect of education in General Comment 
13.303 General Comment 11 also provides that ‘where a State party is clearly lacking 
in the financial resources and/or expertise required to “work out and adopt” a detailed 
plan, the international community has a clear obligation to assist’.304 Most developed 
States generally provide assistance to developing States, yet some have denied the 
existence of a legally binding obligation to do so.305 General Comments 3, 11 and 13 
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each make reference to the word ‘obligation’, however, it is not clear whether this is 
an obligation of a legal or moral character.  
During the drafting of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the United Kingdom, 
the Czech Republic, Canada, France and Portugal argued that international 
cooperation and assistance was an important moral obligation, but not a legal one.306 
The result of this is that the Optional Protocol refers in Article 14(1) to the ‘need for 
technical advice or assistance’ and in Article 14(3) and 14(4) to establishing a trust 
fund with a view to ‘providing expert and technical assistance to States Parties’.307 
Ssenyonjo argues that while Article 14 is a weak provision, it is significant that the 
Optional Protocol does not exclude other forms of assistance and cooperation, which 
could consist of:  
 
[T]he conclusion of international agreements, the provision of human resources, 
enabling access to literature, the development of collaborative research agendas 
that enable researchers in developed states to address issues affecting developing 
states, educational and academic scholarships and exchanges, direct investment 
and joint venture programmes in the creation of various projects relating to 
various aspects of ESC rights’.308  
 
Skogly argues that the uncertainty as to the legality of the obligation does not render 
the concept of international assistance and cooperation worthless, rather it is of utmost 
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importance for the implementation and fulfilment of human rights.309 For example, 
where a State is unable to fulfil the right to education in the context of deliberate and 
direct attacks, international co-operation and assistance may be instrumental in 
realising the right to education.  
Article 26(3) of the CRC elaborates on the principle of international cooperation 
in relation to the right to education, providing that:  
 
States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters 
relating to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of 
ignorance and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific 
and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular 
account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.310 
 
States should therefore take into account the needs of States who are unable to realise 
the right to education due to deliberate and direct attacks during a NIAC, particularly 
developing States. While States may not be legally obligated to provide such co-
operation or assistance, it should be given where possible. 
Whether States in a position to assist and co-operate have a legal obligation to do 
so where assistance and co-operation is sought remains unclear. Even if it is accepted 
that a legal obligation to provide assistance and cooperation exists, the scope of this 
obligation is unclear. The State should at the very least be considered bound by a legal 
obligation to provide co-operation and assistance where this is free, such as sharing 
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information and ideas. In the context of deliberate and direct attacks, this could 
include sharing military or political information to combat NSAG. However, it has 
been argued that ‘although there is clearly an obligation to cooperate internationally, it 
is not clear whether this means that wealthy States Parties are obliged to provide aid to 
assist in the realization of the rights in other countries’.311 It is also unclear from the 
wording of Article 2(1) how much a State would actually have to give to be in 
accordance with their legal obligations.  
While international assistance should not be merely financial, the level of financial 
aid to be provided by developed countries was established in 1970 via a General 
Assembly Resolution, whereby developed countries formally pledged to ‘exert its best 
efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product’ to 
assist developing countries.312 This target has been affirmed in various instruments, 
most notably in the Monterrey Consensus,313 the FAO voluntary guidelines314 and the 
Doha Declaration. 315  Despite this pledge, the levels of aid provided remain 
insufficient and developed countries have mostly failed to meet the above target.316 
Yet it remains questionable whether the CESCR can find developed States to be in 
violation of Article 2(1) for failing to devote 0.7% of their GDP to international 
assistance.317  
It is set out in the Limburg Principles that:  																																																								
311 Matthew Craven, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Raija 
Hanski and Markku Suksi, An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A 
Textbook (2nd ed, Abo Akademi University 1999), 108 
312 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV) 1970, at [43] 
313 Final Outcome of the International Conference on Financing for Development, adopted on 22 March 
2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, A/CONF/198/3.   
314 FAO, ‘Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food 
in the Context of National Food Security’ (2003), 36 at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e.pdf (Last visited 10 April 2013) 
315 United Nations, Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome Document of the 
Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of 
the Monterrey Consensus 2008, A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1*, at [43] 
316 UN report A/HRC/10/5, at [7]  




‘irrespective of differences in their political, economic and social systems, States 
shall co-operate with one another to promote international social, economic and 
cultural progress, in particular the economic growth of developing countries, free 
from discrimination based on such differences’.318  
 
As such, if a State provides assistance and cooperation to another State that is unable 
to realise the right to education, they must do so on an indiscriminate basis. Nor 
should states attach conditions to the aid that they provide where this would result in 
the violation of IHRL.319 For example, in relation to the right to education States 
should not provide aid for the rebuilding of educational institutions following targeted 
attacks, with an attached condition as to the curriculum that would lead to the 
discrimination of certain groups. 
States giving aid also have a responsibility to refrain from withdrawing aid until 
they have first given the recipient State reasonable notice, so they have the 
opportunity to make alternative arrangements.320 De Schutter argues that unjustified 
regressions of the amount of aid that developed countries provide should be treated as 
a violation of a State’s obligations under international law.321 Again, if a State has 
withdrawn aid for education without reasonable notice, it is unclear whether this 
would amount to a violation of the ICESCR, especially where adequate justification 
for doing so is provided.  
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1.5. Obligations Provided for within General Comments 3 and 13 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
It is important to examine the nature and scope of minimum core obligations and 
tripartite obligations to respect, protect and fulfil, to determine whether they improve 
the protection of education during NIAC. If there are, conversely, ambiguities or gaps 
in the manner in which they regulate the right to education, this may pose an obstacle 
to the realisation of the right to education during NIAC when deliberate and direct 
attacks occur. 
1.5.1. Minimum Core Obligations 
It is important to discuss the concept of minimum core obligations because they 
are of particular relevance during NIAC, as the CESCR has stipulated that they are 
non-derogable, and it is also argued that they cannot be subject to reservations or 
limitations. 322 As such, minimum core obligations are capable of ensuring basic 
protection to the right to education during NIAC where a State attempts to restrict the 
rights applicability. However, minimum core obligations are ‘one of the more difficult 
and controversial concepts in economic, social and cultural rights’.323  
On the one hand, the concept of minimum core obligations is argued to be ‘crucial 
in the implementation of economic and social rights’,324 and useful as it defines 
criteria by which to determine clear violations of ESCR.325 In particular, it is argued to 
allow ‘for a clearer formulation of the concept of progressive realisation, by ensuring 
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that the state has a starting-point from which to work’.326 On the other hand, there 
have been various calls for the minimum core concept to be abandoned.327 However, 
Young argues that before we completely embrace or abandon the minimum core 
concept, we must formulate a clearer analysis of its interpretation, it being necessary 
to disentangle the inconsistencies and controversies that have accompanied the 
concept. 328  It is important, therefore, to determine whether the minimum core 
obligations approach is a concept that is clear and useful for determining violations of 
the right to education in a NIAC, or whether it should in fact be abandoned.  
1.5.1.1.Defining the minimum core obligations approach 
General Comment 3 states that: 
 
[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State 
party… if the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être.329 
 
Minimum core obligations are referred to as ‘the nature or essence of a right…the 
essential element or elements without which a right loses its substantive 
significance’.330 The problem is that the minimum core is open to disagreement, and 
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‘the minimum core will look different to an advocate of human flourishing in 
comparison with an advocate of basic survival’.331 One can look to where consensus 
has been reached on a rights nucleus. 332  The importance of consensus is its 
relationship to the principles of State consent and sovereignty, and the ensuring of the 
validity of a minimum core concept universally.333 Yet it is not unclear whose 
consensus counts, nor whether unanimous or majority consensus is required.334 Dixon 
argues that the minimum core should derive from a survey of State practices 
conducted by the CESCR.335 Following General Comment 3, the CESCR has in fact 
fleshed out the minimum core of most ESCR in its General Comments, and if the 
CESCR ‘deviates too far from consensus, the Committee (and the General Comments 
it issues) likewise loses legal authority’.336  
However, the identification of the minimum core by the CESCR has been 
criticised as not having met with success,337 and as being far from coherent.338 As 
such, it is important to take the CESCR determination of the core content of the right 
to education as a starting point, and to determine whether the CESCR has correctly 
identified its core content. Nonetheless, the failure of the CESCR to ‘articulate a 
coherent, stable, and determinate vision of minimum core duties…should not be taken 
to signal the death knoll for the concept of minimum core obligations’.339 Going 
forward the CESCR can update its analysis of the minimum core of ESCR, and should 
ensure that in doing so it adopts a coherent approach with a transparent methodology 																																																																																																																																																															
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as to how they determined that core by consensus. As it may be possible for the State 
to derogate from or limit the applicability of non-core aspects of the right to education 
during a NIAC, it is important that the CESCR ensures that in identifying the core this 
genuinely reflects the ‘raison d'être’ of the right to education. This would ensure that 
education can be meaningfully realised in the face of aggressive derogation or 
limitation practices. 
Another important critique is that by prioritising the core, we neglect the non-core 
elements of a right.340 This is because the minimum core creates ‘a ‘‘floor’’ below 
which conditions should not be permitted to fall’,341 but this floor may become a 
‘ceiling,’ whereby States reach their minimum core obligations and do nothing more 
to fully implement the right.342 The concept is therefore argued to pose ‘a danger that 
the remainder of a right is subsequently considered unimportant and therefore may 
well be denied’.343 This is, however, not a real weakness.  
We must recall the limited purpose of the approach.344 Chapman and Russell argue 
that:  
 
The purpose of minimum core obligations is not to provide States with a loophole 
that allows them to avoid their obligations. Rather it is to accommodate the reality 
that many ESCR require resources that are simply not available in many countries 
and that States must still realize rights fully upon meeting their minimum core 
obligations.345  
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The principle of progressive realization, therefore, makes clear that the concept does 
not allow States to simply comply with the minimum core and do nothing more, once 
the minimum core is realised States must endeavor to realise the non-core elements of 
ESCR. What is required is that ‘states should strive to realize the full spectrum of 
rights’ in accordance with their obligation to take steps progressively. 346  The 
minimum core should therefore be seen as an expanding floor from which States 
should endeavor to move upwards,347 and as a springboard for further action.348  
The question becomes one of timing with the ultimate goal of full implementation, 
and while recognising that all components of a right are equal, tackling the most 
essential elements of a right first is prioritised.349 The minimum core obligations 
concept helps direct resources to where they are most urgent, thereby defining 
priorities for domestic efforts towards the full realisation of ESCR.350 The benefit of 
the obligations approach is, therefore, that it enables a more realistic and informed 
strategy for the realisation of ESCR. 351  Particularly where a State has limited 
resources due to a NIAC, and important budgetary decisions have to be made in 
respect of military expenditure versus expenditure on the right to education, minimum 
core obligations will serve an important function in assisting a State in allocating its 
resources.  
Another critique of the minimum core obligations approach is that it directs 
attention to the performance of developing States,352 whom are more likely to be 
struggling to meet the basic components of a right. However, in this respect, minimum 
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core obligations are also a useful concept at the international level.353 In the context of 
international co-operation and assistance, attention on developing States can be 
beneficial. As the core reflects the most essential elements of a right, States struggling 
to meet the core of the right to education can be afforded the assistance required to 
meet their obligations. 
In this regard, the practicalities of prioritising resources to core needs have to be 
considered. Wesson argues that one approach is that resources allocated to ‘non-core 
needs should be redistributed to satisfy core entitlements as a matter of absolute 
priority’.354 However, he argues that such an approach is unrealistic, unconscionable 
and has the potential to be counterproductive, instead a more nuanced approach is 
needed that allows for the most effective allocation of scarce resources that balances 
short-term and long-term aims.355 Another approach is that there should be no 
redistribution of resources from non-core to core needs, rather, as additional resources 
become available ‘these should be devoted to core needs, while existing services are 
simply maintained without being expanded’.356 However, such an interpretation would 
deprive the minimum core of its raison d'etre.357 A third interpretation is a balance 
whereby certain allocations could be compromised to satisfy core needs, while others 
are maintained. A benefit is that ‘the minimum core would not result in inappropriate 
services being terminated…nor would it be deprived of its teeth’.358 Wesson adds that 
‘this would simply be a bridge too far’, as courts are ill-suited to determine the 
appropriate balance between short and long-term aims, and an approach requiring 
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courts to consider non-core allocations as violations if core needs are not addressed is 
unworkable and inflexible.359 
However, there is a fourth approach to the issue of resource allocation. Lehmann 
argues that ‘in determining whether a particular expenditure that does not involve the 
fulfillment of a right is reasonable, account must be taken of the fact that it is a non-
rights expenditure’.360 There should, therefore, be a more robust analysis of budget 
and expenditure,361 and emphasis should not be placed on the redistribution of 
resources from the non-core to the core. Instead, in determining whether the State has 
effectively allocated its resources to the core and non-core elements of the right to 
education during NIAC, emphasis should be on redistributing resources from non-
rights to the core as far as possible, and where essential from the non-core to the core. 
1.5.1.2. Minimum Core Obligations and their Relationship to Immediate 
Obligations 
The CESCR stated in the context of ESCR and the right to education specifically 
that the ICESCR, as well as providing for progressively realisable obligations and 
acknowledging constraints due to the limits of available resources, also imposes on 
States ‘obligations which are of immediate effect’.362 A State will be considered to 
violate an immediately realisable obligation where non-compliance has occurred, and 
will not be able to justify non-compliance on the basis of resource constraints. 
Immediately realisable obligations, therefore, refer to negative obligations which do 
not require resources to realise. Progressively realisable obligations, conversely, are 
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positive obligations that can be realised over time in light of resources available, as 
discussed above. 
It is often argued that minimum core obligations are not subject to the principle of 
progressive realisation and must be implemented immediately, irrespective of the 
availability of resources.363 On the one hand, the Maastricht Guidelines provide 
expressly that minimum core ‘obligations apply irrespective of the availability of 
resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties… resource 
scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations’.364 On the other hand, 
the Limburg Principles, while not explicitly referring to the concept of minimum core 
obligations, provides that ‘States Parties are obligated, regardless of the level of 
economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all’, and 
that a State will be in violation of the ICESCR if ‘it wilfully fails to meet a generally 
accepted international minimum standard of achievement, which is within its powers 
to meet’.365 The reference to the phrase ‘wilfully fails to meet’ is significant, as this 
infers that one should examine whether a State was unwilling rather than unable to 
comply with international minimum standards, namely minimum core obligations, 
having regard to resource scarcity and the principle of progressive realisation. 
Unfortunately, Russell argues that this contradiction has not been fully grappled with, 
nor resolved.366 
Significantly, De Schutter argues that the Maastricht Guidelines interpretation of 
minimum core obligations is not an accurate reading of the CESCR position.367 																																																								
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Russell argues that the position that minimum core obligations are immediately 
enforceable is ‘hopelessly incompatible in practice’.368 As minimum core obligations 
are not limited to cost free negative obligations but also positive obligations, in reality 
meeting minimum core obligations immediately may be a challenge for States and 
they may have to be realised progressively.369 It would be illogical to accuse a State of 
violating a right that it could not have possibly met.370 This may be particularly unfair 
in the context of a NIAC, when it may be more financially or practically difficult to 
comply with minimum core obligations that are positive in nature. For example, 
rebuilding primary schools destroyed by NSAG requires resources that the State may 
simply not have, and where such resources are available, rebuilding requires time, 
holding a State to be in violation where rebuilding does not happen immediately 
would be unjust, but the impossibility of the situation would be for the State to prove.  
Complicating the debate as to the immediate or progressive nature of minimum 
core obligations further is the fact that the CESCR has interpreted this inconsistently. 
In the first formulation of the minimum core obligations concept by the CESCR, the 
CESCR recognised that it would be unfair to make minimum core obligations 
immediately enforceable, irrespective of resource constraints:  
 
Any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation 
must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country 
concerned...In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at 
least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 																																																								
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It line with the resources, available resources can be taken into account, and the State 
has the burden of proving that all efforts have been made to meet the minimum 
standards set out in the minimum core obligations, including by the adoption of low-
cost programmes.372 
De Schutter argues that the CESCR felt compelled to state that even in relation to 
minimum core obligations, the lack of resources cannot be dismissed.373 In respect of 
the right to education, the CESCR is silent in General Comments 11 and 13 as to the 
progressive or immediate nature of minimum core obligations. However, in General 
Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), it is provided that ‘the State has 
to demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal 
in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’.374 This is in 
line with the wording of General Comment 3, and with the understanding that 
minimum core obligations can be progressively realised in line with resource 
constraints.  
On the other hand, in General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), it is provided that States ‘cannot, under any circumstances 
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations. 375  This was 
reiterated in General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).376 It is clear that 
the CESCR alters their interpretation of minimum core obligations in accordance with 
the idea that States cannot justify non-compliance in light of resource scarcity as a 
result of the immediate nature of minimum core obligations. General Comment 17: 
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material 
Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or 
she is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant), goes further by 
explicitly stating that minimum core obligations ‘are of immediate effect’. 377 
Significantly, however, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) 
reverts back to the wording of General Comment 3, and the idea that minimum core 
obligations are in fact realisable progressively in light of resource constraints.378  
The inconsistent approach of the CESCR risks undermining the minimum core 
obligations approach, despite its importance to the right to education during situations 
of NIAC, as well as other ESCR, due to the inability to restrict their application. This 
risk is highlighted by the fact that there have been calls to abandon the approach due 
to the confusion that surrounds it. Going forward, the CESCR should endeavor to 
update their General Comments and put forward an approach that is consistent. 
I further submit that the view that minimum core obligations are either solely 
immediate or solely progressive is wrong on the basis that minimum core obligations 
may correspond to either immediately or progressively realisable elements of a right. 
This can be evidenced clearly when the minimum core obligations and immediate 
																																																								
376 General Comment 15, at [40] 
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obligations of the right to education, as identified by the CESCR, are compared.379 
Article 13 of the ICESCR lists several specific steps that must be complied with in 
order for the right to education to be fully realised.380 In General Comment 13, the 
CESCR identifies five of those steps as amounting to the minimum core: ‘to ensure 
the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-
discriminatory basis’; ‘to ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in 
article 13(1)’; to ensure the provision of primary education for all on a free and 
compulsory basis; ‘to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which 
includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education’; and ‘to ensure 
free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties’.381 The 
CESCR also identifies various immediate obligations, but these do not necessarily 
correspond with those elements of the right to education that form the minimum core.  
In General Comment 13, the CESCR reiterates that the principle of non-
discrimination is an immediate obligation that is subject to neither progressive 
realisation nor the availability of resources.382 The CESCR, therefore, considers the 
principle of non-discrimination to be both a minimum core obligation and an 
immediate obligation. Conversely, the CESCR does not identify the minimum core 
obligation to ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in Article 13(1) 
of the ICESCR as an immediate obligation. Ensuring that education conforms to the 
objectives set out in Article 13(1) would require resources and time to implement, for 
example to amend educational curricula, or to train educational staff, and therefore, is 
progressively realisable.  
																																																								
379 There is scope for further research into the immediate and progressive nature of minimum core 
components of other ESCR. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to show that at least 
in respect of education, the argument that all minimum core obligations are immediate is deeply flawed. 
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The minimum core obligation to provide free and compulsory primary education to all 
is also specified to be of an immediate nature within General Comment 13.383 As with 
the principle of non-discrimination, there is a direct overlap between what the CESCR 
considers to be a minimum core obligation and an immediate obligation. However, as 
Beiter points out, the nature of a State’s obligation with respect to primary education 
is overstated within General Comment 13, as Article 14 of the ICESCR provides for 
its progressive realisation.384 Therefore, it is clear that the CESCR are incorrect when 
stating that the minimum core obligation to provide free and compulsory education is 
an immediate obligation. 
The CESCR, does however, provide that the adoption of a plan for the progressive 
realisation of the right to education is immediate in nature, stating in General 
Comment 11 that: 
 
A State party cannot escape the unequivocal obligation to adopt a plan of action 
on the grounds that the necessary resources are not available. If the obligation 
could be avoided in this way, there would be no justification for the unique 
requirement contained in article 14 which applies, almost by definition, to 
situations characterized by inadequate financial resources.’’385 
 
In relation to the minimum core obligation ‘to adopt and implement a national 
educational strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental 
education’, it is provided in General Comment 13 that a State party has an immediate 
obligation to take steps to realise all levels of education for all those within its 
jurisdiction, and that ‘at a minimum, the State party is required to adopt and 																																																								
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384 Beiter, (n72), 390; See ICESCR, Art 14 
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implement a national educational strategy which includes the provision of secondary, 
higher and fundamental education in accordance with the Covenant’.386 While the 
CESCR does not provide so explicitly, as with the creation of a plan for primary 
education being immediately realisable, it is clear that the minimum core obligation to 
have a plan for the realisation of the other levels of education is also immediately 
realisable. Transparent plans of action are required, with benchmarks tied to specific 
timeframes, in order to measure progress and ensure that policy commitments do not 
simply remain noble sentiments on paper.387 Plans for all levels of education will be 
particularly important for the realisation of education in situations of NIAC, where 
deliberate and direct attacks against education occur, being reviewed more regularly 
to allow for the nuances of the conflict and nature of attacks. 
In relation to the minimum core obligation to ensure free choice of education 
without interference from the State or third parties, the CESCR does not identify this 
requirement as an immediate obligation. Coomans argues that the freedom dimension 
of the right to education requires a policy of non-interference and implies negative 
obligations.388 Significantly, ‘refraining from interfering with the enjoyment of a right 
does not seem to be contingent upon resource-availability or require progressive 
realization’.389 Therefore, while the CESCR has failed to elaborate on the immediately 
realisable nature of this minimum core obligation, it is clear that this is implementable 
immediately.  
Compliance with the principle of progressive realisation is difficult to measure, 
hence the appeal of an immediately realisable minimum core. An immediately 																																																								
386 General Comment 13, at [51] 
387 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Right to Social Security: Response from a South African Perspective’ in 
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realisable minimum core obligations approach would provide a greater level of 
protection to ESCR, including to education in a NIAC, yet interpreting the approach 
this way risks the approach not being taken seriously. This risk is higher considering 
minimum core obligations are not articulated within the ICESCR itself, but within the 
non-binding General Comments of the CESCR.  
In practice, at the national level in South Africa, the minimum core obligations 
approach has been rejected on numerous occasions.390 For example, in the case of 
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, the South African Constitutional 
Court rejected the minimum core obligations approach on the basis that ‘it is 
impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘‘core’’ service immediately. All that is 
possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide 
access to the socio-economic rights…on a progressive basis’. 391  The SACC 
interpreted minimum core obligations as immediate with the effect that the concept 
was considered unworkable, leading ultimately to its rejection.  
Wesson argues that instead of rejecting the minimum core on the grounds that 
their immediate implementation is impossible, the SACC should have taken into 
account that the CESCR permits a State to justify its failure to meet the minimum core 
where it lacks resources, and as such they should have called upon the State to prove 
that it was unable to meet the minimum core.392 Had the court interpreted the concept 
of minimum core obligations in the manner that some elements of a right are 
immediate and some are progressively realisable, the court may have found greater 
utility and purpose in the approach and ultilised it in coming to its decision.  																																																								
390 South Africa v. Grootboom (2001) (1) SA 46 (CC), at [30]; Minister of Health v. Treatment Action 
Campaign  (2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), at [34-35] (TAC); Khosa v. Minister of Social Development (2004) 
(6) BCLR 569 (CC), at [40]; Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v. Hoërskool Ermelo 
and Another (2010) (2) SA 415 (CC), at [52]; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & 
Others v. Essay N.O. and Others (2011) (7) BCLR 651 (CC), at [37];  
391 TAC, at [35]; Hereinafter SACC. 
392 Wesson, (n147), 284, 299-300, 302 
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In accordance with the approach put forward in this thesis, the SACC should have 
examined first whether the issue concerns a minimum core obligation of an immediate 
nature, if so, this applies immediately irrespective of the availability of resources and 
the court could have found a violation. If the issue relates instead to a minimum core 
obligation that is progressive in nature, it is correct that a State may be able to justify 
non-compliance on the basis of a lack of resources. To justify this, the State must have 
utilised the maximum of its available resources at its disposal, have used all 
appropriate means, prioritising minimum core needs over non-rights expenditure and 
non-core needs in an appropriate manner, and seeking international assistance where 
necessary.  
Young argues that another unanswered question is whether minimum core 
obligations are relative or universal, i.e. whether the obligations change to be State 
specific and dependent on resources, or whether minimum core obligations apply to 
all States in the same way.393 It is, however, frequently argued persuasively that there 
would be no point in having minimum core obligations if they were not universal.394 
Not only would a minimum core obligations approach be more useful if applied 
universally, the CESCR clearly envisages its universal application. If it is accepted 
that minimum core obligations can be either immediate or progressive, the minimum 
core obligations approach can be applied to all States universally in a fair manner, 
regardless of their level of development and whether or not a NIAC exists, as such 
factors can be taken into account when determining progressively realisable minimum 
core components of ESCR, including the right to education.  
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1.5.2. Tripartite obligations – the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil  
The CESCR has applied the tripartite typology of obligations specifically to 
education in General Comment 13, stating that ‘the right to education, like all human 
rights, imposes three further types or levels of obligations on States parties: the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil, with the obligation to fulfil incorporating 
both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide’.395 As stated within the 
Maastricht Guidelines, ‘failure to perform any one of these three obligations 
constitutes a violation’.396 While the concept of minimum core obligations is highly 
contentious, the tripartite typology is not. Cahill-Ripley argues that the acceptance of 
the tripartite framework is evidenced by its consistent use by the CESCR.397  
The tripartite typology is important as it provides a clearer understanding of States 
obligations.398 As such, the typology is useful as it makes State compliance with the 
ICESCR comprehensible, realistic and feasible,399 and encourages the justiciability of 
ESCR.400  However, Ssenyonjo argues that the tripartite typology, despite being 
important, is an underexplored component of IHRL obligations.401 It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine the tripartite obligations further.  
1.5.2.1. Respect 
In order to respect ESCR, States should not adopt laws, policies, programmes, 
administrative or other measures that would fail to conform to ESCR norms.402 
Governments are also ‘obliged to ensure that their organs, agents, and the structures of 
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their law do not violate the human rights of those within their jurisdiction’.403 In 
relation to education, it is provided within General Comment 13 that ‘the obligation to 
respect requires States parties to avoid measures that hinder or prevent the enjoyment 
of the right’.404 To respect the right to education, States must not prevent children 
from attending school by closing education institutions, nor should they discriminate 
with respect to admission to public schools,405 whether in peacetime or a NIAC.  
What the right to respect entails is inaction, in that States should not prevent 
access to the enjoyment of the right to education, and that any action that currently 
infringes such enjoyment should be halted immediately. As such, during a NIAC in 
the context of deliberate and direct attacks, it is clear that the State should ensure that 
they respect education by behaving in a manner that would not prevent children from 
attending school. For example, they should not destroy schools, or target students or 
teachers when conducting physical attacks, or recruit children for military purposes. 
Any such action should be halted immediately to ensure compliance with the 
obligation to respect. 
1.5.2.2. Protect 
Mégret  argues that the obligation to protect is becoming ever more important, as it 
is ‘much more akin to creating an environment in which rights are enjoyed’.406 Eide 
and Rosas similarly argue that the obligation to protect is the most important aspect of 
State obligations. 407 This is a duty that specifically requires the State to prevent other 
individuals or groups from breaching the human rights of the individual’. 408 
According to the CESCR in General Comment 13, the obligation to protect requires 																																																								
403 Murray, Guide, (n12), at [1.1.24] 
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States ‘to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering’ with the enjoyment 
of the right to education.409 ‘Third parties’, also referred to as non-state actors, include 
individuals, groups, corporations, other entities and agents acting under their 
authority.410 Such actors could therefore include NSAG. The use of the word ‘prevent’ 
clearly indicates that where ‘an individual is at risk of having his/her rights violated, 
or where a situation exists which gives rise to such a risk, preventative measures must 
be taken, in order to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that these risks do not 
materialize’.411  
In the case of a NIAC where NSAG are involved, the obligation to protect is of 
particular importance. The obligation to protect clearly encompasses the requirement 
to protect an individuals’ enjoyment of the right to education from being violated by 
NSAG, who are often perpetrators of deliberate and direct attacks against education, 
as will be seen in the case studies of this thesis. However, the State would not be 
liable for every adverse interference of a person’s right to education by third parties 
such as NSAG, only for those interferences that could be traced to its shortcomings in 
protecting individuals.412 So where a State is adequately taking steps to combat 
deliberate and direct attacks against education, but these nonetheless occur, the State 
would not be considered in violation of their obligation to protect. This is, however, a 
subjective assessment, and whether the State is considered to be doing enough can 
vary depending on the decision maker.   
1.5.2.3. Fulfil 
The obligation to fulfil requires ‘the State to take the measures necessary to ensure 
for each person within its jurisdiction opportunities to obtain rights recognized in the 																																																								
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410 General Comment 15, at [23]; Ssenyonjo, Economic (n195), 24 
411 De Schutter, (n400), 436 
412 Mégret (n398), 102 
	 	
	 106	
human rights instruments’.413 According to the CESCR in General Comment 13, the 
‘facilitate’ component of the obligation to fulfil ‘requires States to take positive 
measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to 
education, such as, by taking positive measures to ensure that education is culturally 
appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples, and of good quality for all’.414 The 
obligation to facilitate requires States to manipulate the environment in a way that 
would enable individuals ‘to realise their rights independently with the assistance of 
the state in creating the conditions that make this possible’.415 During a NIAC, States 
should, therefore, avoid creating an environment where an individual cannot realise 
their own right to education, such as by attacking their school or university.   
In relation to the obligation to provide, it is stated within General Comment 13 
that States are obliged to provide ‘a specific right in the Covenant when an individual 
or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the right themselves by 
the means at their disposal’.416 General Comment 14 adds to this interpretation by 
providing that the obligation to fulfil should be seen as requiring that States adopt an 
extensive range of measures, such as legislative, administrative, budgetary and 
judicial, promotional and other measures to ensure the full realisation of human 
rights.417 Where a NIAC prevents an individual from being able to realise their right to 
education, the State should, therefore, adopt a range of measures to ensure the 
realisation of this right, such as rebuilding a new school where no alternative is 
available. 
Since the adoption of General Comment 13 and 14, the CESCR has interpreted the 
obligation to fulfil as being threefold: it includes the additional obligation to 																																																								
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promote.418 Ssenyonjo also argues that the obligation to promote would require States 
to take steps that would generally involve educating the public.419 The inclusion of the 
obligation to promote in the latter interpretations of the CESCR could highlight a 
growing consensus that States also have an obligation to promote the fulfilment of 
ESCR. The addition of the obligation to promote is beneficial in the sense that it 
should heighten State compliance with ESCR if individuals are more aware of their 
entitlements, which would be particularly useful during a NIAC. For example, if the 
State destroys a school during a NIAC, and they purport to provide education through 
the radio, they should promote this widely so that individuals affected are aware of the 
alternative provision of their right to education. However, as the CESCR do not refer 
to the obligation to promote in respect of education, the protective function this offers 
could be lost where it is not recognised, due to a missed opportunity or due to strict 
interpretation, as being applicable. 
1.5.2.4. The relationship between the Tripartite Typology and the 4-A 
Framework 
The CESCR further provides that States are obligated to respect, protect and fulfil 
each of the ‘essential features’ of the right to education, stating that: 
 
[A] State must respect the availability of education by not closing private schools; 
protect the accessibility of education by ensuring that third parties, including 
parents and employers, do not stop girls from going to school; fulfil (facilitate) the 
acceptability of education by taking positive measures to ensure that education is 
culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples, and of good quality 
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for all; fulfil (provide) the adaptability of education by designing and providing 
resources for curricula which reflect the contemporary needs of students in a 
changing world; and fulfil (provide) the availability of education by actively 
developing a system of schools, including building classrooms, delivering 
programmes, providing teaching materials, training teachers and paying them 
domestically competitive salaries.420  
 
This is, however, only a partial analysis by the CESCR of the tripartite typology and 
the 4-A framework in the context of the right to education. The tripartite obligations 
are also of great significance to the realisation of education during a NIAC, as they 
significantly clarify the impact of deliberate and direct attacks on the availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of education, and the States corresponding 
obligations. This is significant, in light of the criticism that the ‘exact contours of the 
concrete obligations remain tentative at best’,421 and that a deficiency of IHRL is that 
it does not expressly address the context of armed conflict, since it applies in 
peacetime and during armed conflicts and relies upon broad and undefined concepts to 
understandably allow for flexibility.422 It is, therefore, necessary to not only examine 
the tripartite obligations further in the context of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education, but also their relationship to the 4-A framework, in a NIAC. 423 
1.6. The Protection of Children from Military Recruitment and Use  
The discussion above sets out how education itself is provided for within IHRL, 
and how IHRL operates to protect education in the context of the issue of deliberate 																																																								
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and direct attacks in a NIAC. While it could be argued that the military recruitment 
and use of children violates the right to education, and such practice is therefore 
implicitly prohibited, this practice is also explicitly prohibited within IHRL. This issue 
is not regulated within the ICESCR, however, considering this is an issue that relates 
to children, the matter is more appropriately regulated within the CRC and its 
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.424  
Article 38 of the CRC provides that the recruitment, and direct participation, of 
children under the age of fifteen into armed forces is prohibited, and that priority 
should be given to those who are oldest between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.425 
However, the more recently adopted OPCRC, in Article 1, provides that States shall 
‘take all feasible measures’ to ensure that those under the age of eighteen, rather than 
fifteen do not directly participate in hostilities.426 Article 2 also provides that States 
should ensure that those under the age of 18 are not compulsorily recruited into their 
armed forces.427 However, Article 3 of the OPCRC permits the voluntary recruitment 
of those under the age of eighteen.428. The OPCRC, nonetheless, clearly protects 
children to a greater extent than the CRC. Given this higher level of protection, it is 
significant to note that the OPCRC has been subject to wide ratification, having been 
ratified by 168 States,429 though it would benefit from wider ratification and those 
States that have not yet ratified it should do so.430 Protecting Children argues that the 
Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict could assist in raising 
awareness and securing greater ratification.431  																																																								
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The OPCRC has been subject to further criticism. The ICRC has stated that 
although it ‘represents a clear improvement of existing international law…the text 
also contains evident weaknesses’.432 Such weaknesses include: the failure to include 
an absolute obligation on States to prevent the involvement of children in hostilities, 
by requiring they only ‘take all feasible measures’; the above-mentioned possibility of 
voluntary recruitment into the State armed forces below the age of 18 years; and that 
while Article 4 refers to NSAG, this is framed as a moral, not a legal obligation.433  
Article 4 provides that NSAG ‘should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use 
in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years’, and places obligations on the State to 
prevent such recruitment and use.434 This is a highly important provision for the 
protection of children in NIAC because it explicitly places obligations on States to 
protect children from recruitment and use by NSAG. However, the OPCRC is 
criticised as imposing a double standard, in that the standard expected from NSAG 
under Article 4 is much higher than that expected of States, undermining the OPCRC. 
Protecting Children recommends that States should be encouraged to adopt the higher 
standard attributed to NSAG, and that international law could be developed by 
heightening the standards for States to match those for NSAG.435 If States are not 
willing to adopt such higher standards, NSAG should be encouraged to uphold the 
higher standard, but where the double standard would result in them disregarding 
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The right to education is inadequately provided for within IHRL. While the nature 
and scope of the normative content of the right to education is generally clear, albeit 
broad, some aspects would benefit by being developed or clarified. In	relation	to	the	IHRL	 obligations	 of	 States,	 Article	 2(1)	 of	 the	 ICESCR	 is	 weak,	 largely	 due	 to	issues	with	 progressive	 realisation.	As to the obligations provided for within the 
General Comments of the CESCR, the biggest cause for concern in IHRL is the 
minimum core obligations approach. Minimum core obligations remain useful when 
understood, as advanced in this chapter, to correlate to content that is either immediate 
or progressive in nature depending on the element of the right in question, particularly 
in situations of NIAC. The tripartite obligations are less controversial, and also 
constitute useful tools for the realisation of education during a NIAC. While the CRC 
and the OPCRC more appropriately regulate the use of child soldiers, there are 














Chapter Two: The Protection of Education during a Non-
International Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law 
2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature and scope of the protection of 
education within IHL during situations of NIAC, and the corresponding obligations of 
States. This chapter examines IHL with a view to determining whether the protection 
afforded to education is adequate, or whether there are gaps and inconsistencies in the 
law that may lead to a lower level of protection of education during a NIAC in 
practice. There has, at the time of writing, been little discussion as to how education is 
protected during a NIAC in respect of the specific issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks against education. As such, this chapter focuses on the adequacy of the nature 
and scope of the protection of education in respect of attacks against educational 
institutions, students and educational staff, the military use of educational institutions 
and the military recruitment and use of children. 
I begin with a brief analysis of the sources of IHL. Following this, I examine what 
constitutes an IAC or a NIAC, and the threshold for the application of IHL in both 
types of hostilities, with a focus on NIAC. I then examine the fact that different rules 
apply in an IAC and a NIAC, with fewer rules applying to NIAC.436 Next, I outline 
those IHL provisions that explicitly protect various aspects of education during 
situations of NIAC. Finally, I set out the IHL provisions corresponding to general 
principles of IHL that protect education in relation to the issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks during a NIAC: the principles of humanity, military necessity, proportionality, 
distinction, passive precautions and precautions in attack. I evaluate whether the IHL 
provisions that explicitly and implicitly protect education are sufficient in situations of 																																																								
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NIAC, examining the strengths and weaknesses of such provisions. I argue that IHL 
insufficiently protects education during situations of NIAC, with such protection 
being worse in a NIAC than an IAC. I test the ambiguities and gaps identified in this 
chapter further in my case studies.  
2.2 Sources of International Humanitarian Law 
2.2.1 Treaty Law 
The key instruments in contemporary IHL are the four Geneva Conventions,437 
and the three Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. 438  The Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols are viewed as the most authoritative 
treaties governing IHL,439 and will be the focus of this chapter. Common Article 3 is 
contained identically within each of the four Geneva Conventions, and is important 
for the purposes of this thesis as it represents the first attempt to extend a minimum of 
humanitarian protection to a NIAC,440 and ‘marks the starting point of the positive 
body of law of NIAC’.441 The adoption of the two Additional Protocols in 1977 is 
especially important for the protection of education during a NIAC, as they cemented 
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the separation of IHL into the categories of IAC and NIAC.442 Additional Protocol I 
applies to situations of IAC,443 and Additional Protocol II applies to situations of 
NIAC, and constitutes the first international instrument dedicated to the application of 
humanitarian principles during a NIAC.444 Additional Protocol II is therefore of great 
significance for the protection of education in a NIAC. 
IHL treaties are among the most universally ratified. The Geneva Conventions 
have 196 State Parties, and thus have attained universal ratification.445 Additional 
Protocol I currently has 174 State Parties,446 and the latter has fewer, having only 168 
State Parties.447 Although binding on a large number of states, the lower level of 
ratification of the Additional Protocols creates legal uncertainty, as the Protocols may 
be applicable to some parties of an armed conflict but not to others.448 Additional 
Protocol II is less widely ratified than Additional Protocol I, so such legal uncertainty 
is more likely in a NIAC. Of concern is that Common Article 3 would be the sole 
treaty-based provision directly regulating NIAC in situations where States have not 
ratified Additional Protocol II, and while customary IHL may also regulate a NIAC 
this source of law, as will be seen, can be problematic.449 Protecting Children argues 
that the Additional Protocols could benefit from further ratification, and that the 																																																								
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Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict could assist in raising 
awareness and securing greater ratification of such instruments.450 Nonetheless, where 
the additional protocols do apply, they ‘strengthen the protection of the defenceless to 
a considerable degree’.451 This chapter examines the extent to which the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols strengthen the protection of education in 
respect of deliberate and direct attacks. 
2.2.2 Customary Law 
Also of relevance is customary IHL. Kolb and Hyde argue that customary 
international law is pivotal on three grounds: firstly, it ensures that those States that 
have not ratified the relevant IHL treaties are still bound by general rules that can be 
applied universally; secondly, customary international law fills in the gaps in 
protection where there is limited treaty regulation; thirdly, it acts as a guide to the 
interpretation of treaty rules.452 While the determination of which rules of IHL amount 
to customary international law is complicated,453 guidance can be gained from the 
ICRC study on ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’.454 However, Crawford 
argues that:  
 
Despite the fact that the study is extensively researched, and makes some 
persuasive arguments, it should be kept in mind that it is an academic work, and 
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not a declaration of the law to which states are bound. States may yet refute its 
findings, especially on some of the more controversial suggestions.455 
 
It is stated in the ICRC study itself that ‘though it represents the truest possible 
reflection of reality, the study makes no claim to be the final word. It is not all-
encompassing’.456 As such, the ICRC study constitutes an excellent starting point for 
determining which aspects of IHL are customary in nature.  
Though, as Bethlehem argues, while:  
 
[T]he study is a remarkable endeavour and one that will greatly advance 
scholarship and debate, and ultimately compliance with, international 
humanitarian law…one should approach exercises of distilling customary 
international law…with caution.457  
  
One reason for needing to utilise caution is that its methodology is frequently 
criticised.458 Yet, Scobbie argues that the methodology ‘is more stringent than some 
commentators have alleged’.459 In Protecting Children, it is argued that while some 
concerns have been expressed about the methodology of the ICRC study, numerous 
States and UN bodies have referred to it in support of particular rules being of 
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customary status, this being an implicit endorsement of the ICRC’s methodology. 
Protecting Children itself refers to, and relies on, the rules of the ICRC study.460  
A further reason for caution is that the ICRC study has been further criticised for 
over-simplifying rules that are complex and nuanced ‘in a way that renders them 
overbroad or unconditional’.461 Bellinger and Haynes argues that a general error of the 
ICRC study is ‘the assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary 
international law in internal armed conflict, notwithstanding the fact that there is little 
evidence in support of those propositions’.462 This Chapter identifies the relevant 
Rules of the ICRC study, but it does not embark on an analysis as to the accuracy of 
these rules as this is beyond the scope of the thesis, however the above criticisms 
should be borne in mind, in that the ICRC study is not viewed as an all-authoritative 
source on what rules of IHL are customary in nature. 
The ICRC study sets out 161 rules of IHL as being customary in nature, of which 
only ‘17 are solely applicable in international armed conflicts, and only six are solely 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts’.463 The possible application of these 
customary rules to NIAC is significant because, as will be seen, there is more treaty 
law on IAC, accepted by a greater range of states, while for a NIAC, there is some 
treaty law, with more limited participation. Akande argues that though issues have 
been raised as to the methodology used in the ICRC study, there seems to be 
acknowledgement that customary international law now provides more elaborate rules 
for NIAC than Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.464 The ICRC study, 
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therefore, has a significant contribution to make in identifying which rules, including 
those relevant to the protection of education from deliberate and direct attacks, are 
considered to have gained customary status in a NIAC. 
A final point to make is that the International Law Commission is engaged in 
looking at wider issues of customary international law, and recently developed draft 
conclusions to assist in the determination of rules of customary international law.465 
The customary law debate is also wider than IHL, and encompasses other areas of 
international law, including IHRL.  
2.3 The Classification of Conflicts and the threshold for the applicability of IHL 
IHL comes into play immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities that amount to 
an IAC or a NIAC.466 According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, IHL continues to apply:  
 
[B]eyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that 
moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory 
of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under 
the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.467  
 
An IAC will end when hostilities cease, and it ‘is not necessary for States to 
communicate this formally through a ceasefire or armistice agreement’.468 In order to 
determine whether IHL applies, it is, therefore, first necessary to establish if there is 
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potentially an armed conflict, and then, if so, assess whether the situation is an IAC or 
NIAC.469  
Classifying a situation as an armed conflict will determine that IHL applies to 
military activities, and classifying the conflict as an IAC or NIAC will determine 
which rules of IHL govern the conduct of armed forces.470 The distinctions between 
an IAC, NIAC, and belligerent occupation are, therefore, of significance as IHL has 
specific rules covering each situation,471 and ‘the nature of the armed conflict is 
relevant to determining the relationship between’ IHRL and IHL.472 It is, therefore, 
important to determine when such situations occur, which rules of IHL apply in such 
situations in respect of protecting education, and how each situation affects the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL.473  
NIAC are, as will be demonstrated below, more poorly regulated than IAC, so 
important legal consequences follow from the characterisation of a conflict.474 For 
example, in respect of education, it will be shown that education is protected from 
deliberate and direct attacks to a lesser extent in a NIAC than an IAC. However, 
despite the significance of classifying a conflict as IAC or NIAC, making the 
distinction between them is often factually and politically difficult,475 and complicates 
the process of identifying the relevant applicable law given that different rules apply 
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in each.476 As NIAC are, as will be seen, more poorly regulated than IAC, important 
legal consequences follow from the characterisation of a conflict.477 
2.3.1 Classifying a non-international armed conflict 
An IAC is more straightforward to classify than a NIAC. An IAC is defined in 
Article 2 common to all four Geneva Conventions as ‘all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them’.478 In 
the case of Prosecutor v. Tadic it was stated that an IAC ‘exists whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between states’.479 Similarly the ICRC argues that an IAC 
‘occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, 
regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this confrontation’.480 As such, it is clear 
that an IAC exists when armed force is resorted to between two or more States. As the 
existence of an IAC does not depend on the intensity of fighting, the number of 
casualties inflicted,481 or the duration of the conflict, there is no minimum threshold 
for an IAC.482 The position generally taken is that IHL applies to an IAC even where 
both parties deny that an armed conflict exists.483 A declaration of war is therefore not 
necessary, the existence of an IAC is simply a factual determination based on the 
conduct of States and their armed forces.484  
Common Article 2 also provides that an IAC can constitute ‘cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
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occupation meets with no armed resistance’.485 This again indicates a low threshold 
for the applicability of IHL to an IAC. The Geneva Conventions do not define 
‘occupation’,486 however, Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provide that 
‘territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army’.487 Akande argues that where the occupying power is engaged in 
hostilities with a NSAG within the territory it is occupying, the law relating to IAC is 
applicable.488 This is significant because more treaty law will apply to an IAC, 
potentially protecting education to a greater extent than if such a situation was 
considered to be a NIAC. 
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I reiterates that an IAC applies in the situations 
outlined in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, and adds that an IAC can 
also be ‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination’.489 In practice Additional Protocol I has not been applied to these three 
situations due to difficulties surrounding their definition.490 The laws of NIAC may be 
inaccurately applied in these situations where the laws of an IAC should be, therefore, 
greater clarity is needed to ensure that education is protected properly in such 
conflicts.   
Conversely, determining the existence of a NIAC has proven difficult,491 as it is 
harder to define.492 It is not easy to determine when a situation of violence within a 
State is to be classified as a NIAC, as there exists a debate as to the threshold of 
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violence that needs to be reached for IHL to apply.493 It is generally accepted that the 
threshold for the level of violence required to establish a NIAC is higher than that 
required to establish an IAC.494 However, while Common Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I set out complementary 
definitions of an IAC, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II set out different thresholds for the category of a NIAC.495 
These different thresholds mean that essentially two sets of rules are applicable in a 
NIAC: those rules contained in Common Article 3 and those contained in Additional 
Protocol II.496  
A NIAC is defined in Common Article 3 as ‘an armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties’.497 The text of Common Article 3 does not elaborate further on how to define 
a NIAC, but where a situation is classified as a NIAC, Common Article 3 applies to 
all parties to the conflict and it prescribes basic rules to the conduct of these parties.498 
Significantly, Common Article 3 was recognised as being of customary law status in 
the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v US).499 The lack of a precise definition, and the resulting lack of clarity, has in 
practice allowed States to deny the existence of a NIAC, 500  and prevent the 
application of Common Article 3.501 Nonetheless, Sivakumaran argues that every 																																																								
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attempt to define a NIAC was met with disagreement and a lack of consensus, so 
ambiguity within Common Article 3 was necessary.502  
Alternatively, Additional Protocol II uses a more restrictive definition of NIAC.503 
Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II provides that a NIAC is one that takes place: 
 
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.504  
 
It is clear that Article 1(1) has a higher threshold of applicability than Common 
Article 3.505 Article 1(1) similarly refers to an undefined notion of a NIAC, but it adds 
additional criteria to be satisfied.506 Article 1(1) adds the prerequisite that armed force 
is between a State and a NSAG so does not apply to conflicts between NSAG, and 
that such NSAG operate under a responsible command and have territorial control.507 
Sivakumaran correctly argues that the essential point of the requirement of territorial 
control is the ability to carry out sustained and concerted military operations, and not 
the quantum of territory controlled by the NSAG.508 Only partial territorial control is 
required, as no reference to the amount of territory is made in Article 1(1). 
Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II adds that the ‘Protocol shall not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 																																																								
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acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’.509 Green argues that the definition 
of an NIAC as contained within Additional Protocol II has a threshold that is so high 
that it would exclude most revolutions and rebellions.510 This high threshold could 
mean that educational institutions, staff and students are left without the protections 
contained within Additional Protocol II during a NIAC. Protection in situations not 
meeting the threshold of Additional Protocol II would be limited to Common Article 3 
where its lower threshold is met, customary IHL, IHRL and regional and domestic 
law. 
However, the discrepancy between Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, 
and the resulting difficulty in determining whether the threshold of violence for a 
NIAC has been reached, has been mitigated by the ICTY. A customary law definition 
of a NIAC was developed in the case of The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic that gives 
further guidance on the applicability of Common Article 3.511 In this case it was stated 
that a NIAC exists whenever there is ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within 
a state’.512 Therefore, in contrast to Additional Protocol II, this definition does not 
require that a Common Article 3 NIAC involve the State, rather it can be solely 
between NSAG. The ICTY also noted that this test ‘focuses on two particular aspects 
of a conflict: the intensity of the conflict and the organization of parties’ and that these 
two aspects differentiated a NIAC from internal tensions and disturbances. 513 
However, it may be difficult to ascertain whether a NSAG has adequate levels of 
organisation and whether the violence in question is of sufficient intensity.514 It is, 
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however, significant to note that this definition differs from that set out in Additional 
Protocol II by not requiring that NSAG exercise a degree of territorial control,515 
which is also difficult to determine. The Additional Protocol also differs in that it 
refers to ‘sustained and concerted military operations’, and the Additional Protocol 
cannot be extra-territorial.516  
In light of these differences, the threshold for the applicability of Additional 
Protocol II remains higher than that of Common Article 3. For both Common Article 
3 and Additional Protocol II to apply, the NIAC will need to meet the criteria of 
Additional Protocol II as well as those required for Common Article 3. Where the 
criteria for Common Article 3 is satisfied, but those for Additional Protocol II are not, 
only Common Article 3 will be applicable.517 While two thresholds for a NIAC 
remain, the applicability of Common Article 3 is nonetheless substantially clarified by 
the customary definition and the gap between Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II is lessened.  
Sivakumaram argues that the customary definition encapsulates the core elements 
that are found in previous definitions in a neat and concise manner.518 The term 
‘protracted’ armed violence is included in the customary law definition in order to set 
it apart from situations of insecurity. In Ramush Haradinaj,519 the ICTY held that the 
phrase ‘protracted armed violence’ refers to the intensity rather than duration of the 
violence.520 The ICTY also identified a number of factors as relevant to assessing the 
intensity of violence, including, but not limited to:  
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the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of 
weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions 
fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the 
number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of 
civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may 
also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.521 
 
Other factors for reaching the intensity criteria could be ‘when the hostilities are of a 
collective character or when the government is obliged to use military force against 
the insurgents, instead of mere police forces’.522 Sivakumaran argues that such factors 
for determining whether the intensity of the violence surpasses the threshold for a 
NIAC do not have to exist at the same time or exist at all.523  
As to the requirement of a minimum level of organisation of the NSAG, the ICTY 
also identified a number of ‘indicative factors’, including but not limited to:  
 
the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms 
within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a 
certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military 
equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry 
out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to 
define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak 
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with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace 
accords.524 
 
Other factors could include the ability to implement IHL, having uniforms, discrete 
roles and responsibilities of differing entities, having advanced modes of 
communication, and having external relations.525 The ICTY pointed out that ‘the 
requirements are not cumulative, but rather indicators of what constitutes an 
‘‘organized armed group’’’,526 so again all do not have to be met at the same time or 
at all. 
The customary definition of a NIAC is supported by the ICRC,527 has been 
adopted by the Rome Statute, 528  and is incorporated into the updated ICRC 
Commentaries on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.529 It is, therefore, 
clear that the customary definition of a NIAC is widely recognised as authoritative 
and has gathered traction, but ‘uncertainty continues to surround the identification of a 
NIAC  [in the sense that] debate is now framed around the facts that aid identification 
of an armed conflict rather than the definition of an armed conflict itself’.530 The issue 
of determining whether a NIAC exists is thus a practical one as it depends on the 
availability of information as to the manner in which NSAG operate. The 
development of a customary definition of NIAC has, arguably, nonetheless 
significantly increased the level of protection available in NIAC.531 As determining 
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the existence of a NIAC is made easier, it is more difficult for States to refute the 
existence of a NIAC, and the protection within IHL can be applied to better regulate 
the protection of education on the ground. 
It is also generally accepted that a NIAC can exist within one territory, across 
State borders, or exclusively extra-territorially.532  For example, a State may be 
fighting a NSAG in its own territory, or in the territory of a neighbouring State or in a 
more distant State, without the involvement of the State in which the NSAG is 
operating. The applicability of the rules in a NIAC is particularly important for the 
protection of education from deliberate and direct attacks in situations in which the 
State is acting extra-territorially, as IHRL may not be applicable to the conduct of the 
State if it is acting without effective control.533 The State may also make a definitive 
statement that military action against a NSAG does not amount to a NIAC, in such 
situations Murray argues that the States armed forces should use IHRL as the sole 
framework governing their operations, subject to any relevant derogations.534 As 
IHRL applies in peacetime as well as during situations of conflict, IHRL continues to 
offer a level of protection to education in respect of deliberate and direct attacks 
where the threshold for a NIAC is not reached.  
A further issue is that in reality armed conflicts do not always fit neatly into the 
two categories of armed conflict.535 A conflict can occur that is both international and 
non-international in character,536 or two or more conflicts with different classifications 
can exist in the same territory at the same time.537 A NIAC can also become an IAC 
where an external State intervenes on the part of a NSAG without the consent of the 																																																								
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State on whose territory the conflict is occurring,538 if the intervention creates conflict 
between the two States.539 However, if an external State intervenes to assist the 
territorial State fighting against a NSAG in a NIAC, the nature of the NIAC will not 
change, it remains a NIAC.540 Situations of mixed conflict can be difficult to 
categorise, and it may be unclear exactly what law applies,541 particularly in situations 
where an external State intervenes on behalf of a NSAG, ‘the law remains opaque and 
opinions vary’ on the crucial question of when such assistance transforms a conflict 
from a NIAC to an IAC.542 This may impact the protection of education, as where 
confusion exists as to whether the rules of an IAC or NIAC should be applied, the rule 
offering less protection may be applied incorrectly.543 
2.4 The Lower Level of Regulation of Non-international Armed Conflicts 
Different rules within IHL apply to an IAC and a NIAC, with IAC being regulated 
by the more rules and the most detailed IHL framework,544 and with fewer and less 
detailed rules applying to a NIAC.545 During the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, 
the ICRC recommended that the Geneva Conventions apply fully ‘in all cases of 
armed conflict which are not of an international character’.546 This suggestion was 
rejected and instead Common Article 3 was incorporated into the Geneva 
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Conventions.547 As stated above, the adoption of Common Article 3 was significant as 
it extended the applicability of IHL to a NIAC for the first time. However, Geneva 
Convention I has 64 Articles, Geneva Convention II has 63 Articles, Geneva 
Convention III has 143 Articles, and Geneva Convention IV has 159 Articles, yet only 
Common Article 3 applies directly to NIAC in each Convention.548  
Unfortunately, NIAC suffer from a lower level of regulation in both the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols.549 Additional Protocol II remains the most 
comprehensive instrument that deals with the rules applicable in a NIAC,550 however 
Additional Protocol II contains only 28 Articles, while Additional Protocol I has 102. 
Therefore, while the rules applying to NIAC have clearly increased since 1949 with 
the adoption of Additional Protocol II, NIAC continue to be less densely regulated.551 
This has resulted in the argument that Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
do not protect in a NIAC to the same extent that the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I protect in an IAC.552 Similarly, Akande argues that Additional 
Protocol II falls ‘far short in establishing a regime of international humanitarian law 
close to that established for international armed conflicts’.553  
Further exacerbating this problem is that, as established above, Additional 
Protocol II has fewer Parties than Additional Protocol I. Essentially, there is more 
treaty law on IAC, accepted by a greater range of States, while for a NIAC, there is 																																																								
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less treaty law, with more limited participation. It is, therefore, important to determine 
whether the lower level of regulation in a NIAC results in a lower level of protection 
of education in the context of deliberate and direct attacks than in an IAC. As such, 
the rules applicable to education in an IAC will also be outlined for the purpose of 
conducting such comparison. 
2.4.1 The Erosion of the International/Non-International Dichotomy 
The conundrum raised by the fact that IAC are much more exhaustively regulated 
is that ‘international law has in place a comprehensive set of rules governing a type of 
armed conflict which is no longer the norm’.554 It is increasingly argued that NIAC 
require better regulation, as most contemporary conflicts are NIAC.555 Rowe argues 
that it is difficult to sustain the distinction between IAC and NIAC from the point of 
view of the victim, considering that NIAC are more numerous.556 Significant in this 
respect is that in Tadic, the ICTY helped blur the traditional legal differentiation 
between the two types of armed conflict.557 It was stated in this case that:  
 
In the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and civil wars 
is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned…If international law, 
while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually 
turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned 
dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.558 
 
In the context of deliberate and direct attacks, it is true that it is difficult to justify a 
greater level of protection to schools, students and teachers in an IAC than a NIAC. 																																																								
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While different players are party to both types of conflict, for the victims the effect is 
equally devastating regardless as to whether the perpetrator was a State or a NSAG. In 
this sense, it is unfair to offer a lower level of protection to individuals in a NIAC. 
This erosion of the distinction between IAC and NIAC is evident in the number of 
recent IHL treaties that apply to all conflicts without distinction.559 The distinction is 
losing its value as one can often look to customary international law, as ‘rules of 
international conflict…are widely accepted as applying to non-international conflict as 
a matter of customary international law’,560 evidenced by the ICRC study. Customary 
IHL can thus play a significant role in the protection of education in the face of 
deliberate and direct attacks during a NIAC, where treaty law falls short. However, 
the ICTY also stressed that it should not be implied that NIAC are to be regulated by 
general international law in all its aspects, as:  
 
[O]nly a number of rules and principles governing international armed conflicts 
have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts [and] this extension has 
not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to 
internal conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed 
regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.561  
 
Even in the ICRC Study, as identified above, while many rules of IAC were 
determined to be applicable in a NIAC, some rules were also identified as only being 
applicable in an IAC or NIAC. Where education is protected from deliberate and 
direct attacks to a lesser degree in a NIAC than in an IAC, customary law, as will be 
seen, plays a role in closing this gap, though not entirely.  																																																								
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Zegveld cautions that ‘while there is...a clear trend in international practice to 
diminish the distinction between humanitarian law for international as opposed to for 
internal conflicts, the distinction between these conflicts has not been abolished’.562 
States are reluctant to abolish the distinction due to the belief that State sovereignty, 
national unity and security would be undermined. States are also concerned that 
treating IAC and NIAC the same way would encourage secessionist movements by 
giving international status to NSAG, and might even encourage international 
intervention.563  
2.4.2 The Unification of International Humanitarian Law 
In 1988, Reisman and Silk argued that the terms IAC and NIAC ‘are, in effect, a 
sweeping exclusion device that permits the bulk of armed conflict to evade full 
international regulation’.564 They added that the distinction between the two types of 
armed conflict ‘is no longer factually tenable or compatible with the thrust of 
humanitarian law’,565 and that continuing the distinction is an unacceptable ‘policy 
error’.566 The closing of the gap between IAC and NIAC through customary law has 
led to a renewed debate as to whether the division continues to makes sense, and 
whether the unification of IHL is desirable.567 Crawford claims that a unified body of 
law is achievable as there are no significant barriers to a unified approach, and that 
‘the ultimate aim of such a law – that of protecting those least able to protect 
themselves during times of conflict – should be sufficient incentive to overcome most, 
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if not all, resistance to creation of such a law’.568 The key question is, therefore, what 
are the barriers, and they insurmountable?  
If a uniform law exists, Crawford argues that:  
 
[T]here would be no need to ascertain…whether the war was international, non-
international or some hybrid…The prima facie approach would always be one of 
‘does an armed conflict exist?’ and ‘have the laws of armed conflict been 
breached?’569  
 
This would be much simpler than the current approach of determining whether an 
IAC, NIAC or mixed conflict exists, and which rules apply to each situation. 
Similarly, Moir claims that we are moving tentatively towards the position where the 
IAC/NIAC dichotomy is becoming outmoded, and what will matter is simply whether 
an armed conflict exists.570 If so, in the context of education and more widely, IHL 
would be more easily applied, but this easy application may come at a great cost.  
One barrier is that there is difficulty in creating a singular definition of ‘armed 
conflict’ that must reflect:  
 
[T]he different levels of intensity that trigger international and non-international 
armed conflicts at present [and] will need to ensure that States continue to enjoy 
an ability to deal with internal disturbances under domestic law [while] 
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international conflicts of low intensity remain subject to international 
humanitarian protection’.571  
 
Yet, this is not a significant barrier. A singular definition of armed conflict is not 
necessary as the problem stems from different sets of rules being applicable in an IAC 
and NIAC, with lower protection being afforded in a NIAC, particularly when 
Additional Protocol II is not applicable. What is required is the creation of one body 
of law applicable equally in IAC and NIAC. This would require the inclusion of a 
provision within the unified instrument providing for the current thresholds as to when 
an IAC or NIAC commences, taking the customary definition of a NIAC, and not the 
stricter definition contained in Additional Protocol II. What would matter is only 
whether the threshold for an IAC or NIAC has been passed, and the same body of law 
would be applied to each type of conflict with the same level of protection being 
afforded regardless of the parties to the conflict.  
Stewart argues that a unified body of law would ‘present an opportunity to 
coherently codify and reconcile the rapid development of customary law applicable in 
internal conflict’.572 This would also serve as an excellent opportunity to develop the 
law beyond the codification of customary IHL. As established, many rules of an IAC 
are now considered to increase the protection afforded in a NIAC as a matter of 
customary law, however, where IHL, at least in the context of education, still falls 
short when the customary rules are considered, the argument for a unified body of 
IHL is strengthened, as this would provide a great opportunity to close the gaps that 
remain. However, further research is required to determine whether customary law is 
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capable of protecting adequately in a NIAC beyond the scope of education. If so, there 
may be no need for a new unified body of law, but instead a new instrument providing 
for the better protection of education. A strength of a unified body of law, or 
alternatively, a new instrument protecting education, is that ‘there would be no need to 
ascertain whether the duty arose in treaty or custom’.573 As such, codifying the rules 
of customary law would strengthen the protection of education significantly, because 
customary law is prone to greater contestation and debate than treaty law. 
It has also been argued that the distinction between IAC and NIAC fails ‘to deal 
with conflicts that contain both international and non-international elements’.574 As 
discussed above, mixed conflicts are problematic as it can be difficult to determine 
whether to apply the rules of an IAC or NIAC. A unified body of law would therefore 
allow for a substantially clearer understanding of which rules to apply to mixed 
conflicts. Once it is determined that a conflict has reached the threshold of both an 
IAC and NIAC in the territory of a State, or where both types of conflicts exist in the 
same territory and the same time, the same rules would apply regardless of this mixed 
classification. Another issue of a similar nature is that the current dichotomy has 
proved susceptible to political manipulation, particularly in mixed conflicts.575 With a 
unified body of law, the issue of political manipulation, whereby States seek to apply 
the rules of a NIAC in a mixed conflict because they offer less protection than the 
rules applicable in an IAC, would also be eliminated.  
However, a significant barrier to the creation of a unified body of law is that there 
is a considerable risk that it would reduce the protection foreseen for all armed 
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conflicts.576 Before a unified body of law is adopted, it would be necessary to 
determine the impact of a unified IHL on all the areas of protection currently provided 
for. For example, even if a unified body of IHL strengthened the protection of 
education in a NIAC, this may be to the detriment of the protection of education 
during an IAC. Alternatively, even if the protection afforded to education improved in 
an IAC, NIAC and mixed conflicts, other areas of IHL may suffer. States may be 
reluctant to extend the rules of an IAC to a NIAC, despite their customary status, 
considering their previous reluctance to provide such protection. As such, an 
exhaustive cost-benefit analysis is necessary before a final decision is made to unify 
IHL. 
If, after this cost-benefit analysis, it is determined that the current protection 
afforded in IHL could not be maintained, rather than creating a unified body of law 
the solution could be to amend Additional Protocol II so that it regulates NIAC in a 
manner that better reflects customary law. This would allow IAC to benefit from the 
wider protection that it currently affords, while ensuring that the rules in a NIAC are 
strengthened. However, this approach, while an improvement on the current system, 
does not fully overcome the issues with applying two sets of law to the different 
situations of conflict, particularly in conflicts that are mixed in nature, and especially 
if this amendment was to continue to afford a substantially lower level of protection in 
a NIAC. 
2.5 Rules relevant to the explicit protection of education during a non-
international armed conflict 
Education is not explicitly referred to in Geneva Conventions I and II. The first 
reference to education is in Geneva Convention III in Articles 38, 72 and 125, in 																																																								
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relation to the education of ‘prisoners of war’ during an IAC.577 Likewise, Articles 94, 
108 and 142 of Geneva Convention IV reiterate the wording of Article 38, 72 and 125 
in relation to the education of ‘internees’ during an IAC.578 While these are highly 
important provisions for the protection of education for prisoners of war and internees 
in an IAC, this thesis focuses on the effect upon the education of non-detained 
civilians caused by deliberate and direct attacks against education-related targets in a 
NIAC, and as such these provisions are not relevant for the purposes of this thesis. 
While Article 78(2) of Additional Protocol I provides for the education of non-
detained civilians, namely children during an evacuation,579 it is also not relevant to 
the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education, but rather to one of the 
wider impacts of conflict on education.  
However, of relevance, Rule 135 of the ICRC study provides that, as a norm of 
customary international law in an IAC and NIAC, ‘children affected by armed conflict 
are entitled to special respect and protection’.580 This requirement can be found in 
Articles 24 and 50 of Geneva Convention IV, Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, and 
within Additional Protocol II in Article 4(3).581 Article 24 provides that parties to a 
conflict must ensure that children who are orphaned or are separated from their 
families as a result of the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their 
maintenance…and their education are facilitated in all circumstances. Their education 
shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition’.582 
Article 50 similarly requires respect for religion and religious practices, providing that 
occupying powers should ‘facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to 
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the care and education of children’, and make arrangements for the education, if 
possible by persons of their own nationality, language or religion, of children who are 
orphaned or separated from their parents.583 Rule 105 of the ICRC study reiterates that 
Article 50 is of customary status in a NIAC. 584 As such, Article 24 and 50 are 
important for the protection of culturally, linguistically and religiously appropriate 
education for orphaned and separated children in a NIAC as a matter of customary 
law. However, they do not require States to provide for such education for children 
who are not orphaned or separated. Also, while they assist in determining how States 
must facilitate the education of children who have become orphaned or separated as a 
result of deliberate and direct attacks against education, or due to a NIAC more 
generally, they do nothing to prevent deliberate and direct attacks against education. 
Article 77(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that ‘Children shall be the object of 
special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties 
to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require’.585 Significantly, 
Article 4(3)(a) of Additional Protocol II goes further and sets out that in a NIAC, as a 
fundamental guarantee, children ‘shall be provided with the care and aid they require’, 
and that in particular, they should ‘receive an education, including religious and moral 
education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of 
those responsible for their care’.586 Again, Articles 77(1) and 4(3)(a) do not prohibit 
deliberate and direct attacks against education in a NIAC, they simply assist in 
determining how States must facilitate the education of children following a deliberate 
and direct attack, or where education becomes inaccessible due to a NIAC more 
generally. 
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It is argued in Protecting Children that three formulas are set out: Article 77(1) 
provides for ‘special respect…care and aid’; Article 4(3) provides for ‘care and aid’; 
and customary IHL provides for ‘special respect and protection’. It argues further that 
as these terms are not defined and not adequately particularised, this may be 
interpreted as meaning that children are entitled to different protections depending on 
the classification of conflict and the source of IHL.587 It is interesting to note in this 
regard that the protection of education appears stronger in a NIAC, as not only does 
Article 4(3) explicitly refer to education, in contrast to Article 77, it also sets out 
religiously and morally appropriate education, as part of the care and aid that children 
require, as a ‘fundamental guarantee’ for all children under 15. However, it is unlikely 
that the obligation to provide special respect, protection, care and aid to children, at 
least in the provision of education, will differ in an IAC and NIAC. While education is 
explicitly stated to be a fundamental guarantee in a NIAC, children still have a 
fundamental right to education in IAC, which must, as evidenced in Articles 24 and 
50 of Geneva Convention IV, be provided in a religiously and morally appropriate 
manner. Similarly, while Article 77(1) appears to protect children to a greater extent 
by explicitly prohibiting any form of indecent assault in an IAC, the principle of 
distinction, discussed below, makes clear that children, including students, have such 
protection in a NIAC. As such, as a matter of treaty and customary law, child students 
are given special protection in a NIAC as they should be afforded special respect and 
protection against indecent assault, such as protection against deliberate and direct 
physical attacks against them, or from recruitment and use in hostilities.  
It is further argued in Protecting Children that even where not interpreted 
differently, the three different formulas are an unnecessary complication and should 
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be discarded, and the language clarified or developed by standardising and 
particularising these special treatment provisions.588 A standardised language would 
be beneficial, as it would eliminate the need to embark on a potentially complicated 
and unnecessary assessment as to whether the obligation differs in an IAC and NIAC 
and in customary law.  
The above provisions clearly indicate that IHL has a contribution to make to the 
legal framework for the protection of education,589 in both IAC and NIAC. However, 
it is equally clear that very few provisions within IHL explicitly protect education, 
particularly in the context of deliberate and direct attacks against education. Most 
importantly, none prohibit such attacks. Moreover, those provisions that do exist are 
aimed at ensuring the provision of education to prisoners of war and internees, which 
are not relevant for the purposes of this thesis, or children under the age of 15. It is 
also important to explicitly prohibit attacks against, and to protect the education of, 
children aged over 15. Therefore, the recommendation in Protecting Children that 
consideration should also be given to whether children should be defined as including 
all person aged 18 and under, is reiterated and supported.590 Even where agreement as 
to the age of children being 18 cannot be reached, the protection of the education of 
those 15 and over is nonetheless equally important. Fortunately, provisions that 
indirectly protect education from deliberate and direct attacks can mitigate the 
weakness of IHL in failing to explicitly protect education from deliberate and direct 
attacks, and in failing to explicitly protect the education of those aged 15 and over. 
Nonetheless, IHL should be strengthened to ensure that education is afforded such 
explicit protection. 
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2.6 Rules relevant to the protection of education from deliberate and direct 
attacks during a non-international armed conflict  
The fundamental principles of IHL relevant to the protection of education from 
deliberate and direct attacks are: humanity, military necessity, proportionality, 
distinction, passive precautions and precautions in attack.591 These principles do not 
explicitly protect education from deliberate and direct attacks, rather they do so 
implicitly. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the manner in which these 
fundamental principles are applicable in a NIAC in the context of protecting 
educational institutions, teachers and students from targeted physical attacks, 
protecting schools from military use, and protecting children in respect of military 
recruitment and use. 
2.6.1 The Principles of Humanity, Military Necessity, and Proportionality 
Humanity is a fundamental principle of IHL, which exists on an equilibrium with 
the equally fundamental principle of military necessity. If only the principle of 
humanity was to be recognised, the rules of IHL would not be considered practicable 
by the military branch, whereas if the principle of military necessity dominated, the 
norms of IHL ‘would be unable to mitigate the evils that accompany war’.592 The 
principle of humanity is therefore of great importance for the protection of education. 
If military necessity were not countered by the principle of humanity, education would 
not be protected from the ‘evils’ accompanying a NIAC.  
The primary aim of IHL is to protect victims of IAC and NIAC and ‘regulate the 
conduct of hostilities based on a balance between military necessity and humanity’.593 
The principle of humanity permeates the whole of IHL, so in every rule one finds a 
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balance between the two opposing principles.594 Melzer argues that keeping the 
balance between the principles of military necessity and humanity is, however, a 
difficult and delicate task, particularly in contemporary armed conflicts.595 While 
difficult, one should nonetheless endeavour to strike an appropriate balance between 
the military necessity of a direct and deliberate attack against education and the 
protection of students, teachers and educational institutions. 
The principles of military necessity and proportionality also permeate IHL.596 
Military necessity is a long-established principle of IHL,597 which allows parties to a 
conflict to use the force necessary to achieve the military submission of the enemy.598 
Military necessity requires, however, that two criteria be met. Firstly, an operation 
must be necessary for the legitimate military purpose of weakening enemy military 
forces’, so measures that offer no definite military advantage are prohibited. Secondly, 
no less damaging action should be possible, so the least destructive measures that gain 
the same military advantage should be preferred.599 This is significant to education, as 
where an attack is not taken for the legitimate purpose of weakening enemy military 
forces, or where other less damaging action was possible, such an attack cannot be 
considered militarily necessary. 
The principle of proportionality is also a fundamental principle of IHL,600 which 
acts as a limit on the operation of military necessity. 601  The principle of 
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proportionality is contained in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, which states 
that ‘an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ would 
be an indiscriminate attack.602 Significantly, Rule 14 of the ICRC Study states that this 
forms a part of customary international law in relation to both IAC and NIAC.603 
Proportionality would therefore be relevant in a NIAC where, for example, 
educational institutions were within the blast radius of a lawful target, and the injury 
to students and teachers, or damage to schools or universities would be excessive to 
the military advantage of conducting the attack. However, Protecting Children argues 
that IHL could be strengthened by developing the law to require that the position of 
children, in evaluating proportionality, are an express factor that is given weight and 
considered.604 This being an explicit consideration would of course improve the 
protection of child students, though it is clear, as will be seen below, that such 
protection for children already exists implicitly. Even if such consideration was 
expressly provided, this will only extend to civilian children, and not those children 
who are taking a direct part in hostilities. 
However, another issue is that there is no mathematical formula for determining 
whether an attack is proportionate,605 so proportionality is very difficult to assess.606 
While determining whether an attack is proportionate is complex, decisions have to be 
made in good faith on the basis of the information that was available at the time.607 
Proportionality reflects the balance between the principles of humanity and military 
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necessity,608 as such it is doubtful whether such a determination can be made to 
everyone’s entire satisfaction.609 Due to the complexity of determining whether, in 
practice, the principles of humanity and military necessity are balanced and an attack 
is proportionate, education will be protected to varying degrees depending on the 
person making the assessment. Nevertheless, the impact on educational institutions, 
students and teachers should always be calculated when assessing whether an attack is 
excessive, striving for an appropriate balance to the greatest extent possible. 
2.6.2 The Principle of Distinction  
 The principle of distinction also permeates IHL,610 and is a central and 
foundational protection.611 It is one of the oldest rules of IHL,612 so it is firmly 
established and its overall validity beyond any doubt.613 However, the principle of 
distinction has been ‘perceived by some as an unreasonable and unworkable fetter 
upon freedom of military action’.614 On the other hand, the principle of distinction is 
argued to be a clear example of the attempt to balance the principles of humanity and 
military necessity, without which the protective rules of IHL are undermined and the 
protection afforded to civilians is crippled.615 The key question then is whether the 
principle of distinction is unreasonable and unworkable in practice, or whether it 
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2.6.2.1 Protection of Civilians and Civilian Populations 
In relation to NIAC, Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II sets out the principle 
of distinction, providing that the ‘civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations’.616 
Article 13(2) further states that:  
 
[T]he civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against the dangers arising from military operations [and that] the civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. 
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population are prohibited.617  
 
Rule 1 of the ICRC Study states that the rule that parties to a conflict must distinguish 
civilians, and therefore not direct attacks against civilians, is of customary status 
during both IAC and NIAC.618 Rule 2 also identifies the prohibition against acts or 
threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population, as a rule of customary IHL during both IAC and NIAC.619  
Protecting Children argues that the IHL framework regarding the conduct of 
hostilities contains no special consideration of children, so could be developed to take 
into account the special position of the children which is already recognised in other 
contexts under IHL, given the vulnerability of children. It is however, acknowledged 
that this is a difficult issue, because there may be undesirable ramifications if the 
position of children is differently treated expressly, and that it may be said that it is 
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unnecessary to specify the position of children as it will be taken into account 
regardless.620 While the principle of distinction does not afford children specific 
protection, and while this might afford them better protection, as a matter of treaty and 
custom, when conducting attacks in a NIAC, parties to the conflict should nonetheless 
distinguish children who are civilians.  
Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II adds that civilians shall enjoy protection 
‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.621 Similarly, 
Common Article 3 provides that persons taking no ‘active part in hostilities’ benefit 
from its protection in a NIAC.622 ‘Direct’ and ‘active’ mean the same thing for the 
purposes of distinction.623 Rule 6 of the ICRC Study identifies this as a rule of 
customary IHL in both IAC and NIAC.624 It is therefore clear that educational staff 
and students are protected by the principle of distinction in a NIAC only to the extent 
that they are regarded as civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities.625 As civilians 
do not have a right to take part in hostilities, educational staff or students not only can 
be legitimately targeted during such direct participation, they also do not benefit from 
‘combatant immunity’ so can be subject to domestic criminal prosecution even after 
they have stopped such participation.626 
While there is guidance as to what makes a ‘civilian’ or ‘civilian population’ in 
Additional Protocol I for an IAC, there are no such definitions in Additional Protocol 
II.627 The lack of treaty law providing express guidance on the meaning of civilian and 
civilian population in a NIAC makes the task of distinguishing civilians more 
difficult, which means that the protection of students and educational staff is higher in 																																																								
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an IAC. However, customary law partially narrows the gap between the protection 
provided by principle of distinction an IAC and NIAC.  
In respect of the meaning of a civilian population, Rule 5 of the ICRC Study 
identifies the rule in an IAC, namely that the civilian population comprises all persons 
who are civilians,628 as a rule of customary IHL in both IAC and NIAC.629 However, 
Article 50(3) of Additional Protocol I provides further that ‘the presence within the 
civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians 
does not deprive the population of its civilian character’.630 This rule ensures that the 
inevitable intermingling of combatants in the civilian population does not impact on 
the protection afforded to the civilian population.631 This rule, however, is not 
included in Additional Protocol II, nor does the ICRC study identify this rule as being 
of customary status in a NIAC. A common sense approach provides that the presence 
of non-civilians within a civilian population would not deprive this population of its 
civilian status, as an attack would need to be considered subject to the principle of 
proportionality. 
The answer to who is a civilian and what is a civilian population is intrinsically 
linked to the question of who is a member of an armed force. While Common Article 
3 and Additional Protocol II refer to ‘armed forces’, Additional Protocol II also refers 
to ‘dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups’, but as with the terms 
‘civilians’ and ‘civilian populations’, these terms are not defined in the treaties.632 
Unfortunately, customary law does not provide any significant clarification.  
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Rule 3 of the ICRC study identifies that Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I, 
which provides that all members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict are 
combatants, except medical and religious personnel, as a rule of customary IHL 
during IAC. However, it adds that for purposes of the principle of distinction, State 
armed forces may also be considered combatants in NIAC, while combatant status 
exists only in IAC.633 The ICRC study also states that, in a NIAC, ‘practice is not 
clear as to the situation of members of armed opposition groups’.634 The law remains 
ambiguous as to whether the States armed forces and NSAG are combatants in a 
NIAC, particularly in respect of NSAG, due to the lack of clarity as to the customary 
status of Rule 3 in a NIAC, in respect of both States and NSAG. 
States have been reluctant to recognise NSAG as combatants as this would entitle 
such groups to combatant immunity in a NIAC, and without such immunity 
individuals can be prosecuted under domestic criminal law.635 As such, in a NIAC a 
NSAG might conduct an attack that is in accordance with IHL, for example targeting 
the States armed forces in or near a school in accordance with the principles of IHL, 
which destroys the school. Yet, if NSAG were to have combatant immunity, the 
domestic criminal system would not be able to do anything further to protect 
education. However, combatants can be subject to attack independent of them directly 
participating in hostilities,636 which may benefit the State fighting against the NSAG, 
as the State would be able to target a NSAG that is party to a NIAC at any time. 
Though the NSAG would also be able to target, in accordance with IHL, the State 
armed forces at any time if both are considered combatants, so the protection of States 
within IHL would simultaneously be decreased. 
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Rule 4 of the ICRC Study similarly provides that Article 43(1) of Additional 
Protocol I may, for the purposes of the principle of distinction, also apply to State 
armed forces in NIAC as a matter of customary law.637 Article 43(1) defines the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict as consisting ‘of all organised armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct 
of its subordinates’.638 Again, the lack of clarity as to the customary status of this rule 
in a NIAC weakens the protection of education, as it causes uncertainty in respect of 
whether the States armed forces, whom are bound by both IHL and IHRL in a NIAC, 
are operating.   
In accordance with Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, Rule 5 of the ICRC Study 
identifies as a matter of customary law the principle that civilians are persons who are 
not members of armed forces, in an IAC and NIAC.639 The problem is that, in a 
NIAC, the State is fighting against civilians who have taken up arms so it can be 
difficult to make the distinction between who is a civilian and who is not, and the 
dramatic increase of NIAC since WWII exacerbates this potential for confusion.640 
The increase in NIAC has led to greater intermingling and involvement of civilians 
with armed actors, and the difficulty of distinguishing civilians is aggravated further 
when armed actors do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population, for 
example, during undercover military operations. This means that civilians are more 
likely to be erroneously targeted, while armed forces that are unable to identify their 
adversary run the increased risk of being attacked by persons they cannot distinguish 
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from the civilian population.641 As such, there is significant risk that students and 
educational staff may be inaccurately identified as an armed actor. 
Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that in an IAC, ‘in case of doubt 
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’.642 The 
principle that a person is presumed to be a civilian in the case of doubt is considered 
to be a very important rule designed to prevent parties to a conflict from ‘shooting 
first and asking questions later’.643 Despite the importance of this rule, there is no 
equivalent rule in a NIAC, and it is not of customary status in a NIAC as ‘the issue of 
doubt has hardly been addressed in State practice, even though a clear rule on this 
subject would be desirable as it would enhance the protection of the civilian 
population against attack’.644 As such, students and teachers who are not combatants 
are protected to a greater extent in an IAC, by benefiting from the presumption of 
civilian status. Where it is difficult to make such distinction, it undoubtedly ‘seems 
justified’ in NIAC that the presumption of civilian status is applied,645 in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality. 
Another difficulty is that NSAG are not considered combatants, but practice is 
also ambiguous as to whether members of such groups are instead considered 
members of armed forces or civilians.646 It is not clear whether NSAG are civilians 
who lose protection from direct attack only when they directly participate in a NIAC, 
or whether they are liable to attack independently of taking such a part in hostilities.647 
If a State were only able to attack NSAG where they were directly participating in 
hostilities due to having civilian status, this could be both a benefit and a detriment to 																																																								
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the protection of education. On the one hand, education may be better protected, as 
States may be unable to conduct an attack against a member of a NSAG where there is 
uncertainty as to their direct participation in hostilities. Such an attack could otherwise 
result in damage to schools, or death or injury to students and teachers. It could also 
prevent the State from inaccurately identifying a student or teacher as a member of a 
NSAG and attacking first before clarifying their civilian status. Conversely, where a 
State is unable to attack a NSAG at any time, this stunts efforts to defeat a NSAG who 
has a policy of using educational institutions for military purposes, of targeting 
schools, students and teachers when co-ordinating attacks, or of recruiting children for 
military purposes. An additional problem is that where a State is considered a 
combatant who can be attacked at any time during a NIAC, considering members of a 
NSAG to be civilians who can only be attacked when they are directly participating in 
hostilities puts the NSAG at a considerable advantage. 
The ICRC study argues that the terms ‘dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups’ in Additional Protocol II inferentially recognises that civilians are all 
persons who are not members of such forces or groups.648 Significantly, the ICRC 
argue that all persons who are not members of State armed forces or NSAG are 
civilians and entitled to protection against direct attack until they take a direct part in 
hostilities in a NIAC. It adds that those taking a direct part in hostilities during NIAC 
can be divided into persons who are members of a NSAG and have a ‘continuous 
combat function’, and into civilians who engage in ‘sporadic acts of violence’.649 
Though this is not a rule of customary status and can be disputed, the ICRC have 
offered guidance where none otherwise exists. The guidance therefore has great scope 
to improve the protection of individuals in NIAC, including students and teachers. 																																																								
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The key question, then, is what is meant by ‘continuous combat function’, and 
‘sporadic acts of violence’, and ‘direct participation’. 
2.6.2.1.1 Members of Non-state Armed Groups with a ‘Continuous Combat 
Function’ 
The ICRC argue that while members of dissident armed forces are former 
members of the State armed forces, they do not become civilians, rather, where they 
remain organised under the structures of the State armed forces to which they 
formerly belonged these structures should continue to determine individual 
membership in such groups.650 The ICRC adds that membership in other organised 
armed groups is more difficult to determine in light of the wide variety of cultural, 
political, and military contexts in which such groups operate, their informal and 
clandestine structures and the elastic nature of membership.651 They argue that the 
decisive criterion for membership of both types of NSAG must depend on whether the 
individual assumes a continuous function involving his or her direct participation in 
hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conflict.652 Given their continuous 
direct participation in hostilities, individuals may be targeted at all times until they are 
no longer a part of a NSAG.653 If accepted, this guidance closes the gap in respect of 
the lack of clarity within IHL as to whether or not members of NSAG can be targeted 
at all times. 
The ICRC continues to interpret continuous combat function as requiring ‘lasting 
integration into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State 
party to an armed conflict’.654 They add that an individual recruited, trained and 
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on its 																																																								
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behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before he or 
she first carries out a hostile act’, but those who leave the NSAG and re-integrate into 
civilian life are civilians until they are called back to active duty, and those who 
assume support functions also remain civilians.655 The ICRC further provides that 
‘continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of 
uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons’ or ‘identified on the basis of 
conclusive behaviour, for example, where a person has repeatedly directly participated 
in hostilities in support of an organized armed group’.656  
Watkin argues that the Interpretive Guidance defines membership in NSAG too 
restrictively, clearly disadvantaging States.657 Melzer argues that this critique is not 
justified, as firstly State armed forces benefit from protection as combatants which 
those in NSAG lack, and secondly: 
 
the criterion for membership is identical for State and non-State actors, namely the 
assumption of a continuous combat function…While it is true that the resulting 
notion of regular armed forces may be wider than that of their irregularly 
constituted counterparts, the practical relevance of this conceptual difference 
should not be overestimated.658 
 
Watkin argues that the best approach is ‘to treat all armed forces the same’.659 Melzer 
again refutes this, arguing that: 
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[T]he Interpretive Guidance goes to great lengths to assimilate, as far as 
reasonably possible, all organized armed forces, groups, and units, regardless of 
whether they fight for a State or non-State party to an armed conflict, or whether 
they wear uniforms or distinctive signs.660 
 
It is clear that debate remains. If the interpretation of the ICRC is to be accepted, then 
civilians and NSAG would have additional protection as a result of a more restrictive 
interpretation of membership, but this appears to be the appropriate balance, in light of 
the fact that NSAG armed groups do not benefit from protection as combatants as 
State armed forces do, and in light of the fact that members of NSAG with a 
continuous combat function can be targeted at all times. Any further assimilation may 
unfairly disadvantage civilians, and unjustifiably reduce the level of protection for 
students and teachers. 
2.6.2.1.2 Civilians who Engage in ‘Sporadic Acts of Violence’ and a Revolving 
Door of Protection 
 The Interpretive Guidance provides that ‘civilians lose protection against direct 
attack “for such time” as they directly participate in hostilities’.661 This means that 
civilians lose protection for the duration of each specific hostile act.662 Civilians, 
including students and educational staff, therefore benefit from a ‘revolving door of 
protection [as they lose and regain protection] in parallel with the intervals of their 
engagement in direct participation in hostilities’.663 Boothby argues that:  
 
[B]y limiting continuous loss of protection to members of organized armed groups 
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with a continuous combat function, the ICRC gives regularly participating 
civilians a privileged, unbalanced, and unjustified status of protection in 
comparison to members of the opposing armed forces, who are continuously 
targetable.664  
 
Similarly, Watkin argues that the lack of clear guidance on the number of times a 
civilian can walk back through the revolving door will be particularly controversial, as 
according to the guidance a civilian can go through the revolving door on a 
‘persistently recurring basis’.665 Melzer, however, disputes Watkin's critique on the 
basis that ‘in practice persons directly participating on a persistently recurrent basis 
will almost always be members of an organized armed group’.666 The revolving door 
approach is an important mechanism to prevent mistakes in the distinguishing of 
civilians, whereby States must be surer of the status of an individual as a member of a 
NSAG before being able to attack irrespective of whether they are at that moment 
acting in a combative function. 
As an alternative to the revolving door approach, Schmitt suggests that civilians 
who have taken a direct part in hostilities are subject to the concept of ‘continuous 
direct participation’, 667 whereby they may be targeted at all times until they have 
opted out of hostilities. Melzer argues that this reflects:  
 
[A]n approach almost exclusively driven by military necessity which is not 
balanced by equally important considerations of humanity…The Interpretive 
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Guidance, faithful to the ICRC's role as a neutral and impartial intermediary, does 
not give either consideration preference over the other, but proposes a balanced 
approach, which takes all legitimate concerns into account, while at the same time 
aiming to ensure a clear and coherent interpretation of IHL consistent with its 
underlying purposes and principles.668 
 
He adds that neither is there a theoretically coherent and practically convincing 
alternative to the approach proposed in the Interpretive Guidance.669 In the face of no 
feasible alternative approach, the Interpretive Guidance offers the best solution to 
protecting civilians, including students and teachers, in practice, while allowing for 
military necessity.  
Significantly, while civilians can no longer be targeted outside of the short and 
restrictively drawn timespan in which they directly participate in hostilities, they can 
be arrested and tried for crimes committed during the time in which they 
participated,670 including crimes in respect of IHL, which must be complied with by 
civilians directly participating in NIAC.671 As such, civilians, including teachers and 
students, are not left unregulated while they are not directly participating in the 
conflict. The revolving door of protection therefore adequately allows for military 
necessity during active participation, and for the law to function when a civilian has 
laid down their arms, in line with the concept of humanity. 
2.6.2.1.3 Direct Participation in hostilities 
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols do not define the term ‘direct 
																																																								
668 Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance’ (n595), 914 
669 Ibid, 915-916 
670 Kolb and Hyde (n16), 128; Gasser (n451), 24; See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, 83 
671 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, 84  
	 	
	 158	
participation in hostilities’.672 The term ‘holds the key to the fundamental protection 
of innocent life [and therefore] clarification of the concept…and its careful application 
to present-day conflicts has assumed extraordinary importance’. 673  Due to the 
importance of this term and the need for its definition, the ICRC adopted ‘Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under IHL’.674 However, 
this guidance has been subject to criticism. Schmitt argues that while the way in which 
the Interpretive Guidance deals with ‘the constitutive elements of direct 
participation…prove the most satisfactory’, but the way in which it examines the 
concept of civilian and the temporal scope of participation is fatally flawed, ‘as is the 
unnecessary and faulty discussion of restraints on the use of force in direct attack’.675 
He adds that these deficiencies ‘demonstrate a general failure to fully appreciate the 
operational complexity of modern warfare. Accordingly, States…are unlikely to use it 
to provide direction to their forces in the field’.676 Watkin also argues that the 
Interpretive Guidance falls short of the mark and is a lost opportunity, as it ‘raises 
more questions than it answers’.677  
Conversely, Pejic argues that the Interpretive Guidance was intended as a guide 
and is therefore necessarily broad in nature, needing ‘to be further ‘‘translated’’ into 
operational tools in order to be applicable on the ground’.678 The BIICL Handbook 
further argues that ‘although this is not a legally binding document, it is a useful guide 
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in determining when the conduct of students or education staff might expose them to 
lawful attack under IHL’.679 Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the 
Interpretive Guidance is in fact flawed and liable to being ignored in practice, or 
whether it has contributed to clarity, being necessarily flexible so that it is broad 
enough to be applicable in a range of situations in practice, including in the context of 
deliberate and direct attacks against education. 
The Interpretive Guidance provides that for an act to be a direct participation in 
hostilities it must satisfy three criteria. Firstly, it must pass a certain threshold of harm, 
as ‘the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or alternatively, to inflict death or serious 
injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack’. 680 
Therefore, for a student or teacher to be considered directly participating in a NIAC, 
they must act in a manner that will affect the military of the State or another NSAG 
adversely, or in a way which will cause death or injury to, for example, other students 
or teachers who are civilians, or cause damage to structures such as schools which are 
not military objects. Secondly, there must be ‘a direct causal link between the act and 
the harm likely to result either from the act, or from a coordinated military operation 
of which that act constitutes an integral part’.681 Therefore, the death or injury of a 
student or teacher, or the destruction of a school or university must be directly caused 
by the act carried out, such as by shooting a student or teacher, or setting a school on 
fire. Finally, the act must be ‘specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to a conflict and to the detriment of another’.682 
So if such action was undertaken in self-defence, as opposed to being taken with the 
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intention of military advantage, this should not amount to direct participation. 
 These important criteria identify when violence by individuals such as a student 
or teacher would amount to direct participation, but despite this importance it is not 
always easy to clearly identify when a person is directly participating in a conflict.683 
Schmitt argues that a ‘strict application of the threshold of harm constitutive element 
would exclude conduct that by a reasonable assessment should amount to direct 
participation’.684 Alternatively, an over inclusive application would result in students 
and educational staff being considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities when 
they should not. The continued lack of clarity means there is an increased likeliness of 
such a mistake being made in practice, which negatively impacts the protection of 
students and teachers. Melzer argues that while: 
 
Schmitt contends that the Interpretive Guidance's definition of "direct 
participation in hostilities" is too restrictive…other experts would criticize the 
Guidance's definition as too generous because, in certain circumstances, it might 
allow the targeting of civilians who do not pose an immediate threat to the 
enemy’.685  
 
There is still, therefore, an on-going debate as to the question surrounding what 
activities constitute ‘taking a direct part in hostilities’.686 
The BIICL Handbook argues that conduct of students and teachers that is ‘likely 
to be’ direct participation in hostilities includes: serving as a lookout during an 
ambush; delivering ammunition to the front line; the recruitment and training of a 
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person/persons specifically for hostile acts, such as recruiting children from schools 
for a particular operation; participation in a military operation that results in harm to 
an adversary, including the identification and marking of targets, transmission of 
tactical intelligence to attacking forces, and providing assistance to troops for a 
specific military operation.687 Significantly, assigning guards to protect schools or 
universities, or arming education staff themselves, is argued not to constitute direct 
participation in hostilities where this is in defence against an unlawful attack such as 
looting or attempted abduction of children from an educational institution by soldiers. 
However, the BIICL Handbook urges caution in pursuing such practices, as ‘there is a 
real risk that such conduct might be mistaken for a direct participation…and may, 
therefore, increase the risk of attack.688 
Conduct argued ‘likely to be too indirect’ includes: general recruitment and 
training of children and other persons; teaching material that constitutes propaganda to 
students in educational facilities or the publishing of such material by academics; 
designing, producing and shipping of weapons and other military equipment not on 
the front line in a civilian facility; undertaking construction or repair of a school 
which may be used for a military purpose; providing supplies or services such as 
training material, textbooks, electricity, fuel, finances and financial services to a party 
to a conflict; participation in the general ‘war effort’ or in general war sustaining 
activities which do not have a direct link to the conduct of hostilities, such as political, 
media or economic activities in support of a war.689  
This guidance is particularly useful in the context of deliberate and direct attacks. 
It also makes clear that a wide array of activities can amount to direct participation, 
and evidences the complexity of determining whether activity is remote or direct in 																																																								
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respect of the hostilities. Due to the wide range of activity that could amount to direct 
participation, a broad notion of direct participation strengthens IHL as it allows for the 
assessment of direct participation on a case-by-case basis that can accommodate for 
the complexities and evolving nature of NIAC. The necessarily flexible definition 
proposed by the ICRC is, therefore, capable of ensuring that a reasonable assessment 
of these criteria can be made on a case-by-case basis. The assessor must keep in mind, 
however, the issue of over or under inclusiveness, take into account all the facts of the 
situation when assessing whether an act is ‘likely to pass a certain threshold of harm’, 
and strive to achieve the appropriate balance between military necessity and 
humanity. 
2.6.2.1.4 Child Soldiers 
A particular problem in respect of the principle of distinction is the increasing 
exploitation of children as combatants in both IAC and NIAC.690 IHL recognises the 
special vulnerability of children by providing for one of the most important special 
protections for children in conflicts, in the form of a prohibition on the recruitment 
and participation of children in hostilities.691 In relation to a NIAC, Article 4(3) of 
Additional Protocol II states that ‘children who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part 
in hostilities’.692 The prohibition on the recruitment of children under the age of 
fifteen into the armed forces is said to be a rule of customary IHL within IAC and 
NIAC in Rule 136 of the ICRC Study.693 Similarly, Rule 137 states that ‘children 
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must not be allowed to take part in hostilities’ as a matter of customary IHL in both 
IAC and NIAC.694  
Article 77(2) replicates much of Article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II, but adds 
that: 
  
In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but 
who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.695 
 
Arguably, article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II is weaker in relation to the issue of 
giving priority to those aged 15 to 18, as Additional Protocol II is silent on the 
matter.696 Nor is this identified as a rule of customary status. It is also stated in Article 
77(3) that: 
 
If, in exceptional cases…children who have not attained the age of fifteen years 
take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse Party, they 
shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by this Article, 
whether or not they are prisoners of war.697  
 
Again, Additional Protocol II is silent on this matter and the rule is not identified as 
being customary in nature, so the protection afforded to child soldiers in an IAC is 
stronger.  
However, the protection is stronger in a NIAC in that Article 4(3) provides more 
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absolutely that States shall not allow children to take part in hostilities’, while Article 
77 only requires States to take ‘all feasible measures’ in this regard. It is suggested 
that the law should be developed so that it also imposes an absolute prohibition in 
IAC.698 Article 4(3) is also stronger as it does not allow children ‘to take part in 
hostilities’, while Article 77 does not allow children to ‘take a direct part’. Protecting 
Children calls for the law in an IAC to be developed so that it ensures that the 
prohibition applies to the use of children beyond their direct participation, so as to 
reflect the approach taken in Art 4(3) that prohibits wider participation.699 The broader 
wording of Article 4(3) is an important protection for children, as even if they are 
used in a NIAC in a way that does not constitute a direct participation, while they do 
not become a legitimate military target, they can still get caught up in active 
hostilities, and it nonetheless may deprive that child of their education.  
Despite the prohibitions against the use of children under the age of fifteen in 
hostilities, the voluntary or involuntary participation of children in IAC and NIAC 
causes them to lose their protection from direct attack, regardless of their age and 
whether they are members of armed groups.700 As such, while students under the age 
of 15 are protected from recruitment and use in a NIAC, their subsequent 
participation, regardless of the forced nature of such participation, means they do not 
benefit from civilian status and can be legitimately attacked. It is unreasonable, 
however, to expect people to sacrifice themselves when faced with a child solider, 
attesting to the importance of preventing the recruitment and use of children in the 
first place. Significantly, there is an absence of a clear prohibition on voluntary 
enlistment, what is prohibited is recruitment, so a recommendation of Protecting 
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Children is that consideration should be given to clarifying or developing the law by 
amending Art 4(3), to state, for the avoidance of doubt, that the voluntary enlistment 
of children under the age of 15 years during armed conflict is prohibited.701 
2.6.2.2 The protection of civilian objects 
Neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II explicitly applies the 
principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives in NIAC.702 
Conversely, Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that ‘civilian objects shall 
not be the object of attack or of reprisals’.703 However, Rule 7 of the ICRC study 
provides that it is a matter of customary law for parties to an IAC and NIAC to ‘at all 
times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only 
be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian 
objects’. 704  Significantly, the distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives has been recognised as applicable in a NIAC in other IHL instruments that 
apply during both IAC and NIAC.705 
Rule 9 of the ICRC Study identifies that the principle contained in Article 52(1) of 
Additional Protocol I, namely that civilian objects are all objects that are not military 
objectives, is a rule of customary IHL applicable in IAC and NIAC.706 As such, it is 
clear that ‘civilian object’ has to be read together with the definition of ‘military 
objective’.707 While IHL does not attempt to provide a list of military objectives,708 
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I specifies two requirements that must be present 
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at the same time.709 Firstly, ‘military objectives are limited to those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action’. Secondly, the total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, of this objective must offer a definite military 
advantage.710 The ‘definite military advantage’ must be ‘concrete and direct’ and not 
‘hypothetical and speculative’.711 Rule 8 of the ICRC study identifies the criteria of 
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I as customary law applicable in both IAC and 
NIAC.712  
Protecting Children argues that a deficiency is that there is a lack of a specific 
prohibition on targeting schools, and suggest that consideration is given to developing 
the law in this regard.713 However, Rule 10 of the ICRC study provides that the rule 
that ‘civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are 
military objectives’, is a matter of customary IHL in both IAC and NIAC.714 While 
explicit protection is better than implicit protection, it is clear that an educational 
institution when used in its ordinary way is a civilian object, and is protected from 
being targeted. However, the military use of a school converts a school into a military 
objective that renders attacks against it lawful,715 in accordance with the principles of 
military necessary and proportionality. Where no alternative means of education is 
provided where that educational institution is destroyed, many individuals are left 
without an education and the benefits of having educated individuals and societies are 
lost.716  
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The legality of attacks against educational institutions being used for military 
purposes is more complicated where it continues to be simultaneously used for its 
intended educational purposes. As IHL does not recognise ‘dual use status’ of an 
object, it may be targeted where it serves both civilian and military purposes.717 An 
educational institution that is being used by the military would be rendered a military 
objective regardless as to whether it had such ‘dual use’. In such a situation, the 
question as to whether this military objective can be attacked must also be answered 
in light of the principles of military necessity and proportionality. This ensures that 
the impact on civilians and civilian objects is taken into account when considering 
whether an attack on a military objective object that is simultaneously being used for 
civilian purposes is lawful.718  
Kolb and Hyde argue that the interests of the civilian population should be given 
high priority in situations where it is open to debate as to whether an attack against a 
military object that is still being used for civilian purposes is proportionate.719 In this 
respect, Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I is significant for the protection of 
education in an IAC. It provides that ‘in case of doubt whether an object which is 
normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other 
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military 
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used’.720 Kolb argues that it can be difficult to 
prove that an object normally dedicated to civilian use is being used for military 
purposes, therefore, if the presumption of civilian use did not exist, civilian objects 
could be targeted on the slightest of suspicion.721 The presumption of civilian use is a 
key protection of education in a NIAC, but the ICRC study does not identify this as a 																																																								
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rule of customary law in a NIAC. Again, the protection of education is unjustifiably 
stronger in an IAC. 
Also, while IHL ‘equally forbids targeting hospitals, religious buildings, schools, 
and other civilian buildings unless they become justifiable military objectives…it fails 
to equally protect these buildings from being used for such objectives in the first 
place’ in both an IAC and NIAC.722 Hospitals, and to a lesser extent religious 
buildings and cultural property, benefit from special protection within IHL and cannot 
be used for military purposes,723 however, school buildings are provided a less 
privileged status and can be used on the basis of military necessity.724 Bart argues that 
the current protection afforded in IHL to educational institutions fails to prevent or 
discourage the military use of educational institutions, and that the law needs to 
evolve.725  
The importance of protecting education from military use is reflected clearly in the 
non-binding ‘Safe Schools Declaration’, an instrument through which 96 states have 
expressed broad political support for the protection and continuation of education in 
armed conflict, and endorsed and committed to implement the Guidelines for 
Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict’.726 
State practice, therefore, indicates a potential development towards providing parity of 
protection to education from military use. 
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Bart further argues that IHL should be updated to provide schools a privileged 
status that is ‘similar if not superior to the privileges afforded to hospitals and 
religious buildings’, because of their inherent educational and humanitarian value to 
society.727 If the military use of educational institutions continues to be permitted, it 
flows from this that such use will occur, and the buildings will be damaged or 
destroyed during a NIAC thereby preventing continued education and the benefits that 
flow from it.728  
While distinctive emblems assist in distinguishing civilian objects such as 
hospitals, there is also ‘a need to create a universally recognized distinctive emblem 
that would identify a temporary or permanent structure as a protected educational 
site’.729 Such a distinctive emblem would be particularly useful in helping to identify a 
building used for educational purposes in the alternative to a school in the area has 
already been damaged or destroyed, especially where this building is not ordinarily 
used for such a purpose and determining its educational and civilian status might be 
difficult. Therefore, educational institutions also need parity of protection in respect of 
a distinctive emblem. 
2.6.3 The Prohibition on the use of Human Shields and precautions against the 
effects of attacks 
Parties to an armed conflict can easily exploit the principle of proportionality by 
using civilians and civilian objects as human shields,730 as is done when schools are 
used for military purposes, particularly where students remain inside. The use of 
human shields is strictly prohibited in an IAC. Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention provides that ‘the presence of a protected person may not be used to 																																																								
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render certain points or areas immune from military operations’.731 Article 51(7) of 
Additional Protocol I elaborates on this, stating that:  
 
[T]he presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians 
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not 
direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to 
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military 
operations.732 
 
As such, parties to an IAC are prohibited from using schools, students and teachers as 
human shields. This is strengthened by Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, which 
requires the taking of precautions against the effects of attacks, namely, by requiring 
that: States remove ‘the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives’; ‘avoid locating military 
objectives within or near densely populated areas’; and ‘take the other necessary 
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 
under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations’.733 As such, 
it clarifies that States should not locate themselves near educational institutions, and 
remove students, teachers and educational institutions away from military objectives, 
and take any other necessary precautions to protect education. The phrase ‘any other 
necessary precautions’ provides a high level of protection in this regard. 
There are, however, no equivalent provisions in Common Article 3 or Additional 																																																								
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Protocol II, again highlighting the weakness of the treaty-based protection of 
education in a NIAC in comparison to an IAC. However, it is stated in Rule 97 of the 
ICRC Study that the prohibition on the use of human shields is a fundamental 
guarantee and a rule of customary IHL in both IAC and NIAC.734  It is common sense 
that education should benefit from the same protection, as such, it would be difficult 
to dispute the customary status of this rule. Similarly, Rule 22 provides that the 
requirement to ‘take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and 
civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks’ is a rule of customary 
status in an IAC and NIAC, however, Rule 23 and 24 state that it is only arguable that 
the requirements to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely 
populated areas and to remove civilian persons and objects under its control from the 
vicinity of military objectives are applicable in NIAC as a matter of customary IHL.735 
Clarification on this issue would be beneficial to the protection of education in the 
context of deliberate and direct attacks, though considering the prohibition of the use 
of human shields, it is likely that such rules also form a part of customary IHL in a 
NIAC. 
2.6.4 Precautions in attack  
The principles of proportionality and distinction require precautions to be taken.736 
In relation to an IAC, Article 57 of Additional Protocol I requires the taking of 
precautions in attack, providing that ‘in the conduct of military operations, constant 
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects’.737 
Article 57(2)(a) states that those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
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i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are 
military objectives…; 
ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with 
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; 
iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.738 
 
The principle is therefore multifaceted in the sense that it requires that a range of steps 
be taken to ensure that the object of attack is a military one and to avoid the erroneous 
targeting of civilians and civilian objects.739 However, Protecting Children argues that 
one way in which IHL could be strengthened would be to develop the law so the 
requirement to take all ‘feasible’ precautions involves express and heightened 
standards for children.740 Such development would certainly increase the protection of 
child students in a NIAC, where, for example, a school is being used for military and 
educational purposes. 
Article 57(2)(b) further provides that: 
 
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 																																																								
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damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.741 
 
Finally, Article 57(2)(c) states that ‘effective advance warning shall be given of 
attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit’.742  This principle is therefore of great significance to the protection of 
education from deliberate and direct attacks, as parties to the conflict would be 
required to do all they could before conducting an attack to determine the status of an 
educational institution, student or teacher. Despite the importance of this rule for 
education, again there are no equivalent provisions for a NIAC in Common Article 3 
or Additional Protocol II. However, this principle is reflected in Rules 15 to 20 of the 
ICRC Study, which provides that all of the above rules are of customary status in both 
IAC and NIAC.743 While, again, the treaty law protecting education from deliberate 
and direct attacks in a NIAC is unjustifiably weak, customary law can fill the gaps in 
protection. 
The requirement of taking precautions makes clear that an attack would not be 
legitimate where it comes to light that an educational institution is a civilian object or 
where a student or teacher is a civilian, or where an attack against a legitimate target 
would not be proportionate. When attacking an educational institution that is used for 
both military and civilian purposes, advance warning should be given for the civilian 
students and teachers inside to evade the attack, but only where possible. However, 
while it is clear that parties to an armed conflict must take precautions to avoid the 
incidental loss of life and injury to students and educational staff, and damage to 
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educational institutions, such consequences of an attack will not be a violation of IHL 
where this is proportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage gained. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The protection of education within a NIAC is inadequate. It is clear that 
educational institutions, staff and students are granted a lower level of protection 
during NIAC than an IAC. There are far fewer provisions applicable during situations 
of NIAC, and it is also much more difficult to determine the existence of a NIAC. 
While customary international law has diminished the international/non-international 
dichotomy not all provisions applicable to IAC apply to NIAC as a matter of 
customary IHL. Few provisions explicitly protect education in a NIAC, with none 
explicitly prohibiting deliberate and direct attacks. While the principles of distinction, 
military necessity and proportionality are broad enough to protect education in 














Chapter Three - The Relationship between International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law 
3.1 Introduction 
There is now substantial evidence of, and consensus towards, the continued 
applicability the right to education alongside IHL during NIAC.744 IHL and IHRL 
norms may therefore be applicable at the same time to the same situation.745 As such, 
much of the controversy now surrounds the question of the manner in which IHRL 
applies alongside IHL,746 as the two regimes are often argued to coexist in a difficult 
relationship.747 Olson argues that it is impossible to implement the law in a manner 
that provides the fullest level of protection to individuals without clarity as to the 
relationship between IHRL and IHL.748 Yet, important and complex questions are 
raised as to how IHRL and IHL apply simultaneously during situations of armed 
conflict, ‘and in some cases the answers have not yet crystallized’.749 Academic 
discussion of this issue is, as will be seen, often contradictory, yet the conclusion that 
there is no legal solution ‘is not open to legal advisors to the armed forces’.750 As 
such, the purpose of this chapter is to answer how the simultaneous application of 
IHRL and IHL during situations of NIAC could work in practice, in respect of attacks 
against education, and more generally. 
This chapter examines the differing approaches to interpreting the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, with a view to highlighting that there is a lack of clarity as to 
which approach should be drawn upon in practice. The approaches are categorised in 																																																								
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this chapter as: the complementarity approach, humanisation approach, lex specialis 
approach, active hostilities/security operations approach, and the unified approach.751 
The first four approaches suggest how IHRL and IHL should be applied 
simultaneously during armed conflicts. The final approach suggests how international 
law could be reformed so that IHRL and IHL both apply in armed conflict having 
been consolidated into one body of law. I argue that the lack of clarity as to how the 
two regimes relate during NIAC impacts the adequacy of the manner in which IHRL 
and IHL regulate the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education in 
practice, as IHRL and IHL are liable to being applied in an inconsistent manner.  
The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are also assessed in order to 
determine which of the approaches provides the highest level of protection to 
education, while concurrently ensuring that military activity can be effectively 
conducted. I argue that the best approach to the relationship between IHRL and IHL is 
the ‘active hostilities/security operations’ approach. This is tested in the case studies 
of this thesis, which goes into greater detail as to how, specifically, IHRL and IHL 
apply simultaneously in the context of deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC. 
3.2 Complementarity Approach 
According to the complementarity approach, IHRL and IHL complement each 
other, while remaining distinct bodies of law.752 Following this approach, where both 
bodies of law apply they must be interpreted in light of one another and 
harmonised.753 Accordingly, it should never be a choice between IHRL and IHL, 																																																								
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54-62: Hathaway and others describe three approaches to relationship between IHRL and IHL: the 
displacement model, complementarity model and conflict resolution model. Gill similarly sets out three 
approaches, namely the traditional approach, humanisation approach and lex specialis approach. 
Heintze also sets out three approaches: the traditional theory, the complementarity theory and the 
integration theory. This thesis examines these approaches, but goes further in that it identifies 
additional approaches, namely the distinct regimes and unified approaches.   
752 Heintze (n11), 57 
753 Hathaway and others (n11), 1897-1898 
	 	
	 177	
rather ‘the two bodies should be contextualised and used to complement and 
strengthen each other’.754 Significantly, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, adopted in 1969 following Resolution XXIII, states that treaties 
should be interpreted alongside ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties’.755 The rule enshrined in Article 31(3) leads to the 
harmonisation of IHRL and IHL rather than the exclusion of IHRL.756 The VCLT 
makes clear that IHRL and IHL should be interpreted alongside each other in the 
context of deliberate and direct attacks against education in a NIAC, because, as 
demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, both contain relevant and applicable rules.  
This is also supported by General Comment 31 of the HRC, which states that ‘in 
respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian 
law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant 
rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive’.757 This 
evidences that both IHRL and IHL remain ‘applicable and capable of informing the 
legal regulation of a situation’, and ‘indicates a balancing of law of armed conflict and 
international human rights law obligations’.758 It is, therefore, necessary to interpret 
IHRL and IHL in light of each other, in a manner that balances the purposes of both 
adequately.  
A benefit of this approach is that it recognises that there are many situations where 
IHRL and IHL regulate a situation differently, in more or less detail, and that there is 
scope for mutual reinforcement.759 As will be seen in the case studies of this thesis, 																																																								
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there are many aspects of IHRL and IHL that are mutually reinforcing in respect of 
their regulation of the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education. 
However, while the two regimes can be complementary, and while there are situations 
in which each can fill the lacunae in the other, they do not mesh together perfectly. 760 
The content of IHRL and IHL norms are sometimes inconsistent,761 and at times there 
may be a fundamental incompatibility and conflict between them that cannot be 
resolved through interpretation.762  
Significantly, the International Law Commission concluded an important and high 
profile study,763 which refers to a conflict as the application of two different rules or 
sets of rules to the same subject matter, which point in different directions.764 It 
elaborates that rules would point in different directions where a party to two treaties 
complies with one but not the other, or more loosely, the goals of one treaty may be 
frustrated by the fulfilment of the other.765 A genuine norm conflict between IHRL 
and IHL would exist whenever such a conflict cannot be avoided or resolved by 
interpretive means.766  
The complementarity approach, while able to resolve some normative conflicts 
through complementary interpretation, fails to acknowledge that genuine conflicts 
between IHRL and IHL norms may occur.767 Therefore, a fundamental weakness of 
the complementarity approach is that it assumes that conflicts are always reconcilable 																																																								
760 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission’ 
(2006) A/CN.4/L.682, at [8, 14, 486];Marko Milanovic , ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective on the 
Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (2010) 14(3) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 459, 481-482; Scobbie, ‘Principle’ (n15), 456 
761 Ibid, at [2.84] 
762 ILC, ‘Fragmentation’, (n760) at [8, 14, 486]; Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict’ (n760), 481-482; 
Scobbie, ‘Principle’ (n15), 456 
763 Anthony E Cassimatis, ‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and 
Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 56(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 623, 
624, hereinafter ILC study 
764 ILC, ‘Fragmentation‘ (n760), at [23] 
765 Ibid, at [24] 
766 Ibid, at [36, 42]; Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict’ (n760), 465-466 
767 Ibid, at [42]; Droege, ‘The Interplay’ (n15), 340, 344 
	 	
	 179	
through complementary interpretation, and it does not offer a tool for determining 
which body of law applies when they are irreconcilable.768 While there are rules of 
IHRL and IHL that are complementary in respect of the issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks against education, the case studies also demonstrate that there are rules of 
IHRL and IHL that genuinely conflict, and that cannot be resolved through 
interpretation. 
It is essential, however, that IHRL and IHL are interpreted in light of each other. 
This brings to light situations where there are genuine conflicts, which may lead to the 
adoption of new rules to eliminate this genuine conflict. Conversely, failing to 
interpret the regimes in light of each other may result in greater fragmentation. The 
notion of fragmentation reflects the fact that international law has become the field of 
operation for specialist systems whose specialised law-making and institution-
building tends to takes place with relative ignorance of adjoining fields of 
international law, which is one of the causes of genuinely conflicting rules.769 As 
such, considering the regimes separately may result in the increased likelihood of 
avoidable genuine conflicts. Fragmentation and genuine conflicts call into question 
the coherence of international law, and coherence is important owing to its connection 
to predictability and legal security, and due to the fact that a coherent legal system 
treats legal subjects more equally.770 Due to a lack of coherence for those on the 
ground when faced with conflicting rules and no approach to resolving such conflict, 
there is an increased likelihood that one regime will be ignored over the other and 
undermined in practice, depending on whether one prefers the rule contained in IHRL 
over IHL, or vice versa. This also means that individuals will be treated differently in 
practice, in respect of those responsible for deliberate and direct attacks being held to 																																																								
768 Hathaway and others (n11), 1901-1902 
769 ILC, ‘Fragmentation‘ (n760), at [8, 14] 
770 Ibid, at [8, 14, 15, 52, 491] 
	 	
	 180	
different standards, and in respect of those individuals impacted by an attack. It is, 
therefore, important that a solution to resolving genuine conflicts between IHRL and 
IHL is found. 
The complementarity approach is only a feasible approach until the point that a 
conflict occurs that cannot be harmonised. An approach is needed that further 
determines how to regulate IHRL and IHL when a conflict cannot be avoided or 
resolved through interpretive means. Another weakness of the complementarity 
approach is that in order to achieve harmony any ‘compromise might require the 
dilution of both bodies of law’.771 As such, where norms can be harmonised, the 
complementarity approach should be utilised, but with diligence to ensure that the 
appropriate balance is struck between IHRL and IHL.  
3.3 Humanisation Approach 
The humanisation approach views IHL as a branch of IHRL and considers it 
necessary to adjust and apply IHL with a view to making it conform more closely to 
human rights standards.772 While the traditional approach to the relationship is that 
IHRL does not apply due to the primacy of IHL in armed conflicts,773 this approach, 
while acknowledging that both regimes apply, views IHRL as having primacy. This 
approach can be understood as being an elaboration of the complementarity approach, 
although requiring that all relevant rules of IHL should be interpreted in a manner that 
complements IHRL. So where IHL protects education from deliberate and direct 
attacks to a lesser extent than IHRL, IHL would be adjusted, even where it does not 
necessarily genuinely conflict with IHRL, so that it affords a stronger level of 
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protection to education. Adopting this approach would undoubtedly protect education 
to a greater extent. 
McLaughlin argues that the debate as to the degree to which IHRL should 
influence, inform and alter the interpretation of IHL is increasing in intensity.774 IHL 
is, as discussed in Chapter 2, predicated on a delicate balance between the principles 
of humanity and military necessity. The problem with the humanisation approach is, 
therefore, that focusing on humanity undermines military necessity as a basic purpose 
of IHL, which is likely lead to IHL being ignored by parties who feel that military 
considerations are being unduly underplayed. 775  A further criticism of the 
humanisation approach is that humanising IHL may also require IHRL to be watered 
down to make its application possible and practical, and this would defy the whole 
purpose of the exercise, and also would potentially compromise the values 
safeguarded by IHRL in peacetime also. 776 While a strict interpretation of the 
humanisation approach would protect IHRL by not requiring any watering down of its 
norms due to its primacy, such a strict interpretation may therefore result in the 
impossible or impracticable application of rules of IHL, and again lead to it being 
ignored in practice. As IHL provides essential protection to education in a NIAC, if 
IHL were to be ignored in practice for favouring IHRL and the principle of humanity, 
this would be catastrophic for education, and for the wider protection afforded by 
IHL.  
While the traditional approach is infeasible as it undermines the application of 
IHRL in both IAC and NIAC, the humanisation approach undermines IHL, whether or 
not the approach is interpreted strictly. This approach is therefore an unsuitable 																																																								
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method for regulating the simultaneous application of IHL and IHRL, including in the 
context of the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education in armed 
conflict. The degree to which IHRL should influence IHL, and vice versa, should be 
in accordance with the complementarity approach, although where neither regime is 
given primacy. 
3.4 Lex Specialis Derogate Legi Generali Approach 
Construing the relationship between IHRL and IHL along the lines of the specialis 
derogate legi generali approach is widely accepted, and reflects prevailing opinion.777 
It is argued to be the most persuasive and coherent approach to regulating the 
relationship between IHRL and IHL,778 and it is often cited as the best approach to 
maintaining a healthy relationship between the two separate bodies of law.779 A 
criticism, however, is that the concept is vague and ambiguous, lending itself too 
easily to legal manipulation,780 and a significant degree of needless confusion.781 As 
this is the approach most advocated for, if it is to adequately protect education from 
deliberate and direct attacks, and regulate in a NIAC more widely, there must be 
clarity as to what it means. 
There is, however, a lack of clarity surrounding the lex specialis approach and the 
role it plays at the international level, as while the ICJ has discussed the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL with reference to lex specialis, the ICJ ‘has not provided a 
transparent account’.782 As the ICJ gives little detail on the application of lex specialis 
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and does not point clearly to the relationship between IHRL and IHL,783 the decisions 
of the ICJ have resulted in many interpretations of the lex specialis approach. These 
interpretations are categorised in this chapter as: the displacement approach, the 
event-specific approach, the reverse event-specific approach, and the specificity 
approach. 784  In the absence of clear and authoritative guidance, the numerous 
interpretations cause increased confusion as to how to regulate the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, and this confusion weakens the protection of education in a 
NIAC. 
3.4.1 Displacement approach 
The ICJ first dealt with the principle of lex specialis in 1996 in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, where it was provided that the test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life ‘falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the 
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities’.785 One interpretation is that as with the ‘traditional approach’, namely that 
IHRL never applies in an armed conflict,786 IHRL is considered displaced in its 
entirety,787 though justified on the basis of the ICJ recognising the primacy of IHL 
over IHRL by designating IHL as lex specialis.788 Following this interpretation, IHRL 
would be unable to protect education from deliberate and direct attacks in a NIAC, as 
the only protection available to education would be that contained in IHL. However, 
as the ‘traditional approach’ has been superseded by the recognition that IHRL applies 
during IAC and NIAC, it is common sense that the ‘displacement approach’ is also 																																																								
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inaccurate. This interpretation also ignores that the ICJ carefully points out in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that IHRL remains applicable in an armed 
conflict,789 and that while they stated that IHL was lex specialis, this was only in the 
context of the assessment of the arbitrary deprivation of life, and did not suggest that 
human rights were abolished in conflict situations.790  
In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated that ‘in order to answer the question 
put to it’, it would have to take into consideration IHRL and, as lex specialis, IHL.791 
This is argued to reaffirm that IHL is always lex specialis,792 as it is believed that the 
ICJ’s ruling here goes further than it did in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion 
by specifically referring to the whole regime of IHL as lex specialis.793 This seems 
entirely unreasonable, when this would amount to a complete abandonment of the 
ICJ’s introductory sentences in both the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinion 
about the continuity of human rights in wartime.794 It is often argued that the law 
should not be misunderstood, as what is examined within both the Nuclear Weapons 
and the Wall Advisory Opinions is a conflict of norms, rather than a conflict of 
regimes, and as such it is inaccurate to read that IHL displaces IHRL in every 
situation.795 The preceding phrase ‘in order to answer the question put to it’ makes this 
clear, as it makes clear that the ICJ was only referring to IHL as being lex specialis in 
the context of the questions they were being asked to decide upon. Therefore, it is not 																																																								
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adequate to refer to IHL as lex specialis for all situations in a manner that would 
displace IHRL.796 As such, it is clear that the ‘displacement approach’ is an inaccurate 
interpretation of the lex specialis principle, and that IHRL continues to apply in a 
NIAC to protect education from deliberate and direct attacks.  
3.4.2 Event-specific and Reverse Event-specific Displacement Approaches 
It is argued that two principles should govern the interaction between IHRL and 
IHL: complementarity and lex specialis.797 Accordingly, alternative interpretations of 
the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinions are the ‘event-specific 
displacement approach’, and the ‘reverse event-specific displacement approach’. The 
former applies both IHRL and IHL following the complementarity approach, upon 
which it holds that IHL displaces IHRL only in the context of specific events in which 
the regimes genuinely conflict.798 IHL would always be considered lex specialis,799 so 
whenever a genuine conflict occurs between IHRL and IHL, including in the manner 
in which they both apply to education, IHL would automatically prevail over IHRL. 
It is argued by some that this is the prevailing view at present,800 and is attractive 
because of its simplicity.801 However, this simplicity comes at a cost, as it ignores the 
contextual nature of the principle of lex specialis,802 and it denies that IHRL could be 
lex specialis and better designed to regulate certain norm conflicts.803 While, the ICJ 
‘does not explain whether IHL is always the lex specialis even when [I]HRL 
provisions may be more specialized and accurate’,804 it is increasingly argued that 
																																																								
796 Murray, Guide, (n12), 3 
797 Droege, ‘Elective Affinities?’ (n12), 502 
798 Hathaway and others (n11), 1902, 1906, 1908 
799 Heintze (n11), 60 
800 Krieger (n780), 268; Oberleitner (n16), 291 
801 Hathaway and others (n11), 1906, 1908 
802 Krieger (n780), 270-271 
803 Hathaway and others (n11), 1908; Gowlland-Debbas and Gaggioli (n12), 86 
804 Quenivet N, ‘The History of the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law’ in Arnold R and Quenivet N, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
Towards a New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008), 11-12 
	 	
	 186	
IHRL can be more specific,805 especially in the case of ESCR.806 This is also more 
likely in NIAC, in light of the fact that there is less applicable treaty-based law than in 
an IAC.807 
Paust argues that the claim that IHRL does not apply during conflicts is 
unmeritorious, as is the tiresome claim that IHRL is displaced due to an alleged 
primary of the laws of war as lex specialis.808 Milanovic also claims that it can be 
dangerous to refer to IHL as lex specialis as individuals can be left without 
protection.809 As such, the realisation of rights, including the right to education, may 
be limited in an IAC or NIAC where the event-specific displacement approach is 
followed, where IHL is taken to displace IHRL in its regulation of the matter. This 
approach, therefore, undermines IHRL and the protection of education from deliberate 
and direct attacks, due to the assumption that IHL contains the special rule without 
any contextual examination to affirm this. 
Conversely, following the reverse-event specific displacement approach, where 
two rules genuinely conflict, including in the context of deliberate and direct attacks, 
IHL is to be excluded and IHRL followed. Hathaway and others argue that this 
approach is plagued by the same problems as event-specific displacement, but in 
mirror image.810 This approach, therefore, similarly fails to take into account that IHL 
may contain the more special rule, undermining the regime of IHL, and it ignores the 
contextual nature of lex specialis, limiting its usefulness as a tool to resolve genuine 
norm conflicts. Also, in both the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinions it 
was held that IHL was lex specialis, so the reverse event-specific interpretation 																																																								
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contradicts the authoritative interpretation of the ICJ. As such, it is clear that this 
approach is also not a feasible one. 
3.4.3 Specificity Approach 
Under the ‘specificity approach’ either IHRL or IHL can be lex specialis, as the 
rule that is most specific is to be applied.811 It is increasingly argued that as it should 
not be presumed that IHL is always lex specialis as the principle does not apply to the 
general relationship between IHRL and IHL, but to specific provisions and the 
specific situation to which the provision is applied only.812 Following this approach, 
where a genuine conflict occurs between IHRL and IHL in the manner in which they, 
for example, regulate the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education, 
depending on the specific rules and the way in which they apply to the specific 
context under examination, either can amount to lex specialis. 
Fortin argues that the conclusions of the ILC Study are helpful when seeking 
clarification on the scope of the lex specialis principle.813 The ILC study states that the 
relationship can, firstly, be understood to mean that ‘the specific rule should be read 
and understood within the confines or against the background of the general standard, 
typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical specification of the latter. The 
specific and the general point, as it were, in the same direction’.814 This first 
interpretation of the relationship between general and specific norms is in line with the 
complementarity approach. So where IHRL and IHL deal with deliberate and direct 
attacks against education, the rule dealing with the issue more specifically should be 
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read and understood to be an elaboration, updating or technical specification of the 
more general rule, therefore being interpreted in light of each other and harmonised.  
The ILC study goes on to acknowledge, secondly, that genuine conflicts can 
occur, stating that the lex specialis principle can be applied as a conflict-solution 
technique in cases where one specific provision and one general provision deal with 
the same subject matter, ‘are both valid and applicable, are in no express hierarchical 
relationship, and provide incompatible direction on how to deal with the same set of 
facts….instead of the (general) rule, one should apply the (specific) exception’.815 The 
ILC study added that only the second ‘is thought to involve the application of a 
genuine lex specialis…the lex specialis principle is assumed to apply if “harmonious 
interpretation” turns out to be impossible’. 816  Following this interpretation, the 
complementarity approach must be utilised as far as possible, and only where 
harmonious interpretation is impossible can lex specialis be invoked. So where IHRL 
and IHL genuinely conflict on the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education, the more specific rule should prevail. The ILC goes further to state that 
there is no formal hierarchy between sources, and therefore rules, of international 
law.817 The ILC, therefore, confirms that there is no hierarchy between IHRL and 
IHL.  
The specificity approach is criticised on the basis that it is not clear whether ‘the 
special prevails over the general, or whether it means that the former actually 
displaces the latter’. 818  However, this is not a true weakness. The ILC report 
emphasizes that the replacement of the general rule remains only partial as the 
‘general rule remains in the background providing interpretative direction to the 
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special one’.819 Further, the ICJ stated that it ‘will have take into consideration both 
these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law’,820 indicating that both need to be taken into account 
without any displacement. D’Aspremont and Tranchez argue that the ICJ engaged in a 
conciliatory interpretation of IHRL and IHL, and utilised the lex specialis, not as a 
normative conflict tool, but as a tool to elect which rules should constitute the primary 
interpretive standard.821 It is no surprise that it is increasingly argued that the special 
rule prevails over the general, but is not displaced.822  
Significantly, in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda, the ICJ 
reaffirmed that IHRL and IHL apply in armed conflicts, though refrained from 
referring to the principle of lex specialis, and instead simply concluded ‘that both 
branches of international law…would have to be taken into consideration’.823 While 
the ICJ gave no explanation as to whether the omission was deliberate and showing a 
change of approach,824 this is increasingly argued to reflect an abandonment of the lex 
specialis approach.825 Murray similarly argues that this evidences a departure from a 
strict interpretation of the lex specialis approach, and that while one body constitutes 
the primary framework, the secondary framework is not displaced, both remain 
applicable and capable of informing the legal regulation of a situation.826 It is clear, 
therefore, that the general should not be considered displaced. 
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Milanovic argues that the lex specialis principle is a tool of norm conflict 
avoidance, as there is no evidence that lex specialis is a rule of conflict resolution 
whereby States are permitted to override the express language of treaties, as a result of 
the unfounded assumption that there can only be one regime that regulates a 
situation.827 Rather, ‘all it can do is assist in the interpretation of general terms and 
standards in either IHL or IHRL by reference to more specific norms from the other 
branch…it cannot create hierarchies where there are none’.828 Milanovic goes further, 
however, and argues that the principle of lex specialis must be avoided and abandoned 
as an explanation of the relationship between IHRL and IHL, as despite all that has 
been written on the principle its meaning remains unclear and vague, it confuses more 
than it clarifies, it is unhelpful and misleading, it creates a false impression of facility 
and it is of little practical use.829 The key question then is whether the approach is a 
vague one, being unhelpful in determining how to regulate the simultaneous 
protection of education in practice within IHRL and IHL. 
While it is clear that the general regime is not displaced and that IHRL and IHL do 
not exist in a hierarchy, this key question can be answered in light of the further 
criticism that the specificity approach lacks clarity due to there being no guidelines to 
help determine whether IHRL or IHL is the lex specialis.830 Droege argues that while 
there may be controversy over which norm is the lex specialis, this should not put into 
question the principle of lex specialis.831 Hathaway and others argue that the specific 
rules in specific circumstances approach ‘is the best available approach to a complex 
problem, as it gives the widest possible ambit for complementary application of the 
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two bodies of law… while addressing the inevitable conflicts by tailoring the legal 
rule to the context in which it operates’.832 However, they acknowledge that a notable 
drawback of this approach is that it ‘lacks a consistent pre-emption rule and the 
simplicity that comes with it…it calls for a judgment to be made regarding the most 
relevant law in each instance.833 They, nonetheless argue that this ‘weakness is not as 
severe as it may at first seem’ and that ‘it is not clear that other models for resolving 
conflict between the two bodies of law serve decision makers any better’.834  
Conversely, Boothby argues that this is a fundamental limitation, as the approach 
cannot function without knowing which rule is the more specific as a starting point, 
and it is not always clear which of the two regimes is the more specialised.835 The 
‘specific rules in specific circumstances approach’ is said to be unrealistic and 
inoperable in practice as armed forces need to know what rules apply in advance, 
which would require the generation of complex and highly fact dependent matrices on 
when and how IHRL, IHL or both applies in all scenarios.836 There are currently no 
internationally agreed matrices, and if States make individual assessments they are 
likely to be contradictory, thus further eroding any notion of a common legal 
interpretation.837 As individual assessments are the only option at present, following 
the ‘specific rules in specific circumstances approach’ will likely result in different 
levels of protection for education in the context of deliberate and direct attacks, and 
for protection more widely in a NIAC, as which rule is given priority will depend on 
the judgement of the decision maker in each instance. While in some instances, such 
judgement may result in higher protection for education, it may fail to appropriately 
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consider the concept of military necessity thereby disadvantaging armed forces, or 
vice versa, putting the armed forces at a considerable advantage without appropriate 
consideration of the detriment of education. 
3.4.4 Active Hostilities/Security Operations Approach 
As a result of the above criticism of the lex specialis approach, an alternative 
approach is the comprehensive one proposed by Murray, namely that IHL should be 
applied in situations of ‘active hostilities’, and IHRL in situations more akin to 
‘security operations’, both of which apply in a NIAC.838 This is advocated for in this 
thesis as the best approach to regulating the protection of education from deliberate 
and direct attacks in NIAC within both IHRL and IHL, and for protection in a NIAC 
more widely, while appropriately balancing human and military interests. It is a better 
alternative model for resolving conflicts between IHRL and IHL. The viability of this 
approach will be tested further in the case studies of this thesis. 
In accordance with this approach, Murray proposes that in determining the 
relationship between IHRL and IHL, ‘the initial reference point is determined by the 
existence of explicit rules designed for the situation’, with the explicit rules 
constituting the ‘primary framework’, which can be either IHRL or IHL depending on 
the situation.839 The existence of explicit rules designed for the situation indicate how 
a situation should be regulated, and States’ intent in this regard.840 A strength of this 
approach is that neither regime is undermined, as either can constitute the primary 
framework where it contains the more explicit rules designed for the situation. 
In order to facilitate the practical application of the law, he further argues that the 
determination of which body of law is the primary framework containing explicit 
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Interplay’ (n15), 344; Greenwood (n12), 74 
839 Ibid (n12), at [4.24, 4.78] 
840 Ibid, at [4.26] 
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rules designed for the situations depends upon whether, as stated above, the situation 
is one of ‘active hostilities’ or of ‘security operations’, this being an appropriate 
response to the law and the reality of armed conflicts.841 Having determined that 
IHRL and IHL both contain rules that protect schools, students and educational 
personnel from deliberate and direct attacks, one must then look at the context to 
which they are applied, and where the situation is one of active hostilities IHL will 
regulate the protection of education as the primary framework, and where it is one of 
security operations, IHRL will be the primary framework. This is a simplified 
approach that would not require the existence of complex matrices, but instead an 
understanding of what is meant by the terms ‘active hostilities’ and ‘security 
operations’. 
The term ‘active hostilities’ is an obvious and self-explanatory reference to 
situations where there is active fighting in an IAC or NIAC.842 ‘Security operations’ is 
said to denote activities that are largely of the nature of law enforcement.843 Murray 
argues that in a NIAC, two situations are regulated by the ‘active hostilities’ 
framework: the use of force, firstly, in situations of high-intensity fighting involving 
sustained and concerted military operations that resemble traditional military 
operations; secondly, in situations where a State does not exercise effective territorial 
control sufficient to conduct law enforcement operations and therefore has difficulty 
regulating primarily by means of IHRL.844 The two criteria are interrelated, as ‘where 
a State exercises a high degree of territorial control, the intensity of the fighting must 
be high in order to necessitate the application of the ‘active hostilities’ framework, 
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and vice versa.845 All other situations, including situations of low-intensity fighting, 
are to be regulated by the ‘security operations’ framework, as IHRL was specifically 
designed for such situations, and is capable of responding to emergency situations on 
the basis of either limitations or derogations.846 Murray argues that in a NIAC that 
exists just above the threshold for the applicability of Common Article 3, most of the 
activity that occurs is a form of law enforcement, while in situations ‘where normal 
life is completely disrupted and public authorities are unable to function, at least in 
respect to certain areas of the territory’, conduct will be directed towards defeating the 
enemy and will resemble traditional military operations.847 These criteria not only 
allow for the clear application of either body of law as the primary framework, it will 
also result in greater consistency in the application of IHRL and IHL in practice, to 
the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education and beyond. 
This approach is also in line with the understanding that one regime should not be 
displaced by another. Murray argues that the ‘secondary framework’ remains 
applicable and must be interpreted in the light of the ‘primary framework’, so this 
terminology does not indicate that the secondary framework is displaced, or placed 
exclusively in the background.848 He adds that the case law appears to have moved 
beyond a strict application of the principle of lex specialis in a manner that would 
displace IHRL, towards a complementary approach, where although one body of law 
may provide the primary framework in light of its appropriateness to the regulation of 
the situation, both bodies of law are applicable and capable of informing the overall 
legal framework.849 While one regime is recognised as the primary framework, the 
protection of education in a NIAC, and protection more widely, is strengthened by this 																																																								
845 Ibid, at [4.51] 
846 Ibid, at [4.41, 4.46-4.47, 4.49, 4.52, 4.53, 4.55, 4.82, 5.08] 
847 Ibid, at [4.43] 
848 Ibid, at [4.03, 4.61] 
849 Ibid, at [4.24] 
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approach, as it does not undermine the secondary regime by requiring its 
displacement. 
In determining the appropriate balance between the primary and secondary 
frameworks, Murray provides that three distinct contexts are envisaged.850 Firstly, 
IHRL and IHL may establish a complementary approach to a specific situation, 
although one may be much more detailed. This situation is straightforward, as 
although one will be the primary framework depending on whether the situation is 
closer to active hostilities or security operations, the secondary framework will likely 
play a significant role consequent to its additional specificity, though is interpreted in 
the context of the primary framework.851 Secondly, one body of law may be silent on 
an issue addressed by the other, but whether IHRL fills the gap in IHRL, and vice 
versa, should be decided on a case-by-case basis, as the gap ‘may be a deliberate 
omission, reflective of the reality of armed conflict’.852 Thirdly, one body may allow 
something that seems to be prohibited by the other.853 While there is no clearly 
established approach to resolving this third situation, Murray argues that the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion provides that the rules most closely designed for the 
situation should provide the primary framework and the influence of the primary 
framework will be significant, though while the secondary is interpreted in the context 
of the primary framework, both remain applicable, and the secondary can contribute 
to, and inform, the understanding of the overall legal situation.854  
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One problem ‘revolves around the relationship between customary international 
law and other “sources” of international law’. 855  There may be difficulty in 
reconciling treaty obligations and customary international law where they regulate the 
same matter in a manner that genuinely conflict. 856  However, the active 
hostilities/security operations approach provides clarification on this matter. While the 
existence of explicit rules should be determined primarily by reference to treaty law, 
custom must also be taken into consideration.857 In the absence of explicit law of IHL 
designed for NIAC, the influence of IHRL is argued to be greater,858 yet the rules of 
IAC relating to the conduct of hostilities applicable in an NIAC as a matter of 
customary law are more closely designed for that specific situation and so provide the 
primary framework.859 However, not only may there be difficulty in determining 
whether a rule has attained the status of customary international law,860 while a 
considerable body of customary international law may be applicable in the absence of 
treaty-based law in NIAC, there is also some uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
certain rules of IAC are applicable to NIAC.861  
Murray argues that while the absence of explicit rules designed for the situation 
causes difficulty in determining which body of law provides the primary framework in 
NIAC, in circumstances where the applicability of certain rules is unclear, the ‘active 
hostilities’ framework is applied where it constitutes the more appropriate body of 
law, namely ‘situations that are closer to the situations that the law of armed conflict 
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was primarily designed to regulate than those that international human rights law was 
designed to regulate’.862 So, for example, in a NIAC, IHL would provide the primary 
framework, even if based on customary law, in respect of deliberate and direct attacks 
against students or teachers, or educational institutions where the rules invoked relate 
to the conduct of hostilities. IHRL should play a greater role though as the secondary 
framework, particularly, where there is debate as to whether a rule of IAC applies to a 
NIAC as a matter of customary law. 
3.5 Unified Approach 
While the applicable rules can currently be discerned and identified, this is a 
complex task,863 as such, a final approach is the ‘unified approach’. Under the unified 
approach, a unified body of law would be created incorporating the relevant 
provisions of both IHRL and IHL in a complementary, conflict free manner.864 This 
may be possible due to the ‘considerable convergence’ between the two regimes in 
recent times.865 Odello argues that ‘a possibility of convergence…is envisaged to 
achieve a better protection for the victims of violence…this development would be of 
course welcome, as it would give a clearer understanding of the legal obligations for 
all actors involved’.866 A unified approach may therefore be capable of achieving 
better protection for students, educational personnel, and educational institutions in a 
NIAC in the future. 
Significant in this respect is that a key recommendation of Protecting Children is 
that consideration be given to collecting, in one international instrument, the 																																																								
862 Ibid, at [4.26, 4.31, 4.45, 4.78] 
863 Ibid, at [1.8.1, 2.88, 3.52.1] 
864 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd ed, Pearson Education Limited 2010), 765; 
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protections applicable to children in armed conflict within IHRL and IHL.867 It 
proposes further that the instrument could be an Optional Protocol to the CRC, which 
would enable the deployment of the CRC Committee as the monitoring and 
adjudicative body, functions which it already has.868 The CRC Committee would 
likely need greater funding and additional members with expertise in IHL, however, 
this is said to be preferable to setting up and financing a wholly new institution.869 It is 
further proposed that the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict 
could have a broadened mandate that would enable them to assist the CRC 
Committee.870 However, the instrument proposed in Protecting Children would only 
potentially increase the level of protection for children. While a consolidated 
instrument specific to children could be adopted, it is also important to attempt to 
consolidate the law applicable to adults. This could be in the form of two instruments, 
where States can agree to greater and specific protection for children in the instrument 
specific to children, being careful that these two instruments do not create greater 
fragmentation within international law, or the additional protections for children could 
be incorporated into a single instrument. Two instruments are likely to be preferable. 
As the CRC evidences, being almost universally ratified, there is an increased 
likelihood of States accepting a greater level of protection for children, so if additional 
protections for children were to be incorporated into a more controversial instrument 
that also protects adults, the additional protections might be lost due to a reluctance on 
the part of States to ratify it. 
It is argued in Protecting Children that the lack of clarity as to the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, and the lack of clarity in relation to customary international 
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law, contribute to the conclusion that it is desirable to simplify the law and make it 
easier to identify by collecting together presently scattered treaty provisions, and by 
codifying existing customary international law.871 Given the lack of treaty-based rules 
of IHL applicable in a NIAC, and given the unclear customary status of some rules of 
IAC in a NIAC, codifying customary international law may significantly increase the 
protection of education in a NIAC, and increase protection more generally in a NIAC, 
for both adults and children. As the law currently stands, those responsible for 
determining what law applies may interpret IHL strictly and find that a rule is 
inapplicable in a NIAC as a matter of customary when it is indeed a customary rule.  
One singular instrument is also argued to have the benefit of ensuring that as many 
people as possible, including States, NSAG, victims, and NGOs, are able to identify 
and understand the applicable legal framework, making it easier to secure compliance 
and enhance accountability, both domestically and internationally. 872  A clearer 
knowledge of the law by all concerned may therefore prevent deliberate and direct 
attacks against education, or ensure those responsible for such attacks are held to 
account. A single instrument could also clarify the law by defining or identifying 
more precisely certain concepts, or the scope of substantive protections, that are vague 
or unclear,873 and it would provide an opportunity to develop the law.874 Such 
clarification and development is especially important in a NIAC, which is 
significantly underdeveloped compared to the law applicable in an IAC, and would be 
helpful in the context of the protection of both children and adults, including in the 
context of education.  
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However, despite some convergence so far, significant differences between the 
two regimes remain. 875  As such, Droege argues that a complete merging is 
impossible.876 Similarly, it is accepted in Protecting Children that consolidation may 
not be possible in relation to all relevant norms.877 Moreover, a complete merger is 
also argued to be neither desirable nor practicable, as this risks lowering the standard 
of protection that currently exists, particularly in situations of NIAC.878 Both IHRL 
and IHL have unique advantages in particular circumstances, so care must be taken 
not to lose these advantages in the search for smoother co-application.879 In response 
to the criticism that whilst political reality may mean that some seek to dilute or 
diminish protections, Protecting Children counters that this risk, as part of the effort to 
improve the law, must be weighed up against preserving the status quo, and that the 
virtues of greater clarity, coherence, compliance and enforcement considerably 
outweigh those of potential dilution.880 Fear of diluting the law should not prevent 
efforts to improve it. An attempt to consolidate and improve the law may prove futile 
and come to nothing, or may be less exhaustive than anticipated, however, doing 
nothing is not a sustainable stance. 
While a complete merger might not be possible, desirable or practical, a solution 
may be to merge IHRL and IHL at least where they are complementary. IHRL and 
IHL could also be merged as far as possible in respect of rules that genuinely conflict 
where agreement can be reached as to how a situation should be handled. Where 
agreement can be reached but it unreasonably results in the lowering of current 
standards of protection, this new rule should not be incorporated into the new body of 																																																								
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law, and the current rules should continue to dictate how to regulate this situation. 
This would make the law substantially clearer and easier to apply in practice in 
situations of both IAC and NIAC, especially if it is possible to eradicate numerous 
genuine conflicts that currently exist, while ensuring that important protections are not 
lost unjustifiably. Where consolidation was not possible, those tasked with 
determining how IHRL and IHL regulate a situation should continue to utilise the 
‘active hostilities/security operations’ approach.  
It is also important that IHRL and IHL are construed in a manner that does not 
undermine their integrity.881 As to the complexity of consolidating IHRL and IHL, it 
is argued that these are not insurmountable legal obstacles, as evidenced by the CRC 
and the OPCRC, single international instruments that address both IHRL and IHL.882 
Consolidation will, however, need to be done with considerable care. If the two 
regimes were to be consolidated in way that does not delicately balance the needs of 
both IHRL and IHL, then the risk is that the unified body of law is not complied with 
in practice, ultimately having the opposite effect intended, namely a lowering of 
protection for education in the context of deliberate and direct attacks, and for 
protection more widely. 
3.6 Conclusion 
There is currently a lack of clarity as to how to regulate the simultaneous 
application of IHRL and IHL, as a result of many conflicting interpretations as to their 
relationship. The ‘active hostilities/security operations’ approach is advanced as the 
best approach to regulate the relationship between IHRL and IHL in practice. It is also 
suggested that the unified approach, and while not a feasible approach presently, this 
is certainly a possibility in the future, and is one that should be pursued. 																																																								
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Chapter 4 - Case studies: Deliberate and Direct Attacks Against Education in 
Colombia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the simultaneous application of IHRL and 
IHL to the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education in the context of real 
life scenarios, namely, in Colombia and the DRC. This is done in order to examine the 
adequacy of the protection of education when the context, intricacies and nuances of a 
NIAC are taken into account, giving a more realistic analysis of whether IHRL 
effectively provides for the right to education and whether IHL adequately protects 
education. 
I analyse whether violations of IHRL and breaches of IHL have occurred in 
Colombia and the DRC in respect of deliberate and direct attacks against education. 
Chapter Three of this thesis argued that while IHRL and IHL can complement each 
other when they are applied simultaneously, genuine norm conflicts can exist, though 
at present, there is no authoritative approach to regulating the relationship between the 
two regimes when such conflicts arise. The analysis of violations and breaches is 
necessary, as it allows the examination of whether IHRL and IHL coexist in a 
complementary, or more importantly, a contradictory manner, in their simultaneous 
application to the same conduct in respect of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education. Without a clear approach to regulating the relationship between IHRL and 
IHL, the legal uncertainty created by genuine norm conflicts causes a risk of the norm 
offering a lower standard of protection being incorrectly given precedence in practice, 
with the norm offering the higher level of protection considered to be displaced. The 
examination of violations and breaches of IHRL and IHL respectively also permits the 
testing of the argument that the ‘active hostilities/security operations’ approach is the 
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best approach to regulating the relationship of the two regimes in practice. Chapters 
One and Two highlighted various gaps and ambiguities in the provision for education 
within both IHRL and IHL as individual regimes. The examination of gaps in existing 
regulation should be identified so that new norms can be created to fill those gaps.883 
As such, this chapter also identifies whether gaps remain and whether there is a need 
for additional regulation.  
The chapter starts by setting out the research methodology for the case studies. I 
then provide an outline of the conflicts in Colombia and the DRC, with a view to 
determining the existence of an IAC or NIAC in the territory of these States between 
2009 and 2016, and provide a comparative analysis as to the conflicts in both 
States.884 Next, I look in turn at the simultaneous application of IHRL and IHL to the 
issues of attacks against schools and universities, the military use of schools, attacks 
against students and educational personnel, and the recruitment of children in 
Colombia and the DRC. 
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1. The Sample 
Significant patterns of deliberate use of force and threats against schools, 
universities, teachers and students were reported in 30 States in ‘Education under 
Attack: 2014’, with there being widespread military use of educational buildings in 24 
of these 30 States, and the military recruitment and use of children in schools or along 
school routes in six of these 24 States, namely Colombia, the DRC, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Thailand and Yemen.885 In Education Under Attack: 2018, it is reported that between 
2013 and 2017 at least 20 attacks on education occurred and the military recruitment 
of children transpired in these 6 States. However, the military use of educational 																																																								
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institutions was reported in only 5, to the exclusion of Thailand.886  Therefore, 
Colombia, the DRC, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen were the starting point from which 
to choose my case studies. 
It would not have been feasible in terms of time and word limit constraints to 
examine more than two case studies. I chose to examine Colombia and the DRC. 
Colombia, the DRC and Yemen have shown a stronger commitment to realising the 
right to education during situations of NIAC, by ratifying all of the relevant IHRL and 
IHL instruments. While all five States have ratified the ICESCR, only Colombia, the 
DRC, and Yemen have ratified the OPCRC. Similarly, all five States have ratified the 
four Geneva Conventions,887 which is unsurprising in light of the fact that they have 
been universally ratified. However, only Colombia, the DRC and Yemen have ratified 
Additional Protocol II.888 The OPCRC and Additional Protocol II are key instruments 
for the realisation of the right to education in the context of deliberate and direct 
attacks during a NIAC, and as such, Pakistan and Somalia should ratify these 
instruments as a matter of urgency.  
The failure of Pakistan and Somalia to ratify these key international instruments 
means that important protections may be lost. Child soldiers will only be afforded the 																																																								
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lower level of protection within the CRC and IHL. Also, NIAC will only be regulated 
by Common Article 3 and customary international law. The Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict could, as argued by Protecting Children, assist in 
securing greater ratification by Pakistan and Somalia, as well as wider ratification by 
other States.889 While customary law may fill in the gaps in protection where the 
OPCRC and Additional Protocol II have not been ratified, determining whether a rule 
is of customary status can be difficult. This is a particular difficulty in the context of 
customary IHRL, as while the existence of the ICRC study clarifies customary IHL, 
no equivalent comprehensive study on what aspects of IHRL constitute customary law 
exists. While the ICRC study has been subject to criticism, it is well accepted that it 
constitutes an excellent starting point for determining what rules of IAC apply to 
NIAC as a matter of customary law. The possible application of these customary rules 
to NIAC is significant because there is more treaty law, containing more detail, for an 
IAC, while for a NIAC, there is some treaty law, with less detail. 
While Yemen has ratified all of the relevant international instruments, the issue of 
attacks against education is more longstanding in Colombia and the DRC. UNESCO 
previously published ‘Education under Attack’ in 2007 and 2010, and in these two 
earlier reports, Colombia and the DRC were identified as countries in which attacks 
against education occurred, but Yemen was not.890 Given the long-lasting nature of 
the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against education in Colombia and the DRC, 
they were chosen as my case studies. 
The reasoning behind analysing the States that have shown a stronger commitment 
to IHRL and IHL is two-fold. Firstly, it allows the examination of whether those 
States showing a firmer commitment to the realisation of the right to education in 																																																								
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theory are taking their obligations seriously in practice. Secondly, as the key purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of the simultaneous application of IHRL 
and IHL, examining how the regimes apply when all the relevant instruments can be 
taken into account gives a fuller picture of the effectiveness of the law. It is clearly 
important to also analyse the effectiveness of IHRL and IHL during situations of both 
IAC and NIAC, and in those countries where ratification of international instruments 
is less committed. Where the rules of an IAC are to be applied instead of those of a 
NIAC, or where fewer instruments apply, this will impact the assessment of the 
effectiveness of IHRL and IHL in providing for education, and there is scope for 
further research into what this impact would be.  
4.2.2. Analysing Documented Direct and Deliberate Attacks against Education 
This thesis is original as I have undertaken an analysis of existing data on 
deliberate and direct attacks against education during a NIAC, in order to apply the 
legal framework of simultaneously applicable IHRL and IHL to such attacks, which 
has not been done before. I examined documented direct and deliberate attacks against 
education in order to develop insights on patterns and trends in such attacks in 
Colombia and the DRC respectively, and to determine violations of IHRL and 
breaches of IHL in respect of specific incidents.  
The data analysed was quantitative and qualitative in nature. Quantitative methods 
involve statistics, counting and measuring. 891  Some of the data examined was 
quantitative in the sense that the data reported on the amount of attacks in a given time 
frame, and was therefore general, numerical and quantitative. Some of the numerical 
data reported on the number of attacks over a few years, and some reported on attacks 
on a yearly basis. These yearly and multiple year figures often do not correlate 
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exactly, but both are included in the tables below to provide for a fuller and more 
accurate picture of patterns and trends in deliberate and direct attacks. The different 
figures in the yearly and multiple year reports are likely due to the manner in which 
attacks were reported to the various bodies documenting such attacks. A limitation of 
the quantitative data on attacks against education was that the information available 
was often vague. Where such data was vague, this is acknowledged.  
Qualitative methods are descriptive and inferential in character, and the focus is 
primarily on the kind of evidence that will enable you to understand the meaning of 
what is going on.892 Other data documented specific incidents of attacks against 
education and was descriptive and qualitative. While it was important to examine 
quantitative data in order to determine patterns and trends in attacks, adopting a purely 
quantitative approach was unsuitable, as it was the specific detail within the 
qualitative data that was key to the identification of violations of IHRL and breaches 
of IHL. It was not possible to apply IHRL and IHL to each documented attack against 
education, as such, only selected incidents are analysed. A limitation of the qualitative 
data was also that it was often vague, though less so than the quantitative data. Where 
necessary, namely where the information required was simply not available, the law 
has been applied to the chosen specific incidents hypothetically.  
I adopted a longitudinal study methodology, as the data examined related to 
attacks between 2009 to 2016. A benefit of a longitudinal methodology is that 
examining data over a longer period of time may enable a cumulative view of data 
drawn from different contexts, and therefore one is able to determine the true state of 
affairs.893 A longitudinal analysis of documented attacks against education not only 
demonstrates the fact that attacks on education within Colombia and the DRC are long 																																																								
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standing issues in need of addressing, it also enabled the adequate identification of 
patterns and trends in attacks. While incidents of attacks against education in 
Colombia and the DRC are documented from the late 1990’s onwards and the issue is 
clearly longstanding, it was not practical or necessary to have examined attacks 
against education for such an extended period of time. The ‘Education Under Attack: 
2014’ report was the starting point for choosing my case studies, and the report 
documents attacks against education between 2009 and 2013, as such, it is logical to 
similarly examine attacks from 2009 onwards. There was also a sufficient amount of 
information available to enable me to carry out an analysis of documented attacks 
between 2009 and 2016. Examining attacks until the end of 2016 highlights that 
attacks against education in both Colombia and the DRC remain recent issues, and 
illustrates the importance of this research.  
A wide range of sources document attacks against education, including UN 
reports, reports of NGO’s, and reports of attacks within the media. The use of a wide 
variety of sources facilitates the validation of data through triangulation.894 The term 
‘triangulation’ can be understood to mean that multiple sources that explore the same 
phenomenon are utilised.895 Triangulation allows one to examine how people with 
different roles describe the same event.896 A benefit of triangulating data is that 
concerns about validity and bias are minimised, as chances of making errors or 
drawing the wrong conclusions are less likely.897 As such, as far as possible, attacks 
are validated through triangulation. A weakness of the methodology is that it was not 
possible to directly examine sources written in Spanish and French, the national 
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languages of Colombia and the DRC respectively. However, Education Under Attack 
2014 and 2018 comprehensively examine the occurrence of attacks in Colombia and 
the DRC, and these reports include information from sources in these languages, so 
this weakness is mitigated. 
Having set out the trends and patterns in attacks, I apply IHRL and IHL to specific 
incidents of attacks, adopting the ‘violations approach’ to examine whether there were 
IHRL violations and breaches of IHL in Colombia and the DRC. Chapman, who 
argued that if effective and systematic monitoring of ESCR is to work then we need to 
work to identify and rectify violations, developed the ‘violations approach’. 898 
Likewise, if effective and systematic monitoring of IHL is to work, then we also need 
to identify and rectify breaches. Cahill-Ripley states that the violations approach is 
useful as it reflects the reality of the enjoyment of a right in practice.899 This chapter 
assesses the reality of the enjoyment of the right to education in practice, and also the 
reality of enjoying the protection afforded to education within IHL.  
Measuring progressive realisation ‘involves the gathering of data which is often 
not available, is complex to assess and is often inexact’.900 Progressive realisation also 
requires long-term measurement over a considerable period of time, and this is ‘not 
suitable for a small-scale individual research project with time and financial 
constraints’.901 As such, it is not possible to conclusively determine whether violations 
of progressively realisable elements of the right to education occurred in the context 
of this small-scale individual research project. As this chapter does not seek to 
determine violations of progressive elements of the right to education, it is not 
necessary to analyse the steps taken by Colombia and the DRC to realise those 
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progressive elements, such as the adoption of legislation. Conversely, violations of 
immediate obligations can be measured without the need to examine missing, 
incomplete or complex data as to a State’s available resources and as to the steps 
taken by the State to realise the right to education. As such, I determine violations of 
immediate obligations of the right to education in accordance with the violations 
approach. Similarly, considerations as to available resources are not relevant to 
assessing measuring breaches of IHL, so such determinations can be more 
conclusively made.  
4.2.3. A Comparative Approach 
A final point to make on methodology is that I have adopted a comparative 
approach. According to Coomans et al, there are three general comparative methods; 
global comparisons, few country comparisons and single case comparisons.902 Clearly 
a global comparison is not possible, as examining the thirty States in which attacks 
against education have occurred is beyond the scope and resources of this thesis. The 
focus of a few country comparison approach tends to be on the similarities and 
differences among cases, and makes generalisations that are less broad. The few 
countries approach suffers from two major methodological weaknesses; firstly, such 
studies may identify a large number of explanatory variables, which may make it 
difficult to determine the relationship between these variables and the outcome. 
Secondly, the intentional selection of cases rather than a random selection can 
undermine the inferences that can be drawn due to bias.903 The single country 
approach tends to focus on a country with particularly problematic human rights 
records and provide the richness of contextual description and analysis. However, it is 
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difficult to make inferences wider than the context of the individual case.904 Despite 
the weaknesses of a few country comparison, this approach was most suitable as it 
allows a comparison and thus wider inferences than a single country approach. In this 
respect, I have adopted a ‘few country comparison approach’. 
 It is, therefore, possible to generalise from case study research.905 It is in terms of 
generalisability that the case study approach is most vulnerable. However, although 
each case is in some respects unique, it is a specific example of a broader class of 
things, and the breadth of generalisability depends on how far the case study in 
question is similar to others of its type.906 As the contexts of the conflicts are unique in 
Colombia and the DRC, selecting these two case studies is beneficial as the findings 
of the case studies are generalisable to a greater extent, as the same gaps and 
inconsistencies in IHRL and IHL can be identified when applied to both conflict 
settings. Considering that direct and deliberate attacks against education are a global 
phenomenon, it is important that wider inferences can be drawn from the 
recommendations contained within this thesis.  
4.3. Colombia 
4.3.1. The Context 
In 2009, in the case of Gian Carlo Guttierrez Suarez, the Colombian Supreme 
Court held that a NIAC existed in its territory.907 Additionally, the government of 
Colombia recognised the existence of a NIAC in Colombia with the enactment in June 
2011 of the Victims and Land Restitution Law.908 Various UN bodies also refer to an 
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armed conflict in Colombia between 2009 and 2016.909 It is, therefore authoritatively 
confirmed that a NIAC existed between 2009 and 2016, due to the fact that hostilities 
were between Colombia and NSAG operating within the territory of Colombia. 
The NIAC is a particularly protracted one. The 1960’s saw the emergence of the 
two main leftist NSAG:910 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército 
del Pueblo, 911  and Ejército de Liberación Nacional. 912  FARC-EP and ELN 
represented the poor in rural areas of the country, and sought to overthrow the 
Colombian government and end perceived social inequality.913 This evidences the 
argument that social inequality can cause the outbreak of conflict, including social 
inequality in the context of education.914 The threat posed by FARC-EP and ELN led 
to the adoption of Law 48 in 1968, authorising the State to create civilian patrols to 
repel guerilla activities, and authorising the Ministry of Defence to provide them with 
																																																								
909 UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ‘Countries Where Children are Affected by 
Armed Conflict’ <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries-caac/> accessed 13 April 2018. 
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weapons normally reserved for the military.915 Paramilitary groups began to emerge in 
the 1980’s to provide private protection to individuals from NSAG such as FARC-EP 
and ELN, and citizens armed as a result of Law 48 were involved in such paramilitary 
activity. This led to most of Law 48 being revoked by 1989, and self-defence groups 
were made illegal.916 However, scattered paramilitary groups consolidated in 1997 to 
form the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia.917 The AUC were demobilised between 
2003 and 2006, however, former paramilitaries who reneged on this deal went on to 
form new NSAG, including Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, Los Paisas, and las Águilas 
Negras. These groups are considered to be the third generation of paramilitary groups, 
the initial objective of which was the maintenance of control over areas where the 
AUC formerly operated.918 This highlights that one danger of arming civilians for 
self-defence purposes is that armed civilians can form NSAG, and cause a conflict or 
increase tensions. 
Colombia ratified the relevant IHRL and IHL instruments prior to 2009, and no 
relevant reservations, derogations or limitations were made. Therefore Colombia, as 
the primary IHRL obligations holder, was bound fully by IHRL between 2009 and 
2016. The applicable rules of IHL in a NIAC, however, depend on whether the 
thresholds for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II are reached.919 As discussed in Chapter 2, it is harder to determine when a NIAC 
has commenced than an IAC, as while an IAC simply requires armed force between 
States,920 Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II have different thresholds, 																																																								
915 Szesnat and Bird (n910), 205 
916 Ibid,  206-207 
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which are both nonetheless higher than that for an IAC. There is a lack of a precise 
definition of NIAC within Common Article 3,921 however, the customary definition of 
the ICTY in the case of Tadic gives guidance on its applicability.922 The ICTY 
provided that a NIAC exists whenever there is ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within 
a state’.923 In Ramush Haradinaj,924 the ICTY also clarified that the phrase ‘protracted 
armed violence’ refers to the intensity rather than duration of the violence.925 While 
these decisions provides substantial clarification, it may, however, be difficult to 
ascertain whether the violence in question is of sufficient intensity, and whether a 
NSAG has adequate levels of organisation. 926 However, determining whether 
Additional Protocol II applies is more difficult. Additional Protocol II has a higher 
threshold, requiring that parties to a NIAC also exercise control over part of territory 
as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.927 As such, 
it is often more difficult to determine whether Additional Protocol II applies. The case 
of Colombia evidences the difficulty in determining the applicability of these 
provisions, though this is largely due to the unavailability of information. 
Significantly, in 2009, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that both Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II were applicable, 928  which makes the 
determination slightly easier. The UN stated that in 2010, clashes intensified between 
the government, FARC-EP and ELN,929 and the armed conflict continued in 2011 and 
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2012.930 In light of the intensification of armed conflict in 2010, and its continuation 
between 2011 and 2012 it is likely that both Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II remained applicable. Of relevance in this respect is that Szesnat and Bird 
argue that the period from the mid-1990’s until the time of writing in 2012 
experienced the greatest intensity in fighting,931 and that during this period the 
hostilities between Colombia and FARC-EP constituted a NIAC within Common 
Article 3 that also reached the threshold for the application of Additional Protocol 
II.932 Between 2009 until at least 2012, FARC-EP retained the capability to conduct 
large operations, was estimated to have 6000-12,000 fighters forming 110 operational 
units, and control of around 15 to 20 per cent of territory. On the other hand, ELN had 
a command structure consisting of a 15-member high command, around 2200 to 3000 
members, with several units trained in special operations as well as the manufacture of 
explosives.933 As such, during this period FARC-EP and ELN satisfied the criteria of 
Common Article 3, due to both the duration and the intensity of the fighting between 
governmental authorities, and the organisation of the groups. It is also clear that 
during this period FARC-EP satisfied the additional criteria of Additional Protocol II, 
as it had had a responsible command structure that enabled sustained and concerted 
military operations and it had control over part of territory. Szesnat and Bird argue, 
however, that from the late 1990’s until 2012, only a Common Article 3 NIAC existed 
between ELN and Colombia, as a result of fewer attacks and fighters.934 However, 
they had a command structure and 2200 to 3000 members, which is a substantial 
number, so it appears that the requirements of organisation and intensity were met. 
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Yet, it is also less clear from the available information whether ELN controlled 
territory. On the facts, it appears that they did not.  
Following the signing of the ‘General Agreement for the end of the conflict and 
the construction of a stable and lasting peace’ in Havana on 26 August 2012,935 peace 
talks were initiated on 18 October 2012 between the Government and FARC-EP.936 
As a consequence, the UN reported that the period of September 2011 and June 2016 
was marked by an overall decrease in the number of armed actions and attacks against 
civilians.937 However, despite this, and despite on-going talks between FARC-EP and 
the Government of Colombia in 2013, hostilities between FARC-EP, ELN and the 
Colombian army continued and also intensified in multiple parts of the country.938 In 
2014, peace talks between the government and FARC-EP continued, and in December 
they started talks about de-escalating the conflict. However, hostilities between 
FARC-EP, ELN, and the Colombian Armed Forces continued and again intensified in 
some parts of the country.939 In light of the fact that, despite a general decrease in 
hostilities, there were also parts of the country, which experienced the increased 
tensions, it appears that between 2012 and 2015, that Common Article 3 applied to the 
hostilities between Colombia and FARC-EP and ELN, while in respect of FARC-EP, 
Additional Protocol II continued to apply. 
However, in 2015, substantial progress was made in the peace talks and armed 
violence between FARC-EP and government forces reached its lowest level in 50 
years following a unilateral ceasefire in July. However, activities by ELN and other 
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armed groups continued.940 In March 2016, the Government of Colombia and ELN 
announced an agreement to commence peace talks.941 Also, peace talks between the 
government and FARC-EP continued in 2016, and the year was marked by the signing 
of a final peace agreement between the Government and FARC-EP on 26th 
September. However, despite the withdrawal of FARC-EP and a decline in conflict 
intensity and with armed violence between the Colombian military and FARC-EP 
again reaching its lowest level in 50 years, ‘the presence of NSAG, such as ELN and 
post-demobilization groups, as well as FARC-EP dissident fronts, continued to pose 
child protection challenges’.942 While hostilities continued, it is clear, in light of the 
significant de-escalation in the intensity of the conflict, that only Common Article 3 
was applicable between 2015 and 2016 between Colombia, FARC-EP dissidents and 
ELN.  
More complicated still is the question of whether post-demobilisation NSAG 
satisfies the thresholds of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Szesnat and 
Bird add that any hostilities between Colombia and post-demobilisation NSAG 
amounting to an armed conflict between 2009 and 2012 would qualify as a Common 
Article 3 conflict, unless it can be shown that these groups met the criteria of 
Additional Protocol II.943 However, due to the lack of specific information as to the 
makeup of each of these groups, it is difficult to determine whether hostilities between 
them and Colombia are regulated by Common Article 3, let alone Additional Protocol 
II. More information is required to make an accurate assessment on this matter, as 
such no assessment is proposed here. This is, however, unnecessary, as the specific 																																																								
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incidents analysed relate to the activity of the State, FARC-EP or ELN. A brief 
discussion of such groups was, however provided here, to provide a fuller picture of 
the conflict and to highlight the dangers of armed civilians in the name of self-
defence. 
 
Fig. 1 Table showing the relevant NSAG party to the NIAC in Colombia and the 
years in which they were active between 2009 and 2006 
 
NSAG active in the NIAC Years active between 2009 and 2016 
FARC-EP 2009 - 2016 
ELN 2009 - 2016 
Post-demobilisation groups 2009 - 2016 
 
4.3.2. Attacks against Educational Institutions in Colombia  
 
Fig. 2 Table showing the number of, and description of, schools damaged or destroyed 
in Colombia as a result of explosive ordnance between 2009 and 2016  
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attacks 
2009 – 2012 10944 Schools were damaged or destroyed by 
explosives, explosive remnants of war, 
and landmines in or near schools. 
 
2013 – 2017  31945 Schools were damaged or destroyed by 
explosives, explosive remnants of war, 
and landmines in or near schools. 
 
2009 Unknown The UN reported incidents of attacks on 																																																								
944 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102), 126 









educational institutions each year in 
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 individually. 
Schools were damaged by explosive 
ordnance, but no numerical information is 
provided as to the number of attacks each 
year individually.946 
 
2013 4947-26948 4 schools reported to be attacked in the 
first half of 2013. The UN also identified 
26 education-related incidents resulting in 
damage to schools or suspension of 
classes in the whole of 2013. It is unclear 
how many, if any, of these incidents 
relate to explosive ordnance or 
landmines, or also what the nature of 
such attacks were. The GCPEA, however, 
reported one incident involving explosive 
ordnance on a school, and one further 
incident targeting a university.949 
 
2014 12950 Schools were caught in crossfire and 
affected by anti-personnel mines and 
explosive remnants of war. It is unclear 
how many of these incidents relate to 
crossfire, which is outside the scope of 
this thesis, and how many relate to 
explosive ordnance. However, the 
GCPEA identified 3 incidents involving 
landmines being planted in or near 
schools in 2014, as well as 1 incident at a 
university.951 
 
2015 11952 Schools were damaged in crossfire and 
by landmines and explosive remnants of 
war. It is unclear how many of these 
incidents relate to crossfire, which is 
outside the scope of this thesis, and how 
many relate to explosive ordnance. 
However, the GCPEA identified 4 
individually reported incidents involving 
landmines and explosive ordnance.953 																																																								
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2016 6954 Schools were damaged during crossfire 
and as a result of landmines planted in or 
near schools. It is unclear how many of 
these incidents relate to crossfire, which 
is outside the scope of this thesis, and 
how many relate to explosive ordnance. 
The GCPEA identified one incident 
involving explosive ordnance being 




One pattern and trend can be identified in respect of deliberate and direct attacks 
against educational institutions in Colombia between 2009 and 2016. Each year there 
were incidents of landmines or explosive ordnance being planted in or near schools by 
NSAG, which often resulted in damage to educational institutions. The total number 
of incidents affecting educational institutions reported by the UN suggests the 
possibility that incidents involving landmines were more frequent between 2013 and 
2016 than 2009 and 2012, but that such attacks decreased in frequency each year 
between 2013 and 2016. However, conclusively determining this is difficult, as it is 
unclear how many of these incidents relate specifically to the deliberate planting of 
landmines and explosive ordnance. Such attacks have mainly been attributed to 
FARC-EP, but also ELN. 956  Schools were often targeted with landmines and 																																																								
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explosive ordnance because of their military use, or proximity to military bases and 
police stations, or because of their use as polling stations.957  
 
Fig. 3 Table showing the number of, and details of, incidents of the military use of 
educational institutions between 2009 and 2016 
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attacks 
2009 – 2012 75958 The ICRC recorded 75 cases of 
occupation of school facilities by all 
armed actors, including the State of 
Colombia. 
 
2013 – 2017  18959 The GCPEA reported that FARC-EP used 
at least 18 schools for weapons storage. 
ELN and other NSAG also used schools 
as bases, while ELN also stationed troops 
in front of or near schools, placing 
students at risk, though the total number 












Between 2009 and 2013, the UN reported 
incidents of military use of schools, but 
did not provide the numerical information 
for the amount of such incidents per 
year.960  
 
2014 11961 The UN reported that there were 11 cases 
of military use in 2014, at least one of 
which was committed by the armed 
forces and at least one by FARC-EP.  																																																																																																																																																															
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2015 5962 - 8963 The UN reported 5 cases of military use 
of schools, one by FARC-EP and four by 
the Colombian military. The GCPEA 
reported three incidents in 2015. It is 
unclear whether these overlap with the 5 
reported by the UN, or whether they are 3 
additional incidents.  
 
2016 3964 - 7965 The UN verified 3 cases of military use. 
The GCPEA reported two cases of 
military use by the Colombian armed 
forces, as well as two incidents by 
NSAG, one by ELN and another by a 
post-demobilisation NSAG. It is unclear 
whether these overlap with the 3 reported 
by the UN, or whether they are 4 
additional incidents. 
 
Three patterns and trends in respect of the military use of schools in Colombia 
between 2009 and 2016 can be identified. Firstly, each year schools were used for 
military purposes by the Colombian armed forces and police.966 Secondly, schools 
were used for military purposes by NSAG, with incidents mainly being attributed to 
FARC-EP, but also ELN.967 Thirdly, the military use of schools by the Colombian 
armed forces and NSAG resulted in schools being damaged and minefields being left 
																																																								
962 SGCAC 2016, at [181] 
963 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n103), 109 
964 SGCAC 2017, at [54] 
965 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n103), 109; See HRW (n999)  
966 UNHCHR Colombia 2010, at [73, Annex, 29]; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict: Concluding Observations – 
Colombia, CRC/C/OPAC/COL/CO/1, 21 June 2010, at [39] (CRC Concluding observations Colombia 
2010); SGCAC 2010, 13 April 2010, at [132]; UNHCHR Colombia 2011, at [86, Annex 19a, 19c]; 
SGCAC 2011, at [162]; UNHCHR Colombia 2012, at [79, 91]; SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [39, 43]; 
SGCAC 2012, at [134]; Watchlist (n983), 28-29; SGCAC 2013, at [177]; SGCAC 2014, at [168]; 
GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102), 106, 127; CRC Concluding Observations Colombia 
2015, at [51e]; SGCAC 2015, at [222]; SGCAC 2016, at [181]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [38]; 
SGCAC 2017, at [54]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n103), 108-109 
967 SGCAC 2011, at [163]; UNHCHR Colombia 2012, at [Appendix 1, 10e]; SGCAC Colombia 2012, 
at [39, 42]; SGCAC 2014, at [168]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102); CRC Concluding 
Observations Colombia 2015, at [51e]; SGCAC 2016, at [38]; HRW, ‘Colombia: Armed Groups 
Oppress Riverside Communities,’ Human Rights Watch news release, June 7, 2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/07/colombia-armed-groups-oppress-riverside-communities 
(Accessed 22/05/2018); GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 108-109 
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behind.968 The military use of schools appears to have been more common between 
2009 and 2013, and seems to have reduced in frequency each year between, at least, 
2014 and 2016. In addition to being used as bases from which to conduct military 
operations, NSAG also used schools for the purposes of storing weapons.969  
On 26 May 2009, FARC-EP threatened several people in the indigenous Emera 
and Katio communities in Carmen de Atrato, Chocó, informing them that a number of 
antipersonnel mines had been laid around schools.970 As the focus of this chapter is on 
the obligations of States, it is not necessary to analyse whether FARC-EP has violated 
IHRL and IHL. The situation is clearly one that relates to targeting and precautions 
against the effects of attacks, as it involves the practice of mining educational 
institutions as part of a pattern and trend on the part of FARC-EP in particular, and 
precautionary measures on the part of States. As such both the active hostilities and 
security operations approaches would be applied, requiring that IHL be considered as 
the primary framework, and IHRL as the secondary framework. IHRL would 
reinforce the obligations of IHL and provide further content and specificity.971 This is 
significant as IHRL provides a stronger level of protection in this situation. 
As the perpetrator was FARC-EP, and not the State, few provisions of IHL apply 
directly to Colombia. However, the most important provision in this context is Article 
4(3) of Additional Protocol II, assuming that the schools attacked were of primary and 
secondary level for those under the age of 15. Article 4(3) provides that in a NIAC, as 
a fundamental guarantee, children ‘shall be provided with the care and aid they 
																																																								
968 UNHCHR Colombia 2011, at [86]; SGCAC 2011, at [162]; Watchlist (n983), 28-29; SGCAC 
Colombia 2012, at [39, 42]; SGCAC 2013, at [177]; SGCAC 2014, at [168]; GCPEA, Education under 
Attack: 2014 (n12), 126-128; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [36, 38] 
969 SGCAC 2015, at [222]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [38];  
970 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, A/HRC/13/72, 4 March 2010, 28. 971	Murray, Guide, (n12), at [5.35, 5.88]	
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require’, and that in particular, they should ‘receive an education’.972 While the terms 
care and aid are not defined nor adequately particularised,973 at least in the context of 
education, it is clear that these terms require that Colombia protect a ‘fundamental 
guarantee’ to education for all children under 15. Article 77(1) of Additional Protocol 
I also explicitly provides that ‘Children shall be the object of special respect and shall 
be protected against any form of indecent assault’, though this obligation arguably 
applies to NIAC as a matter of customary law, in accordance with Rule 135 of the 
ICRC study.974 In order to protect the fundamental guarantee to education, the State 
would be required to de-mine the schools affected by the attack by FARC-EP. The 
mining of schools could be argued to be an indecent assault against children, as the 
term ‘any form’ allows for flexibility as to the meaning of indecent assault, and if 
considered to be applicable in a NIAC, better protects children from attacks that target 
them specifically. 
These provisions can also be read in light of Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, 
which, of great importance, protects all students, and not just those under the age of 
15. It is not clear from the information available whether the schools mined were for 
children aged 15 to 18, or whether they were universities. While not entirely clear on 
the facts available, it also appears as though the schools targeted were civilian objects, 
as the mines were planted as part of a wider threat to the indigenous community, and 
were not, for example, placed in the schools for storage purposes, which would make 
the schools a military objective.  
The civilian status of the school is relevant as it requires the taking of precautions 
against the effects of attacks, requiring that States ‘take the other necessary 
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 																																																								
972 Additional Protocol II, Art 4(3)(a) 
973 Protecting Children (n6)  at [3.43.7, 3.54-3.54.1, 9.12.1] 
974 ICRC Study, Rule 135 
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under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations’.975 While 
there are no equivalent provisions in Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II, 
highlighting the weakness of the treaty-based protection of education in a NIAC in 
comparison to an IAC, Rule 22 of the ICRC study provides that the requirement to 
‘take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects 
under their control against the effects of attacks’ is a rule of customary status in an 
IAC and NIAC. The phrase ‘any other necessary precautions’ provides a high level of 
protection in this regard, as it is flexible enough to regulate the situation by requiring 
that Colombia take a range of steps to protect civilian students and teacher in the 
schools targeted, such as ensuring they are not located in or near the schools and the 
mines, and to protect the schools themselves by removing the mines.  
Significant in this respect is that Article 58 also requires that States remove ‘the 
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from 
the vicinity of military objectives’, and while this obligation would be helpful in this 
context, Rule 24 of the ICRC study states that it is only arguable that rule is applicable 
in NIAC as a matter of customary IHL.976 It is clear that IAC benefit from greater 
protection in this regard, but the justification for this is not clear, as ensuring that 
civilians are removed from a school with numerous mines planted within it seems 
equally important whether an IAC or a NIAC. Interpreting this rules as failing to 
consider this an obligation in a NIAC seems counterproductive in light of the fact 
above-mentioned wider-ranging requirement to ‘take all-feasible measure’ would 
require this step to be taken. Clarification on this issue would, however, be beneficial 
for the protection of education in the context of deliberate and direct attack, while the 
development of IHL in this regard would be even better.  																																																								
975 Additional Protocol I, Art 58 
976 ICRC Study, Rules 22-24 
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These obligations should be read in light of IHRL. IHRL provides a 
complementary regulation of attacks against schools, though in a way that 
supplements and protects education to a far greater degree in the context of a NIAC. 
The setting out of a fundamental guarantee for education in Article 4(3) is in line with 
the wording of Article 13 of the ICESCR on the right to education, though the 
Covenant provides for the right to education for all and not just children and is 
therefore stronger. Article 13 of the ICESCR makes clear that each of the levels of 
education should be provided to all. This provision should be read alongside Article 
2(2), and considered in light of the fact that Afro-Colombian and indigenous children 
were particularly affected by all grave violations reported on by the UN Secretary 
General on Children and Armed Conflict, including attacks on educational 
institutions.977 So it is clear that, while there is no explicit protection for indigenous 
peoples, such individuals would be protected under the term ‘other status’, as this is 
broad and all encompassing.  
It is clear on the facts available that the practice of threatening several people from 
an indigenous community and informing them that mines were planted in schools is 
discriminatory in nature, and while it is not clear whether it was a primary, secondary, 
higher or fundamental educational institutions that were deliberately and directly 
mined, this is irrelevant. Significantly, IHRL provides for the principle of non-
discrimination in education in a strong manner, as this is clearly set out within the 
ICESCR, but also because it is a minimum core obligation that always remains 
applicable in a NIAC and is immediately realisable irrespective of available resources 
and means of the State. While the minimum core has been subject to extensive debate, 
and there have been various calls for its abandonment, it is clear that it serves a 																																																								
977 SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [6, 32]; SGCAC 2012, at [127]; SGCAC 2013, at [179]; SGCAC 2014, 
at [164]; SGCAC 2015, at [218]; SGCAC 2016, at [183]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [9] 
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fundamental purpose in the context of NIAC, even when understood, as proposed in 
this thesis, to mean that some elements of the minimum core are immediately 
realisable while others are subject to progressive realisation. A particular strength of 
this being an immediately realisable minimum core obligation is that one does not 
have to embark on a complicated assessment as to progressive realisation and whether 
the maximum of available resources and means were utilised, as this is difficult to 
determine, despite increased consensus and clarity as to the meaning of such concepts.  
This obligation is made clearer with reference to the tripartite typology and its 
relationship to the 4-A framework, and as such these concepts constitute useful tools 
for the evaluation as to whether Article 13 of the ICESCR was violated by the State. 
The State has obligations to protect and fulfil the availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability of education in this context of this attack. In respect of 
the obligation to protect the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability 
of education, while it is not clear on the facts, if the State were in a position to know 
of, and be able to prevent, the planting of the mines in the schools by FARC-EP, and 
it did nothing to do so, this would be a violation of Article 13 of the ICESCR. It 
would amount to non-compliance with the obligation to protect the availability and 
accessibility of education, where, respectively, the mines meant that there was no 
functioning educational institution available, or prevented safe access to the school for 
individuals protected by the immediately realisable principle of non-discrimination. 
Having learnt of this attack, where the State has done nothing to rectify the 
availability and accessibility of education, this would similarly amount to a violation 
of the immediate minimum core obligation to fulfil the right to education for 
indigenous peoples. Such steps to rectify the situation could include the provision of 
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an alternative building in which to conduct classes until the schools are de-mining. 
IHRL, therefore, provides a strong level of protection in the context of this attack. 
If for example, the schools were conversely used for the military purpose of 
storing mines, in light of the pattern and trend identified above in respect of using 
schools to store weapons, schools would not benefit from the above IHL protections, 
though civilian students and teachers would continue to benefit from them. As IHRL 
is the secondary framework in this context, IHL would have to be interpreted in light 
of IHRL. As such, Colombia would need to protect education from the military use 
from NSAG, to ensure that schools are available and accessible. Similarly, it would 
also need to fulfil the right to education by adapting to the situation and providing 
education through some other means. The obligation to fulfil, however, is progressive, 
so individuals may legitimately be left without an education for some time. 
4.3.3. Attacks on Students and Educational Personnel in Colombia 
 
Fig. 4 Table showing the number of, and details of, children killed or injured as a 
result of explosive ordnance between 2009 and 2016 in Colombia 
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attack 
2009 – 2011 116978 The UN reported that between January 
2009 and August 2011, according to the 
Presidential Programme for 
Comprehensive Action against Anti-
personnel Mines, 116 children were 
victims of landmines and unexploded 
ordnance. 
 
2011 – 2016  264979 The UN verified a further 117 cases of 
children killed and 147 cases of children 
injured between September 2011 and 																																																								
978 SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [32] 





2014 – 2016 10980 The GCPEA reported that between 
January 2014 and December 2016 there 
were 10 incidents involving land mines 
planted in schools or along schools 
routes, and that students were gravely 
injured in these attacks. 
 
2009 33981 The UN reported that between January 
and October 2009, anti-personnel mines 
resulted in the deaths of 9 children and 
injury of 24 children. 
 
2010 18982 The UN reported that between January 
and November 2010 2 girls and 16 boys 
were injured by landmines.  
 
2011 39983 The UN reported that at least 32 children 
had been injured and 7 killed by anti-
personnel mines and explosive remnants 
of war. 
 
2012 65984 The UN reported that at least 52 children 
were injured and 13 children killed by 
anti-personnel mines or explosive 
remnants of war. 
 
2013 165985 The UN reported that at least 43 children 
were killed and 83 maimed during attacks 
by NSAG, and that 11 children were 
killed and 28 maimed by anti-personnel 
mines or explosive remnants of war.986 
 
2014 69987 The UN reported that at least nine 
children were killed and 60 maimed. 
These were mostly landmine incidents. 
 
2015 22988 The UN verified the killing of 12 children 
and maiming of 10, mainly as a result of 
landmines. 																																																								
980 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n103), 107 
981 SGCAC 2010, at [130]  
982 SGCAC 2011, at [157] 
983 SGCAC 2012, at [131] 
984 SGCAC 2013, at [175] 
985 SGCAC 2014, at [166] 
986 Ibid, at [166] 
987 SGCAC 2015, at [221] 




2016 8989 The UN verified the killing of 6 children 
and the maiming of 2 children by 
landmines and unexploded ordnances. 
 
 
One pattern and trend is identifiable in respect of attacks against students between 
2009 and 2016 in Colombia: each year there were incidents of children being killed or 
injured as a result of landmines and explosive ordnance. Such attacks have been 
attributed mainly to FARC-EP but also ELN.990 As established above, there was a 
significant practice of targeting schools and school routes with landmines and 
explosive ordnance, and the UN reported that between September 2011 and June 2016 
‘cases of children killed or maimed by antipersonnel mines and unexploded ordnance 
near or within schools were a particular concern’.991 The numerical data above does 
not, however, make clear how many children were killed or injured as a result of the 
specific practice of planting landmines and explosive ordnance in or near schools. 
However, it is important to highlight the frequency of incidents where children were 
killed or injured by landmines and explosive ordnance, as a result of the likeliness of 
children being killed or injured due to the practice of targeting schools with such 
devices.  
While the true scale of students killed or injured as a result of landmines and 
explosive ordnance planted in or near schools within schools is unclear, such incidents 
were at least a problem between 2011 and 2016. The total number of children killed or 
injured by landmines and explosive ordnance suggests that such incidents were likely 
to have been a problem throughout the entirety of the reporting period, being a 																																																								
989 SGCAC 2017, at [52] 
990 SGCAC 2010, at [130]; SGCAC 2011, at [157]; SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [26, 33]; SGCAC 2012, 
at [131]; Watchlist (n983), 30; SGCAC 2013, at [175]; SGCAC 2014, at [166]; GCPEA, Education 
under Attack: 2014 (n102), 106, 127; SGCAC 2015, at [221]; SGCAC 2016, at [179]; SGCAC 
Colombia 2016, at [25, 27]; SGCAC 2017, at [52] 
991 SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [27-28] 
	 	
	 231	
particular problem in 2012 and 2013, and with a downward trend at least between 
2014 and 2016. The sharp decrease in 2016 has been attributed to the 2015 de-mining 
agreement between the Government and FARC-EP.992 
 
Fig. 5 Table showing the number of, and details of, teachers killed or threatened 
between 2009 and 2016 in Colombia 
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994 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102), 126, 129 
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2009 – 2011 Unknown The UN reported 
that between 




the number of 
such attacks is not 
specified.993 








2009 – 2013 140995 The GCPEA 
reported that 140 
teachers were 
killed according 
to the Colombian 
Ministry of 
Education. 






the Ministry of 
Education.997 
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of its members 
were killed. 




threats in 2012, 
and ENS 181. 
2013 51016 The UN reported 










the Ministry of 
Education. 
2014 31018 The UN reported 
that 3 teachers 
were killed. 










2015 21020 The UN reported 
that at least 2 
teachers were 
killed. 
241021 The GCPEA 
reported 
threats against 
24 teachers in 
2015. 
2016 11022 The GCPEA 
reported the 
killing of a 
teacher and vice 







Two patterns and trends are identifiable in respect of attacks against educational 
personnel between 2009 and 2016 in Colombia. Firstly, each year teachers were killed 
by NSAG. While the UN does not specify the number of deaths each year in their 
yearly reports, they confirm that such deaths occurred each year between 2010 and 
2016.1023 This confirmation strengthens the reliability of the above data. Attacks were 
attributed to FARC-EP, ELN and post demobilisation armed groups.1024 Between 
2013 and 2016, perpetrators were reported to be more often post-demobilisation 
groups, rather than FARC-EP or ELN.1025 Secondly, the use of threats by NSAG 
towards teachers and other educational personnel was particularly widespread, 
occurring every year. Threats were attributed mainly to FARC-EP and ELN, but also 
other NSAG.1026 This indicates that the killing of teachers was an issue within 
Colombia between 2009 and 2016, with a general downward trend in the number of 
teachers killed per year. The GCPEA, however, reported that it ‘was unable to include 
Ministry of Education and teachers’ union information on threats to teachers’ in 
Education Under Attack 2018, and as a result ‘comparisons with similar information 
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from the 2009-2013 period were not possible’.1027 As, it may be that such threats are 
not as well reported and that this is still a particularly problematic issue. 
Given the problematic nature of threats in conflict, the specific incident chosen to 
examine relates to this issue. In August 2011, 44 teachers in Córdoba were threatened 
by NSAG, of which at least 18 resorted to displacement for protection.1028 As the 
focus of this chapter is on the obligations of States, it is again not necessary to analyse 
whether FARC-EP has violated IHRL and IHL. In this situation, given it also relates 
to the targeting of teachers by NSAG and precautions against the effects of attack by 
States, both the active hostilities and security operations approaches would be applied. 
However, while Article 13 of Additional Protocol II explicitly prohibits threats 
towards civilians in the context of NIAC,1029 as the threats were committed by NSAG, 
it appears as though the only rule applicable is Rule 22 of the ICRC study which 
requires as a matter of customary law the State ‘take all feasible precautions to protect 
the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of 
attacks’ is a rule of customary status in an IAC and NIAC. It could be argued that 
States would be required to take all feasible precautions to protection teachers from 
threats. As such, IHRL would provide a substantial amount of protection for teachers 
subject to threats in a NIAC. This emphasises the importance of the continuity of the 
right to education during situations of conflict, as it shows that IHRL can protect 
education above and beyond IHL. The issue of threats is significant. As evidenced in 
the above example, teachers who are threatened will flea, which will in turn disrupt or 
prevent education altogether. Article 13(2)(e) clearly instructs States to continuously 
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improve the material conditions of teaching staff.1030 It is also acknowledged in 
General Comment 13 that unacceptably low levels of material conditions and teaching 
staff are major obstacles to the full realization of students' right to education’.1031 As 
such it is clear that threats against teachers forces teachers to work in conditions not 
conducive to a quality education, or flea the situation, also impacting the realisation of 
the right to education for students. However, continuously improving conditions is 
likely to be more difficult during a NIAC in the face of persistent threats, and 
conditions will likely instead deteriorate. Nonetheless, States should clearly strive, in 
accordance with the ICESCR and customary IHL, to ensure the best possible 
conditions during a NIAC in order to fully realise the right to education. In achieving 
this progressively realisable obligation, the tripartite obligation framework once again 
clarifies what is expected of States. They should not only protect the availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability of the right to education, by taking steps 
to prevent threats towards teachers.1032 Where education is prevented due a systematic 
use of threats towards them, States should take steps to fulfil the right to education to 
the maximum of their available resources.  
4.3.4. The Military Recruitment and Use of Children  
Fig. 6 Table showing the number of, and details of, children recruited and used for 
military purposes between 2009 and 2016 in Colombia 
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attack 
2009 – 2011 3431033 343 cases of the recruitment and use of 
children were verified by the UN, and 
reported recruitment campaigns were 																																																								1030	ICESCR,	Art	3(2)(e)	
1031 General Comment 13, at [27] 
1032 For the purpose of maintaining focus, other rights, such as the right to life, will not be examined. 
1033 SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [15, 19] 
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conducted in schools. 
 
2011 – 2016  15561034 The UN verified a total of 1,556 cases of 
recruitment and use of children, and 
reported a progressive annual reduction in 
verified cases. 
 
2009 2151035 The UN further reported widespread and 
systematic recruitment and use of 
children in 2009 and 2010, and schools 
were a major venue for recruitment by 
NSAG. A total of 215 children had been 
separated from NSAG. 
 
2010 3381036 The UN further reported widespread and 
systematic recruitment and use of 
children in 2009 and 2010, and schools 
were a major venue for recruitment by 
NSAG. 338 children, 114 girls and 224 
boys had been separated from NSAG. 
 
2011 3001037 The UN reported widespread and 
systematic recruitment and use of 
children by NSAG, and acknowledged 
that ‘although the actual scale and scope 
remains unknown, 300 cases of 
recruitment and use were reported’. 
2012 3001038 The UN similarly reported widespread 
and systematic recruitment and use of 
children by NSAG, again acknowledging 
that ‘although the full scale and scope 
remain unknown, around 300 cases of 
recruitment and use were reported’. 
 
2013 811039 The UN verified 81 cases of recruitment 
and use of children by NSAG. 
 
2014 3431040 In 2014, the UN verified 343 cases of 
recruitment and use of children by 
NSAG. 
 
2015 2891041 The UN verified 289 cases of child 																																																								
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recruitment and use by armed groups in 
2015. 
 
2016 2301042 the UN verified the recruitment and use 
of 151 boys and 79 girls. 
 
 
Three patterns and trends in relation to the military recruitment and use of children 
between 2009 and 2016 can be identified in Colombia. Children were recruited and 
used for military purposes by Colombia. Children were used for intelligence purposes 
by the Colombian armed forces in 2009 and 2011 and in 2015 and 2016.1043 
Significantly, between 2009 and 2011, there were incidents where children were killed 
or threatened by NSAG due to the suspicion of them being informants for the State 
armed forces.1044 Secondly, each year between 2009 and 2016, children, including 
children under the age of 15, were recruited for military purposes by NSAG, with 
some of the recruitment taking place in schools and along schools routes, and with 
attacks often being attributed to FARC-EP, but also ELN and post-demobilisation 
groups.1045 Children were used by NSAG for various reasons, including for direct 
participation in hostilities, for intelligence purposes whereby children acted as spies 																																																								
1042 SGCAC 2017, at [51] 
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CRC Concluding Observations Colombia 2015, at [65(e)]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [23]; United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of 
Colombia, CCPR/C/COL/CO/7, 17 November, 2016, at [40] (UNHRC Colombia 2016) 
1044 SGCAC 2010, at [130]; CRC Concluding observations Colombia 2010, at [19, 26, 30, 39]; SGCAC 
Colombia 2012, at [25] 
1045 SGCAC 2010, at [127-128]; UNHCHR Colombia 2010, at [44, 60-61, 69, Annex, 27, 28, 29]; 
SGCAC 2011, at [154-155]; UNHCHR Colombia 2012, at [76-77, 84-85, Appendix 1, 9c, 10e, 10j, 
13g, 13p]; SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [16-21, 23, 31]; SGCAC 2012, at [129]; Watchlist (n983), 29; 
SGCAC 2013, at [173-174]; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Working Groups on the 
Universal Periodic Review: Colombia, A/HRC/24/6, 4 July 2013, at [105] (UPR Colombia 2016); 
SGCAC 2014, at [165]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 20, 54, 106, 124, 128; 
UNHCHR Colombia 2015, at [49-50]; United Nations General Assembly Security Council, SGCAC 
2015, at [219-220]; SGCAC 2016, at [178]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [18-19, 21]; UNHRC 
Colombia 2016, at [40]; UNHCHR Colombia 2017, at [19, 99]; SGCAC 2017, at [50-51, 60]; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic 
report of Colombia, E/C.12/COL/CO/6, 19 October 2017, at [43]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 
2018 (n13), 109-110; Mónica Hurtado, Ángela Iranzo Dosdad and Sergio Gómez Hernández, ‘The 
relationship between human trafficking and child recruitment in the Colombian armed conflict’ (2018) 
39 Third World Quarterly 941, 941-942, 946, 952 
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and informants, to recruit other children, for logistics activities, and for running drug 
business. 1046  NSAG also used recruited children, particularly girls, for sexual 
purposes.1047 Thirdly, at least between 2009 and 2012, there was a pattern of threats of 
military recruitment and use towards children by FARC-EP, ELN and post-
demobilisation groups.1048 Afro-Colombian and indigenous children were particularly 
affected by all grave violations reported on by the UN Secretary General on Children 
and Armed Conflict, which includes the military recruitment of children, with 
recruitment by FARC-EP and ELN mostly affecting these communities in rural 
areas.1049 Conversely, ‘post-demobilization groups and other local armed groups 
frequently recruited and used children in marginalized urban areas’.1050 In is not clear 
how many new cases of recruitment there were each year, but the table clearly 
indicates the prevalence of the military recruitment and use of children within 
Colombia between 2009 and 2016, with such attacks decreasing in frequency from 
2015 onwards, in line with the adoption of the peace agreement. This emphasises the 
importance of peace for the protection of education from deliberate and direct attack. 
On February 8, 2011, in the village of Concha Medio, Anorí, Antioquia, FARC-
EP had been occupying a school and carried out political propaganda and military 
training activities with the students. Some of these children were victims of 
																																																								
1046 UNHCHR Colombia 2010, 27; SGCAC 2010, at [127]; SGCAC 2011, at [154-155, 157]; SGCAC 
Colombia 2012, at [19]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 20, 54, 124, 128; SGCAC 2015, 
at [221]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [26]; Hurtado, Dosdad & Hernández (n1048), 945 
1047 UNHCHR Colombia 2010, 25; SGCAC 2010, at [127]; SGCAC 2011, at [160]; SGCAC Colombia 
2012, at [132]; CRC Concluding Observations Colombia 2015, at [65(c)]; SGCAC 2013, at [176]; 
SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [32]; Hurtado, Dosdad & Hernández (n1048), 945 
1048 UNHCHR Colombia 2010, at [69]; SGCAC 2010, at [127]; SGCAC 2011, at [154]; UNHCHR 
Colombia 2012, at [76-77, Appendix 1 10c, 11n, 13g]; SGCAC 2013, at [174] 
1049 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/COL/CO/14, 28 August 2009, 
at [14]; SGCAC 2010, at [127]; CRC Concluding observations Colombia 2010, at [19, 26, 30]; SGCAC 
2011, at [151]; SGCAC Colombia 2012, at [6, 14, 21, 32]; SGCAC 2012, at [127]; SGCAC 2013, at 
[179]; UPR Colombia 2016, at [80, 107]; SGCAC 2014, at [164]; CRC Concluding Observations 
Colombia 2015, at [57, 65]; SGCAC 2015, at [218]; SGCAC 2016, at [183]; SGCAC Colombia 2016, 
at [9, 19]; UNHRC Colombia 2016, at [40] 
1050 SGCAC Colombia 2016, at [19]; CRC Concluding Observations Colombia 2015, at [65]; 
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recruitment.1051 The differences between IHL and IHRL on the recruitment and use of 
children make the law complex.1052 However, the argument of Murray is reiterated, 
namely, in respect of the protection of civilians, IHRL significantly expands on 
IHL.1053 Therefore, while IHL protects children under the age of 15 from military 
recruitment or use in States’ armed forces, States Parties to the OPCRC ‘must raise 
the age of recruitment to a minimum of 16, taking into account the special protections 
extended to persons under the age of 18, must raise the conscription age to 18, and 
must take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who 
have not reached the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities’.1054 
 
Additionally, in respect of the States IHRL obligations when faced with the issue 
of military recruitment of children by NSAG, Article 4 of the OPCRC places 
obligations on the State to prevent the recruitment and use of children under the age of 
18 years by NSAG.1055 This is a highly important provision for the protection of 
children in NIAC where the military recruitment and use of children by NSAG is 
widespread, and it should influence the interpretation of the IHL obligations as such. 
However, the OPCRC is criticised as imposing a double standard, in that the standard 
expected from NSAG under Article 4 is much higher than that expected of States, as 
the OPCRC permits the voluntary recruitment of those under the age of eighteen. This 
weakness could significantly undermine the OPCRC. Protecting Children 
recommends that States should be encouraged to adopt the higher standard attributed 
to NSAG, and that international law could be developed by heightening the standards 
																																																								1051	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	Report	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	
Rights	on	the	situation	of	human	rights	in	Colombia,	A/HRC/19/21/Add.3,	21	January	2012,	27.	1052	Ibid,	at	[4.117,	9.12.5]	1053	Murray, Guide, (n12), at [9.02]	1054	Murray, Guide, (n12), at [9.52]	
1055 OPCRC, Art 4 
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for States to match those for NSAG.1056 States and NSAG should be encouraged to 
uphold the higher standard. However, where the double standard would result in them 
disregarding IHRL entirely, they should be encouraged to uphold, at least, the same 
standard as States. This is an inconsistency that requires urgent attention. IHRL, 
nonetheless, imposes a higher obligation on States than IHL and offers increased 
protection in a NIAC.  
4.4.The Democratic Republic of Congo 
4.4.1. The Context 
The UN has referred to a state of armed conflict in the DRC between 2009 and 
2016.1057 The DRC has experienced a range of IAC and NIAC since 1993, with a 
multitude of NSAG involved.1058 However, the armed conflict during the period 
between 2009 and 2016 was between the DRC and a wide range of NSAG operating 
within the territory of the DRC, as such this armed conflict is a NIAC. 
Armed conflict emerged in the eastern province of North Kivu in 1993 due to 
disputes over land use and ownership between different ethnic communities, 
exacerbated in 1994 by a flood of refugees following the Rwandan genocide.1059 
Among the refugees were members who had played a pivotal role in the Rwandan 
genocide.1060 There were direct interventions by Rwanda and Uganda, justified on the 
																																																								1056		Ibid,	at	[9.13.8]	
1057 UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ‘Countries Where Children are Affected 
by Armed Conflict’ <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries-caac/> accessed 13 April 2018. 
The reports of the UN Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict present ‘information about 
grave violations committed against children in 20 conflict situations’, including the DRC. See United 
Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/369, 9 July 2010, at [1] (SGCAC DRC 2010); SGCAC 
2011, at [90] SGCAC 2013, at [56]; SGCAC 2014, at [58]; United Nations Security Council, Report of 
the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
S/2014/453, 30 June 2014, Summary (SGCAC DRC 2014); SGCAC 2015 
1058 For the purpose of maintaining focus, only the conflict between 2009 and 2016 will be examined, 
and only the NSAG relevant for the purpose of this chapter will be discussed. 
1059 Louise Arimatsu, ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo 1993-2010’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012), 148-149 
1060 Ibid, 149 
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grounds of national security.1061 In 1997, President Mobutu fled, and on the same day 
Laurent Kabila proclaimed himself to be president.1062 The country was renamed from 
Zaire to the DRC,1063 and the east of the DRC remained volatile.1064 In 1999, the 
Lusaka ceasefire agreement was entered into, and the UN Security Council 
established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,1065 a ‘peace-keeping’ military force with a mandate to monitor the cessation of 
hostilities and use force in self-defence to protect civilians.1066 However, serious 
fighting continued and President Kabila was assassinated in 2001. His son, Joseph 
Kabila, was sworn in as the new president.1067  
In 2002, Rwanda withdrew from the DRC, Uganda began to withdraw, and a 
transition government was established, but fighting continued in the east, and high 
levels of violence between NSAG were also documented in the Orientale and Katanga 
provinces, particularly in Ituri in the Orientale Province.1068 One of the groups 
operating in this region at the time was the Force de Résistance Oatriotique en 
Ituri. 1069 Soon after, the armed forces were renamed the Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo,1070 and individuals involved in the Rwandan 
genocide who fled into the DRC alongside Rwandan refugees regrouped to form the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.1071 Due to the failure of President 
Kabila in disarming FDLR insurgents, large-scale armed conflict affected the province 
																																																								
1061 Ibid, 157 
1062 Ibid, 159 
1063 MONUSCO, ‘Background’ at https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background (accessed 27 
February 2017) 
1064 Arimatsu (n1065), 67 
1065 MONUSCO (n1069) 
1066 Arimatsu (n1065), 170 
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1069 Ibid, 177; Hereinafter FRPI 
1070 Hereinafter FARDC 
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of North Kivu from the latter half of 2008 until early 2009.1072 Also, the Congrès 
national pour la défense du peuple was formed in 2007 in North Kivu, ostensibly to 
champion the rights of the Congolese Tutsi community, who extended their control 
over territory throughout 2007, stretching up the to the Congolese border with 
Uganda. By summer 2008 tensions escalated between the CNDP and FARDC.1073 In 
January 2009 CNDP issued a declaration announcing the end of hostilities between 
them and the FARDC, and an agreement was reached for the integration of CNDP 
forces into FARDC to combat the FDLR, which paved the way for the fast-track 
integration process of NSAG into FARDC, including Alliance des patriotes pour un 
Congo libre et souverain, 1074  Patriotes résistants congolais, 1075  and Mai-Mai 
groups.1076 On 23 March 2009, CNDP and other NSAG of North and South Kivu, 
except FDLR, signed a peace agreement. However, the APCLS denounced 
‘preferential treatment’ of CNDP and the PARECO during the integration process.1077 
Similarly, at the end of June 2009, the PARECO leader rejected the integration 
process, claiming that it provided preferential treatment of CNDP.1078 Additionally, 
CNDP appeared to have maintained a parallel chain of military and political command 
within FARDC, and in late 2009, the desertion of several CNDP cadres from FARDC 
units in North Kivu were reported.1079 Additionally, the Lords Resistance Army began 
committing mass atrocities in Northern Congo in December 2008,1080 and continued 
to show a significant capacity to commit grave violations against local populations 
																																																								
1072 Ibid, 185 
1073 Ibid, 186 
1074 Hereinafter APCLS 
1075 Hereinafter PARECO 
1076 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [2-4]; Arimatsu (n1065), 187; SGCAC DRC 2014, at [8] 
1077 Hereinafter PARECO 
1078 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [2-5] 
1079 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [8-10]; SGCAC DRC 2014, at [8] 
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during the course of 2009.1081 As will be seen, the FRPI, FDLR, APCLS, PARECO, 
CNDP, Mai-Mai groups, and the LRA were among the NSAG responsible for attacks 
against education during the NIAC in the DRC between 2009 and 2016.  
As stated above, the DRC ratified the relevant IHRL and IHL instruments prior to 
2009, and no relevant reservations, derogations or limitations were made. Therefore 
the DRC, as the primary obligations holder, was bound by IHRL and IHL obligations 
between 2009 and 2016. The applicable IHL in a NIAC depends on whether the 
thresholds for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II are reached.1082 Arimatsu argues that as ‘both the CNDP and FDLR operated under 
a responsible command and each exercised control over a part of territory such as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement 
its terms’, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II applied to the conflicts 
involving these actors between 2003 and 2011.1083 She added that ‘the intensity of the 
fighting in many cases leaves little doubt that the armed encounters should have been 
governed by non-international conflict rules’.1084 Arimatsu is correct in respect of the 
CNDP and FDLR. It is clear that during the period between 2009 and 2011 that the 
low threshold of Common Article 3 is reached in respect of the CNDP and the FDLR. 
Additional Protocol II requires that parties to a NIAC operate under responsible 
command, and exercise control over part of territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol, which is 
established by Arimatsu in respect of the CNDP and the FDLR.1085 The additional 
requirement of intensity, as established by the ICTY, is also satisfied. However, it is 
also necessary to discuss developments since 2011 until 2016, and determine whether 																																																								
1081 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [8-10-14] 
1082 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the classification of NIAC. 
1083 Arimatsu (n1065), 189-190 
1084 Ibid, 190 
1085 Additional protocol II, Art 1(1) 
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both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II applies to the other relevant NSAG 
involved in the conflict in the DRC.   
Between 2009 and 2016, ethnic tensions continued to be an issue,1086 as was the 
continued struggle for control over land and natural resources.1087 Despite a total of 
12,074 armed group elements being integrated into the FARDC during the fast-track 
integration process of 2009, the humanitarian situation deteriorated as a result of 
military operations and human rights violations.1088 In the beginning of 2009, FARDC 
launched two simultaneous anti-FDLR military operations in the Kivu provinces, with 
MONUC providing logistical support. However, one operation lasting for 10 months 
proved to be hugely contentious with atrocities committed by both the FDLR and 
FARDC.1089 Continued MONUC support was conditioned on FARDC respect for 
international law, rising levels of violence against civilians, including by FARDC, 
were reported during a third military operation beginning in January 2010.1090 The 
DRC also launched military operations against the LRA in 2009,1091 but the security 
situation concerning this group deteriorated further in 2011. 1092  MONUC was 
renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in 2010.1093  MONUSCO was authorised to use all necessary 
means to carry out its mandate relating to the protection of civilians, humanitarian 
personnel and human rights defenders and to support the Government of the DRC in 
its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts.1094 Arimatsu correctly argues that 
even if MONUC and MONUSCO were parties to the conflicts, ‘there is no question 																																																								
1086 Arimatsu (n1065), 148-149, 185 
1087 Ibid, 148-149 
1088 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [8-10]; SGCAC DRC 2014, at [8] 
1089 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [2-4]; Arimatsu (n1065), 187 
1090 Arimatsu (n1065), 187-188 
1091 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [8-10-14] 
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that the conflicts remained non-international in character since all the military 
operations were conducted either with the support of the DRC or in close 
collaboration with the FARDC’.1095  
Between 2010 and 2013, the presence and activities of NSAG in eastern DRC 
remained a major source of insecurity and violence. Several NSAG remained active, 
including the LRA, FRPI, FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces,1096 and Mai Mai 
groups.1097 The UN reported that ‘the absence of State authority in conflict-affected 
areas and weak accountability and command and control of the national security 
forces contributed to an environment in which children were victims of grave 
violations’.1098 In January 2011 FARDC began to withdraw units from remote areas in 
the Kivu provinces, creating security voids and resulting in a further deterioration of 
the security situation. Taking advantage of this situation, the FDLR and Mai-Mai 
groups expanded their area of control, which in turn led to the mobilization of local 
self-defence militias such as Raia Mutomboki. 1099  In April 2012, there was a 
resurgence of conflict in the eastern DRC, as former CNDP and PARECO 
commanders defected from FARDC and created the Mouvement du 23 mars 
rebellion,1100 which resulted in security vacuums and the remobilization of NSAG, 
some in support of the Government and others in support of the rebellion. Between 
November and December 2012, M23 occupied the city of Goma, fighting erupted 
between two M23 factions, and in November 2013, FARDC, supported by 
MONUSCO, inflicted a military defeat on M23.1101 The Orientale Province was also 
affected by a deteriorating humanitarian crisis between 2010 and 2013, as the LRA 																																																								
1095 Arimatsu (n1065), 191-192 
1096 Hereinafter ADF 
1097 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [3-4] 
1098 Ibid, at [5] 
1099 Ibid, at [9] 
1100 Hereinafter M23 
1101 SGCAC 2013, at [56]; SGCAC DRC 2014, at [2, 11-13] 
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remained extremely active in 2010 and 2011, while between August 2011 and 
December 2013, LRA activities progressively decreased, Mai-Mai groups intensified 
their activities at the end of 2012 and throughout 2013.1102 The situation in the 
Katanga province remained relatively calm throughout 2010 and 2011, but attacks by 
FARDC and Mai-Mai groups continued in 2012 and 2013, with attacks my Mai Mai 
groups intensifying particularly in 2013.1103 In the northern part of North Kivu, the 
ADF intensified attacks on FARDC and the civilian population, prompting FARDC to 
respond with the support of MONUSCO in early 2014.1104 In 2014, the situation in 
eastern DRC remained volatile and witnessed major political and security 
developments, including a series of military operations against NSAG. 1105  The 
security situation in Ituri, North Kivu and Tanganyika remained volatile in 2015, 
marked by military operations by FARDC against the FDLR, the ADF, the FRPI, and 
other armed groups.1106 In 2016, the UN reported that the east of the country remained 
volatile and was marked by military operations by the FARDC against NSAG. The 
number of child casualties was also the highest recorded since 2012.1107 
The situation in the DRC between the DRC is clear an incredibly complex one, 
involving numerous NSAG. In terms of whether both Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II applied to hostilities between the DRC and the various armed 
groups, as established above, both were applicable to the CNDP prior to its 
demobilisation in 2009, and both were applicable to the FDLR between 2009 and 
2011, in light of the FDLR continued significant involvement in the NIAC and 
continued control of territory, both instruments apply to hostilities between FARDC 
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and the FDLR. In relation to the FRPI, in the case of Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the International Criminal Court held that they had a 
certain degree of organisation, acted under a responsible command, and had an 
operative internal disciplinary system, and had the capacity to plan and carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations as a result of control of parts of the 
territory of the Ituri District between 2002 and 2003.1108 As such, it is clear that both 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II applied to the NIAC between FARDC 
and the FRPI between 2002 and 2003. Again, in light of the continuous and 
significant armed activity of the FRPI between 2009 and 2016, and its control of 
territory, it is clear that this group remained bound by these instruments. As 
established above, the ADF, LRA and Mai-Mai groups also held control of territory 
and were significant actors in the NIAC, being able to carry out sustained and 
concerted armed activities, therefore, clearly operating under a responsible command, 
and both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. In regards to M23, it is clear 
that at least during its occupation of Goma that Additional Protocol II was applicable 
to armed activities between this group and FARDC, and in light of its clear ability to 
carry out sustained and concerted military activities during its entire existence, it is 
clear that both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II were applicable. In light 
of the above-mentioned NSAG level of organisation and territorial control, in addition 
to IHL obligations, they also have IHRL obligations, at least in relation to the 
obligation to respect.1109 As will be seen, additional NSAG were reported to have 
perpetrated attacks against education between 2009 and 2016, these groups include: 
Forces républicaines fédéralistes,1110 Forces populaires congolais-Armée Populaire, 
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who are ex-PARECO,1111 Union des patriotes congolais pour la paix,1112 and Nduma 
défense du Congo.1113 It was not possible to determine whether Additional Protocol II 
was applicable to them, and similarly whether they held IHRL obligations. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that at least Common Article 3 is applicable to their activities, 
as parties to the conflict. 
 
Fig. 7 Table showing the relevant NSAG party to the NIAC in the DRC and the 
years in which they were active between 2009 and 2016 
NSAG active in the NIAC Years active between 2009 and 2016 
CNDP 2009  
PARECO 2009  
FRPI 2009 - 2016 
FDLR 2009 - 2016 
LRA 2009 - 2016 
ADF 2009 - 2016 
Mai-Mai  2009 – 2016 
M23 2012 - 2013 
APCLS At least in 2009 and between 2013 and 
2014 
FRF At least in 2010 and 2011 
FPC/AP At least in 2013 
NDC/Cheka At least between 2013 and 2014 
UPCP At least between 2013 and 2014 
																																																								
1111 Hereinafter FPC-AP 
1112 Hereinafter UPCP 




4.4.2. Attacks on Educational Institutions 
Fig. 8 Table showing the number of, and description of, schools damaged or destroyed 
or looted between 2009 and 2016  
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attack 
2010 – 2013 1291114 The UN reported that between January 
2010 and December 2013 47 schools 
were destroyed and 82 were looted. 
 
2013 – 2017  Unknown The GCPEA reported that hundreds of 
schools were reportedly shelled, burned, 
and looted by NSAG.1115 
 
2009 811116 Between October 2008 and December 
2009, the UN reported 51 attacks against 
schools, though it is not clear how many 
of these attacks occurred in 2008.  
 
2010 141117 At least 14 schools were reported by the 
UN to be destroyed or looted.  
 
2011 531118 The UN reported 53 attacks against 
schools and health centres, though it is 
not clear how many of these attacks were 
against schools rather than health centres. 
 
2012 181119-6001120 The UN documented 18 attacks against 
schools. However, the GCPEA reported 
that, according to local protection 
monitors, the number of attacks increased 
significantly, as there were at least 561 
incidents of looting and damage, 
affecting 548 primary schools and 13 
secondary schools. UNICEF similarly 
reported that the total number of schools 																																																								
1114 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [47] 
1115 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 112 
1116 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [42]  
1117 SGCAC 2011, at [89] 
1118 SGCAC 2012, at [37] 
1119 SGCAC 2013, at [62] 
1120 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n102), 132; UNICEF (n1126) 
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affected by conflict in 2012 was over 
600, and that families and NSAG 
occupied or looted some 250 additional 
schools. It is not clear how many of these 
attacks were carried out by NSAG, or 
how many relate to looting rather than the 
sole military use of the school. 
 
2013 951121-1331122 In 2013, the United Nations verified 95 
attacks on schools. The GCPEA reported 
that ‘as of March 2013, the Education 
Cluster had received 133 reports of 
schools affected by looting and damage’. 
  
2014 221123 The UN reported that 22 schools were 
attacked. 
 
2015 221124 The UN verified 22 attacks on schools. 
 
2016 511125-2431126 A total of 51 attacks on schools were 
verified by the UN, and there were further 
allegations of a high number of attacks on 
schools. Amnesty International reported 
that in 2016, according to local chiefs and 
civil society organizations, over 150 
schools were burned down. 1127  The 
GCPEA reported that there were at least 
639 verified and unverified attacks on 
schools in 2016 and 2017, at least 396 of 
which were verified by the UN to have 
occurred in 2017, and also that 
‘approximately 87 schools were attacked, 
set on fire, or looted in Kasai-Central by 
either the FARDC or militias between 
August and December 2016’ alone. 
 
 
Two patterns and trends can be identified in respect of attacks against educational 
institutions between 2009 and 2016 in the DRC. Firstly, at least between 2009 and 
																																																								
1121 SGCAC 2014, at [65] 
1122 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 132 
1123 SGCAC 2015, at [63]. 
1124 SGCAC 2016, at [49]. 
1125 SGCAC 2017, at [67] 
1126 GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 112-113 
1127 Amnesty International, ‘World Report 2016/2017’ at 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1048002017ENGLISH.PDF>, 140  
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2011, in 2013, and in 2016, educational institutions were destroyed, damaged, 
subjected to arson attacks and looted by FARDC.1128 Secondly, between 2009 and 
2016, schools were often destroyed or damaged, subjected to arson attacks and looted 
by NSAG. Such attacks were attributed mainly to FDLR, FRPI, Mai-Mai groups, and 
the ADF throughout this period, but also to LRA in 2009 and 2012, to PARECO and 
the FRF in 2010, while in 2012-2013 attacks were attributed to the M23 and the NDC, 
in 2014 to the UPCU, and between 2015 and 2016, to self-defence groups.1129 This 
indicates that deliberate and direct attacks against educational institutions were a 






1128 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [44-45]; SGCAC 2011, at [89]; CRC Concluding Observations DRC 2012, 
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Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 132; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 112 
1129 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UN Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner, Summary of fact finding missions on alleged human rights violations 
committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in 
Orientale province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2009, at [3]; SGCAC DRC 2010, 
at [43-45]; SGCAC 2011, at [89]; CRC Concluding Observations DRC 2012, at [32]; SGCAC 2012, at 
[37]; UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of children and armed conflict affected 
by the Lord’s Resistance Army, S/2012/365, 25 May 2012, at [37]; UNICEF, ‘Over 600 schools looted 
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in and around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012, May 2013, at 
[31] (MONUSCO UNHCHR joint report); Save the Children, Attacks on Education: The impact of 
conflict and grave violations on children’s futures (Save the Children 2013), 13; SGCAC 2014, at [65]; 
SGCAC DRC 2014, at [47-48]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 21, 57, 132-133; 
SGCAC 2015, at [63]; HRW, '“Our School Became the Battlefield”: Using Schools for Child 
Recruitment and Military Purposes in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo', October 2015, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/27/our-school-became-battlefield/using-schools-child-recruitment-
and-military, 25, 51; SGCAC 2016, at [49]; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, CRC/C/COD/CO/3-5, 28 February 2017, at [39(f)] (CRC Concluding Observations DRC 
2017); SGCAC 2017, at [67]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 112-114 
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Fig. 8 Table showing the number of, and description of, schools used for military 
purposes in the DRC between 2009 and 2016  
 
Year of attacks Number of attacks Description of attack 
2010 – 2013 511130 Between January 2010 and December 
2013, the UN verified the use of 51 
schools for military purposes. 
2010 71131 The UN reported 7 cases of military use 
of schools and hospitals, though it is not 
clear how many were schools or who 
used the schools. 
2011 21132 The UN reported 2 cases of military use 
of schools in 2011. 
2012 121133-421134 The UN reported the military use of 12 
schools in 2012. The UN also reported 
that from 20 November 2012 to at least 
24 December 2012, FARDC reportedly 
occupied 42 primary and secondary 
schools. 
2013 251135 The UN reported 25 incidents of military 
use of schools. 
2014 121136 12 schools were reported by the UN to 
have been used for military purposes. 
2015 301137 The UN reported that 30 schools were 
used for military purposes. 
2016 191138 The UN reported that a total of 19 
schools were used for military purposes. 
 
Two patterns and trends can be identified in respect of the military use of 
educational institutions between 2009 and 2016 in the DRC. Firstly, at least between 
2011 and 2016, educational institutions were used for military purposes by FARDC, 
which has resulted in the destruction or damage to schools as a result of fighting 
																																																								
1130 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [47] 
1131 SGCAC 2011, at [89] 
1132 SGCAC 2012, at [37] 
1133 SGCAC 2013, at [62] 
1134 MONUSCO UNHCHR joint report, at [24] 
1135 SGCAC 2014, at [65] 
1136 SGCAC 2015, at [63] 
1137 SGCAC 2016, at [50] 
1138 SGCAC 2017, at [68] 
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NSAG, or because of arson and looting.1139 Secondly, at least between 2012 and 2016 
NSAG have also used of educational institutions for military purposes, with such 
attacks attributed to the FDLR, Mai Mai groups, and M23, and which often resulted in 
the destruction or damage of schools as a result of arson and looting.1140 This indicates 
that the issue of military use of schools was a problem in the DRC at least between 
2010 and 2016, with a general trend of such attacks increasing per year until 2015. 
Three schools in the locality of Ntoto, Walikale territory in North Kivu, were 
attacked and looted twice in July 2009 and again on 4 September 2009, allegedly 
perpetrated by a battalion of the FARDC 212th Integrated Brigade temporarily 
deployed. Teachers and students reported that schoolbooks and stationery were looted, 
and that blackboards and desks were burned.1141 The situation is clearly one that 
relates to targeting, as it involves the State armed forces in the DRC attacking schools 
outside of the context of normal law enforcement, but rather in the context of military 
deployment. As such the active hostilities approach should be applied, requiring that 
IHL be considered as the primary framework, and IHRL as the secondary framework. 
The provisions relevant to this situation are complementary in their approach, 
however, as the applicable IHL rules are of a customary nature, the role that IHRL 
plays in informing the regulation of the situation is significantly greater. This is 
significant as IHRL provides a stronger level of protection in this situation. 
																																																								
1139 SGCAC 2012, at [37]; SGCAC 2013, at [62]; MONUSCO UNHCHR joint report, at [24]; GCPEA, 
Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 132-133; SGCAC 2014, at [65]; SGCAC 2015, at [63]; HRW 
(n1121), 67-69, 71, 86, 88, 94; SGCAC 2016, at [50]; Amnesty International (n1135), 141; SGCAC 
2017, at [68]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 115 
1140 SGCAC 2013, at [62]; SGCAC 2014, at [65]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 132-
133; SGCAC 2015, at [63]; HRW, 'When Schools Become Barracks, Children Suffer', 29 October 
2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/29/when-schools-become-barracks-children-suffer>; HRW 
(n1121), 27-31, 85, 87; SGCAC 2016, at [50]; Amnesty International (n1135), 141; CRC Concluding 
Observations DRC 2017, at [39(f)]; SGCAC 2017, at [68]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 
(n13), 115 
1141 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/369, 9 July 2010, at [45] 
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As the arson and looting was carried out by the State armed forces, one can 
examine the manner in which the principle of distinction protects educational 
institutions from attack in a NIAC. Article 13 of Additional Protocol II sets out the 
principle of distinction, but it does not explicitly prohibit the targeting of civilian 
objects.1142 It should first, therefore, be ascertained whether the three schools affected 
were civilian objects deserving of protection. A particular weakness of IHL is, 
however, that neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II explicitly applies 
the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives in 
NIAC.1143 This distinction has, nonetheless, been recognised as applicable in a NIAC 
in other IHL instruments.1144 Rule 7 of the ICRC study also provides that it is a matter 
of customary law for parties to an IAC and NIAC to ‘at all times distinguish between 
civilian objects and military objectives’ and to ensure that attacks are not ‘directed 
against civilian objects’.1145 Schools therefore benefit from the principle of distinction 
where they are not used for military purposes. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I 
is, according to Article 8 of the ICRC study, a rule of customary IHL, which provides 
that ‘military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action’ and ‘whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage’.1146  
While not entirely clear on the facts available, if on the one hand, the three schools 
were simply looted and subject to arson in an attack by FARDC and not used for 
military purposes, the looting and arson were prohibited by the principle of 																																																								
1142 Additional Protocol II, Art 13 
1143 Müller, The Relationship (n12), 56 
1144 ICRC CIHL Study 2005, Rule 7; See Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, Art 3(7); Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property, Art 6(a) 
1145 ICRC CIHL Study 2005, Rule 7 
1146 Additional Protocol I, Art 52(1-2)   
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distinction, as it should not have been subjected to attack. As the rules identified are of 
customary status and not treaty based, their applicability to NIAC could be disputed, 
though this is unlikely. As such, IHL would benefit from being developed to explicitly 
protect educational institutions from deliberate and direct attacks where they 
constitute civilian objects in a NIAC. Conversely, if the damage was caused to the 
school because FARDC were using it as a military base, this would cause the school 
to lose its protection as a civilian object, and it could legitimately be targeted by other 
parties to the NIAC. A significant problem with IHL is that despite this loss of 
protection, unlike with hospitals there is no prohibition on the military use of schools. 
The law should be developed in this regard.  
These obligations should be read in light of IHRL, with IHRL being interpreted in 
light of IHL, it being the secondary source. Article 13 of the ICESCR makes clear that 
each of the levels of education should be provided to all. It is not clear on the facts 
available what level of school was affected, however, if this concerned the right to 
primary education, education would be protected to a greater extent than secondary, 
higher and fundamental education. As the right to primary education forms part of the 
minimum core of the right it always remain fully applicable in a NIAC. The right to 
primary education is nonetheless progressively realisable in line with resources, as are 
the other levels of education. Again it is clear that the minimum core obligations 
approach serves a fundamental purpose in the context of NIAC. Although, while all 
the levels of education can be achieved progressively, reference to the tripartite 
typology makes clear that FARDC, where it is considered to have attacked a school 
rather than used it for military purposes, violated their immediate obligation to respect 
the availability, accessibility and acceptability of education, and as such, should have 
refrained from attacking the three schools. The looting and arson resulted in 
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significant damage to blackboards and desks were burned. This not only affects the 
availability of functioning educational institutions, it means the building may also be 
unsafe and inaccessible, while the lack and schoolbooks and stationery due to looting 
means that education was also not acceptable. In the context of the military use, IHRL 
must be interpreted in light of IHL, so the military use of schools should similarly be 
considered to be permitted in IHRL. However, IHRL can supplement IHL. Where it is 
considered necessary to use a school for military purposes. The State should be 
considered to have an obligation to fulfil the availability, accessibility, acceptability, 
and adaptability of education by ensuring alternative means of realising education are 
provided as appropriate, where possible. The fulfil criteria is progressively realisable, 
so a weakness of IHRL is that individuals may be left without an education for an 
extended period of time where schools are destroyed or used for military purposes. 
IHL is unable to fill this gap. If IHL were to be developed to better protect education 
from military use, IHRL could also be interpreted accordingly.  
4.4.3. Attacks on Students and Educational Personnel 
It was not possible to identify patterns and trends in respect of attacks against 
students and educational personnel between 2009 and 2016 in the DRC. However, 
students may have been deliberately and directly attacked between 2009 and 2016 as 
children were frequently killed and injured, though it is not clear from the evidence 








4.4.4. The Military Recruitment and Use of Children 
Fig. 11 Table showing the number of children recruited and used for military purposes 
in the DRC between 2009 and 2016  
 
Year of attacks 
 
Number of attacks Description of attack 
2010-2013 41941147 The UN documented 4194 cases, 
including 3,773 boys and 421 girls, of 
military recruitment, and approximately 
one third of the documented cases 
involved children under 15 years of age. 
2009 8481148-22801149 The UN reported that MONUC 
documented 848 newly recruited 
children, including 52 girls. At a later 
date, the UN reported 1235 cases, with 
attacks on schools corresponding with 
reports of child recruitment,1150 and later 
still, the UN reported 2280 new cases of 
recruitment in 2009. 
2010 4471151-11081152 The UN initially reported 447 cases of 
child recruitment, including 49 girls, and 
including recruitment from school, and 
later reported a total of 1108 new cases of 
recruitment, including 78 girls. 
2011 2721153-7671154 The UN initially reported 272 cases of 
recruitment and use of children, 259 boys 
and 13 girls, and later reported 767 cases, 
680 boys and 87 girls. 
2012 5781155-12961156 The UN initially reported that 578 
children, including 26 girls, were 
recruited, and later reported 1296 cases, 
1167 boys and 129 girls. 
2013 9101157-10231158 The UN initially documented the new 																																																								
1147 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [21-22] 
1148 SGCAC 2010, at [69] 
1149 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [23] 
1150 SGCAC DRC 2010, at [17, 42] 
1151 SGCAC 2011, at [85] 
1152 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [33] 
1153 SGCAC 2012, at [34] 
1154 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [23] 
1155 SGCAC 2013, at [57] 
1156 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [23] 
1157 SGCAC 2014, at [59] 
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recruitment and use of 910 children, 783 
boys and 127 girls, and later documented 
1023 cases, 896 boys and 127 girls. 
2014 2411159 The UN documented 241 new cases of 
recruitment, 223 boys, 18 girls, though 
the total figure is likely higher as it was 
acknowledged that a large backlog of 
children separated was still under 
verification. 
2015 4881160 In 2015, the UN verified the new 
recruitment of 488 children, including 26 
girls. 
2016 4921161 The UN verified the new recruitment and 
use of 492 children, including 63 girls, in 
2016, and 129 of those children were 
under fifteen at the time of recruitment. 
 
Three patterns and trends in respect of the military recruitment of children can be 
identified between 2009 and 2016 in the DRC. Firstly, between 2009 and 2016, 
members of FARDC have recruited and used children for military purposes, including 
from schools.1162 Secondly, NSAG have recruited children, including those under the 
age of 15, and including while they were in school or as they travelled to or from 
school, between 2009 and 2016. Such attacks were attributed mainly to FDLR, Mai-
Mai groups, FRPI, the LRA, and ADF throughout this period, but also to CNDP in 
2009 and ex-CNDP elements in 2010, to PARECO, and FRF between 2009 and 2011, 
to M23 in 2012 and 2013, and to UPCLS, NDC/Chaka, UPCP, and the FPC/AP 
																																																																																																																																																															
1158 SGCAC DRC 2014, at [23] 
1159 SGCAC 2015, at [59] 
1160 SGCAC 2016, at [45] 
1161 SGCAC 2017, at [63] 
1162 CESCR, Concluding observations DRC, at [27]; United nations Human Rights Council, Second 
joint report of seven United Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
A/HRC/13/63, 8 March 2010, at [Summary, 4, 36, 71] (UNHCR Second joint report DRC 2010); 
SGCAC 2010, 13 April 2010, at [69-70]; SGCAC DRC 2010, at [17]; United Nations Human Rights 
Council, Third Joint Report of Seven United Nations Experts on the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, A/HRC/16/68, 9 March 2011, at [10]; SGCAC 2011, at [85]; SGCAC 2012, at 
[34]; SGCAC 2013, at [57-58]; SGCAC 2014, at [60]; SGCAC DRC 2014, at [29-30]; United Nations 
General Assembly, Report of the Working Groups on the Universal Periodic Review: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, A/HRC/27/5, 7 July 2014, at [15, 52, 57, 115]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 
2014 (n12), 133; SGCAC 2015, at [59]; U SGCAC 2016, at [45]; CRC Concluding Observations DRC 
2017, at [47]; SGCAC 2017, at [64] 
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between 2013 and 2014.1163 Children were used in military operations as combatants, 
they were used as informants, as escorts of commanders, cooks and porters, and for 
forced labour.1164 Children, mainly girls, were also used for sexual purposes.1165 This 
indicates that the military recruitment and use of children between 2009 and 2016 was 
widespread within the DRC, with recruitment and use being a particular problem 
between 2009 and 2013, and while dropping in frequency between 2014 and 2016, 
there was an upward trend in the frequency of such attacks between 2014 and 2016.  Near	Kingi,	Masisi	territory,	on	April	19,	2012,	M23	forces	rounded	up	at	least	32	male	 students	 at	Mapendano	 secondary	 school	 in	North	Kivu.	 It	was	one	of	their	 methods	 of	 forcibly	 recruiting	 school	 students	 when	 villagers	 refused	 to	hand	 over	 their	 sons.	1166	To	 avoid	 repetition,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 too	 state	 that	 this	
																																																								
1163 CESCR, Concluding observations DRC, at [27]; UNHCR Second joint report DRC 2010, at [36, 
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joint report, at [32-33]; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights and the activities of her Office in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, A/HRC/24/33, 12 July 2013, 2; SGCAC 2014, at [59, 66]; SGCAC 
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UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Report of the UN Joint Human Rights Office on 
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April 2012 – November 2013, October 2014, at [32]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2014 (n12), 20, 
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Humanitarian Law Violations Committed by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Combatants in the 
Territory of Beni, North Kivu Province, Between 1 October and 31 December 2014, May 2015, at [2, 
50-53]; SGCAC 2015, at [59, 64]; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights and the Activities of the United 
Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo, A/HRC/30/32, 27 July 2015, 
at [48]; HRW (n1121), 17, 18, 21-22, 31; SGCAC 2016, at [45]; CRC Concluding Observations DRC 
2017, at [17(a), 39(f), 47]; SGCAC 2017, at [63, 69]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 
116 
1164 UNHCR Second joint report DRC 2010, at [37]; SGCAC 2011, at [85]; SGCAC 2012, at [34, 62]; 
SGCAC 2013, at [57-59]; SGCAC 2014, at [59-60, 66]; SGCAC 2015, at [59, 64]; SGCAC 2016, at 
[45, 51] 
1165 SGCAC 2010, at [74]; SGCAC 2012, at [62]; SGCAC 2014, at [59-60, 66]; GCPEA, Education 
under Attack: 2014 (n12), 133; SGCAC 2015, at [59, 64]; SGCAC 2016, at [45, 51]; SGCAC 2017, at 
[63, 69]; GCPEA, Education under Attack: 2018 (n13), 116-117 1166	HRW,	'“Our	School	Became	the	Battlefield”:	Using	Schools	for	Child	Recruitment	and	Military	Purposes	in	Eastern	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo',	October	2015,	https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/27/our-school-became-battlefield/using-schools-child-recruitment-and-military,	18	
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issue	would	be	regulated	in	the	same	manner	as	described	in	respect	of	Colombia	above,	with	 the	 same	 issues	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 gaps	 and	weaknesses	 in	 need	 of	addressing.	This	evidences	that	the	problem	with	the	gaps	identified	in	respect	to	Colombia	 are	 not	 specific	 to	 Colombia	 but	 also	 to	 other	 contexts.	 As	 such,	 the	State	would	nonetheless	be	 required	 to	prevent	 the	 recruitment	of	 children	by	NSAG,	regardless	as	to	whether	the	recruitment	was	forcible	or	not.	
4.5. Conclusion 
Overall, it is clear that the current state of IHRL and IHL is inadequate as it fails 
to properly protect education in practice. The use of two case studies was useful in 
this sense, as weaknesses show even when the contexts and nuances of a conflict are 
taken into account. Applying IHRL and IHL to the issue of deliberate and direct 
attacks against education in practice highlights the insufficiencies of international law. 
While IHRL may be used to fill in the gaps in protection in IHL, and IHL can be used 















5.1. Are the Current Legal Provisions Concerning Education within 
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian law 
Effective?  
 The central research question of this thesis was answered from a working 
hypothesis that education is inadequately provided for within IHRL and IHL, as a 
result of gaps and inconsistencies within the two regimes which impact the realisation 
of the right to education in practice. As such, Chapters One to Three were approached 
with a view to exposing such gaps and inconsistencies, and Chapter Four applied 
IHRL and IHL simultaneously to the conflicts in Colombia and the DRC in order to 
determine whether the IHRL was capable of filling in the gaps and inconsistencies 
within IHL, and vice versa.  
Chapter One examined the protection of education during a NIAC within IHRL. 
While the nature and scope of the normative content of the right to education is 
generally clear, albeit broad, some aspects would benefit from being developed or 
clarified. There is a well-established principle of non-discrimination within IHRL, 
which is clear in scope; everyone has a right to non-discrimination in education. 
While Article 2(2) of the ICESCR does not as exhaustively set out the grounds for 
discrimination as other IHRL instruments, this is not a gap or an ambiguity. The term 
‘other status’ within Article 2(2) is, in and of itself, broad and all encompassing 
enough to ensure that an individual is prevented from accessing their right to 
education on additional grounds not explicitly mentioned within the ICESCR. Other 
IHRL instruments, nonetheless, inform the understanding of who can be discriminated 
against under the term ‘other status’ within the ICESCR, such as those individuals 
discriminated against due to their economic condition, ethnic origin, or disability. 
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Other IHRL instruments also inform the understanding within the ICESCR as to how 
individuals can be discriminated against in the provision of education. As the 
prohibition against discrimination forms part of the minimum core of the right to 
education, the protection against discrimination in the provision of the right to 
education is strong, as in the context of a NIAC, minimum core cannot be restricted in 
their applicability through reservation, derogation or limitation. Similarly, while the 
ICESCR does not sufficiently set out the aims and objectives of education, this 
apparent weakness is overcome by considering the ICESCR alongside other 
applicable IHRL instruments that elaborate on what the aims and objectives of 
education should be. Again, as the aims and objectives of the right to education form 
part of the minimum core, they remain applicable in a NIAC, and are instrumental to 
ensuring that education has a peace-building function in such a situation. 
Article 13 of the ICESCR sets out broad rules in respect of the various levels of 
education and the corresponding obligations of States. The obligation to make primary 
education free and compulsory is clearly set out, and the manner in which it is 
provided for is particularly strong. Such protection continues in the context of NIAC, 
in light of the fact that the provision of free and compulsory primary education, 
progressively if necessary, is a minimum core obligation. While the other levels of 
education are not stated as explicitly forming part of the minimum core, there is 
nonetheless a minimum core obligation to adopt and implement a national educational 
strategy in respect of these levels of education. In respect of secondary education, 
while the obligations of States are clear, unlike primary education, there is no legal 
obligation to make secondary education compulsory, despite the importance of this 
level of education for the individual and society. Similarly, while the provision for 
higher education is clear, the ‘capacity’ criterion is problematic in the context of a 
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NIAC, as a NIAC may affect the primary and secondary education of individuals, 
which will have a knock on effect on the capacity. The provision of fundamental 
education is similarly important in the context of a NIAC, as a NIAC may deprive an 
individual of the right to primary education. However, there is a gap in the ICESCR as 
it does not contain a requirement to make fundamental education progressively free. It 
is also unclear whether, in light of the importance of primary education, the realisation 
of free fundamental education should be prioritised over secondary and higher 
education. The 4-A framework is also particularly helpful in determining how each 
level of education should apply in the context of a NIAC.  
In relation to the IHRL obligations of States, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR is weak. 
The meaning of progressive realisation is sufficiently clear, in practice, however, 
compliance with this principle is difficult to measure from an academic perspective, as 
it requires substantial access to information that is often not available. Issues arise, in 
particular, when determining whether the maximum available resources and means 
were utilised by States. While it is now clearer what resources and means are to be 
used, and there is guidance as to how they should be allocated, determining whether 
this has been done to the ‘maximum’ is a subjective and complex decision. Also, 
while it is clear that there is a legal obligation for States to seek international 
assistance and cooperation where they cannot realise the right to education 
themselves, whether, and the extent to which, those States in a position to assist and 
cooperate have a moral or legal obligation to do so is also uncertain.  
As to the obligations provided for within the General Comments of the CESCR, 
The minimum core obligations approach, while controversial, should not be 
abandoned. Although, we should abandon the rhetoric that minimum core obligations 
are immediate. Minimum core obligations remain useful when understood, as 
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advanced in this chapter, to correlate to content that is either immediate or progressive 
in nature depending on the element of the right in question. Minimum core obligations 
are also particularly useful in situations of NIAC in the context of deliberate and 
direct attacks, in light of the fact that they cannot be subject to reservation, derogation 
or limitation. The tripartite obligations are less controversial, and also constitute 
useful tools for the realisation of education during a NIAC. They are broad, although 
clear in their application, particularly when considered alongside the 4-A framework. 
While the CRC and the OPCRC more appropriately regulate the use of child 
soldiers, there are numerous inadequacies in the manner in which they do. Firstly, the 
CRC only protects those under the age of 15, and while the OPCRC closes this gap in 
protection by protecting those under the age of 18, the OPCRC instrument would 
benefit from wider ratification so as to ensure that all States adhere to the same higher 
standard. Secondly, there is no absolute obligation on States to prevent the 
involvement of children in hostilities, those below the age of 18 can voluntarily enlist, 
and while Article 4 refers to NSAG, this is framed as a moral, not a legal obligation. 
Thirdly, and most significantly, the OPCRC imposes a double standard, in that the 
standard expected from NSAG under Article 4 is much higher than that expected of 
States, undermining the OPCRC. 
Chapter Two examines the protection of education within IHL in the context of a 
NIAC. There are various gaps and ambiguities within IHL that may impact the 
protection of education in practice. The first thing to note is that while the Geneva 
Conventions benefit from universal ratification, a weakness of IHL is that the 
Additional Protocols, particularly Additional Protocol II, could benefit from further 
ratification, to ensure consistency in the application of IHL rules. Another issue is that 
it is clear that educational institutions, staff and students are granted a lower level of 
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protection during NIAC in comparison to an IAC. There are far fewer provisions 
applicable during situations of NIAC. Customary IHL is, however, capable of filling 
in some of the gaps in protection left by the lack of applicable treaty law in a NIAC. 
The ICRC study is an excellent starting point for determining the applicable 
customary IHL in a NIAC, but it should be noted that the methodology of the study 
has been subject to criticism, and should be used with caution. The possible 
application of customary rules to NIAC is significant because there is more treaty law, 
with more detailed provisions, on IAC, accepted by a greater range of States, while for 
a NIAC, there is fewer and less detailed treaty law, with more limited participation.  
Despite the significance of classifying a conflict as IAC or NIAC, making the 
distinction between them is often factually and politically difficult, particularly in the 
context of mixed conflicts. Though the gap between them has also narrowed with the 
adoption of a customary definition in Tadic. There has been renewed debate as to 
whether the division between IAC and NIAC continues to makes sense. Before a 
unified body of law is adopted, it would be necessary to determine the impact of a 
unified IHL in respect of all the areas of protection currently provided for within IHL. 
If, after this cost-benefit analysis, it is determined that the current protection afforded 
in IHL could not be maintained, rather than creating a unified body of law the solution 
could be to amend Additional Protocol II so that it regulates NIAC in a manner that 
better reflects customary law. This would allow IAC to benefit from the wider 
protection that it currently affords, while ensuring that the rules in a NIAC are 
strengthened. 
Few provisions explicitly protect education in either an IAC or NIAC, again with 
fewer provisions existing that explicitly protect education during NIAC. None 
explicitly prohibit deliberate and direct attacks against education. However, the 
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provision for care and aid is a significant protection for children in a NIAC. In light of 
the significance of this provision, the suggestion that consideration should also be 
given to whether children should be defined as including all person aged 18 and 
under, is reiterated and supported.1167 The principles of distinction, military necessity 
and proportionality are also broad enough to protect education in relation to deliberate 
and direct attacks. However, determining whether an attack is proportionate is 
complex, decisions have to be made in good faith on the basis of the information that 
was available at the time.  
In relation to the principle of distinction, the concept is regulated to a much greater 
extent in an IAC. The protection granted through the principle of distinction depends 
upon whether someone or something comes within the definition of civilian, civilian 
population or civilian object respectively, but there is a lack of authoritative guidance 
on when a person is a civilian entitled to protection from attack, or taking a direct part 
in hostilities and liable to targeting, and the suggestion of a revolving door of 
protection is subject to criticism. A particular weakness of IHL is that only protects 
those under the age of 15 from military recruitment and use. As to a civilian object, 
again the protection granted in a NIAC is weaker still, as no provisions explicitly 
prohibit attacks against civilian objects, though this is said to apply a matter of 
customary law. The greatest weakness in the protection of education within IHL is 
that educational institutions are not given special protection in respect of a prohibition 
on their military use. They would also benefit from distinctive emblems. In light of 
the fact that educational institutions lack special protection, the presumption of being 




Chapter three dealt with the more debated and difficult question as to the manner 
in which IHRL and IHL applies in armed conflict simultaneously. There is currently a 
lack of clarity as to how to regulate the simultaneous application of IHRL and IHL. 
While the ICJ attempted to provide guidance on this matter, the lack of clarity in its 
effort resulted in many conflicting interpretations. The implication of this is that the 
application of relevant legal norms may vary in practice depending on the approach 
adopted, resulting in the inconsistent and therefore inadequate realisation of the right 
to education during NIAC. 
It is clear that the humanisation approach, like the traditional approach, is no 
longer an accepted interpretation of the relationship between the two regimes. It is 
also clear that the complementarity approach is insufficient on its own, as this 
approach fails to take into account that genuine conflicts between IHRL and IHL may 
occur. As such, the complementarity approach remains relevant, but recourse to a 
further approach is needed to explain how to resolve such conflicts.  
The lex specialis is often argued to be the prevailing approach that appropriately 
regulates the relationship, particularly when understood with the ‘specificity’ context. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the application of the lex specialis principle 
is still controversial, as there is no clear consensus as to the manner in which one 
determines which rule is special and which is general. I further argue it is not always 
possible to determine which rule is special and which is general, as will be seen in the 
case study. A further, and significant, problem with the lex specialis approach is that it 
is difficult for those on the ground, in the absence of matrices that determine which 
rule is the special rule, to apply the law in practice. These difficulties are overcome 
with the ‘active hostilities/security operations’ approach, which I advance as the best 
approach to regulation the relationship between IHRL and IHL in practice, one 
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regime, to varying degrees depending on the context, works as the primary 
framework, with the other being taken into account as the secondary framework. This 
not only simplifies the relationship, making the law more easily applicable in practice, 
it also appropriately balances the regimes and makes clear that neither regime is 
undermined because both remain applicable and neither is displaced. This approach 
also clarifies the relationship in respect of conflicts between treaty and customary 
rules. 
 The final approach examined in this chapter is the unified approach, and while not 
a feasible approach presently, this is certainly a possibility in the future, and is one 
that should be pursued. If the unified approach were to be pursued, it would need to be 
done with considerable care so that the two regimes are consolidated in way that 
delicately balance the needs of both. It is correct that the suggested obstacles to such 
an approach are surmountable. 
Chapter Four of this thesis examined the adequacy of IHRL and IHL when applied 
simultaneously in practice to the issue of deliberate and direct attacks against 
education in the States of Colombia and the DRC. This chapter highlights the gaps 
and weaknesses highlighted in the earlier chapters, and makes clear that the current 
state of IHRL and IHL is inadequate as it fails to properly provide for education in 
practice. While IHRL can be used to fill in some of the gaps in IHL, and vice versa, 
gaps remain.  
5.2. Recommendations 
The recommendation contained in Protecting Children is reiterated, namely that 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and the OPCRC be subject to 
greater ratification, and that the Special Representative for Children and Armed 
Conflict could assist in raising awareness and securing greater ratification of such 
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instruments.1168 Wider ratification is necessary as these are essential instruments for 
the protection of education from deliberate and direct attacks in a NIAC. It is clear 
that the biggest problem permeating IHRL and IHL is ambiguity, there are also some 
gaps in protection that need rectifying. Both areas of law can be reformed to better 
provide for education in the context of deliberate and direct attacks during NIAC in 
respect of the gaps or ambiguities outlined above.  
5.3. Scope for further research 
There are avenues for further research. Firstly, the effectiveness of the manner in 
which international criminal law protects education in a NIAC in the context of 
deliberate and direct attacks can be examined. Secondly, there is scope for further 
research into the immediate and progressive nature of minimum core components of 
other ESCR. Thirdly, case studies involving IAC and mixed conflicts could be 
examined, or case studies analysing how effective IHRL and IHL are when, for 
example, Additional Protocol II has not been ratified by a State, and what the impact 
of this would be. Fourthly, the IHRL and IHL obligations of NSAG in respect of 
deliberate and direct attacks against education could be examined in the context of 
case studies. Fourthly, an examination of which rules of IHRL relevant to the 
protection of education form a part of customary law could be undertaken, alongside 
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